Probabilistically Checkable Proofs of Proximity with Zero-Knowledge
Lecture Notes in Computer Science(2017)
摘要
A probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) allows a randomized verifier, with oracle access to a purported proof, to probabilistically verify an input statement of the form "x is an element of L" by querying only few bits of the proof. A PCP of proximity (PCPP) has the additional feature of allowing the verifier to query only few bits of the input x, where if the input is accepted then the verifier is guaranteed that (with high probability) the input is close to some x' is an element of L. Motivated by their usefulness for sublinear-communication cryptography, we initiate the study of a natural zero-knowledge variant of PCPP (ZKPCPP), where the view of any verifier making a bounded number of queries can be efficiently simulated by making the same number of queries to the input oracle alone. This new notion provides a useful extension of the standard notion of zero-knowledge PCPs. We obtain two types of results. Constructions. We obtain the first constructions of query-efficient ZKPCPPs via a general transformation which combines standard query-efficient PCPPs with protocols for secure multiparty computation. As a byproduct, our construction provides a conceptually simpler alternative to a previous construction of honest-verifier zeroknowledge PCPs due to Dwork et al. (Crypto '92). Applications. We motivate the notion of ZKPCPPs by applying it towards sublinear-communication implementations of commitand- prove functionalities. Concretely, we present the first sublinearcommunication commit-and-prove protocols which make a black-box use of a collision-resistant hash function, and the first such multiparty protocols which offer information-theoretic security in the presence of an honest majority.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络