Game Analysis of Rural Land-Use Right Transfers with Government Regulations

In China, presently rural land-use right transfers are not smoothly executed because of several reasons, such as farmers' insufficient enthusiasm of supply, land contractors' high risk, price distortion, agency and risk prevention mechanism and so on. However, government regulations play a key role in rural land-use right transfers. In this paper, both the government and farmers' actions and strategies during rural land-use right transfers are analyzed in the sight of government regulations by use of the game theory with construction and analysis of a game-theoretic model of rural land-use right transfers between them. It believes that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will exist between the government and farmers during rural land-use right transfers and their strategies are interdependent. The government could greatly excite rural land-use right transfers, and the excitation effect depends upon support level, punishment level and probability of the government for rural land-use right transfers.