Course Allocation By Proxy Auction
WINE'10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics(2010)
摘要
We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students' reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading manipulation observed in the course allocation mechanism currently used at Harvard Business School (HBS). The proxy bidding mechanism simplifes students' decisions by directly incorporating downgrading into the mechanism.Our proxy bidding mechanism is Pareto efficient with respect to lexicographic preferences and can be extended to allow for a more expressive preference language which allows complementarity, substitutability, and indifference. Simulations suggest that the proxy bidding mechanism is robust to the manipulations observed in the HBS mechanism and may yield welfare improvements.
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关键词
proxy bidding mechanism,HBS mechanism,course allocation mechanism,new proxy bidding mechanism,proxy bidding mechanism simplifes,specific strategic downgrading manipulation,Harvard Business School,expressive preference language,reported preference,welfare improvement,proxy auction
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