UNIVERSAL SECURITY FOR RANDOMNESS EXPANSION FROM THE SPOT-CHECKING PROTOCOL

Colbeck [Ph.D. thesis, 2006] proposed using Bell inequality violations to generate certified random numbers. While full quantum-security proofs have been given, it remains a major open problem to identify the broadest class of Bell inequalities and lowest performance requirements to achieve such security. In this paper, working within the broad class of spot-checking protocols, we prove exactly which Bell inequality violations can be used to achieve full security. Our result greatly improves the known noise tolerance for secure randomness expansion: for the commonly used CHSH game, full security was only known with a noise tolerance of 1.5% [Miller and Shi, T. ACM, 63 (2016), 33], and we improve this to 10.3%. We also generalize our results beyond Bell inequalities and give the first security proof for randomness expansion based on Kochen Specker inequalities. The central technical contribution of the paper is a new uncertainty principle for the Schatten norm, which is based on the uniform convexity inequality of Ball, Carlen, and Lieb [Invent. Math., 115 (1994), pp. 463-482].