Bidder cost revelation in electric power auctions

Journal of Regulatory Economics, no. 1 (1994): 5-26

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Competitive auctions for electric power sources whose operation will be based upon economic dispatch raise new challenges for auction designers. The efficient selection and operation of such generation sources requires revelation of bidder types over two-dimensions, fixed and variable costs. The way in which fixed and variable prices are ...更多

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