The Exact Round Complexity Of Secure Computation

We revisit the exact round complexity of secure computation in the multi-party and two-party settings. For the special case of two-parties without a simultaneous message exchange channel, this question has been extensively studied and resolved. In particular, Katz and Ostrovsky (CRYPTO '04) proved that 5 rounds are necessary and sufficient for securely realizing every two-party functionality where both parties receive the output. However, the exact round complexity of general multi-party computation, as well as two-party computation with a simultaneous message exchange channel, is not very well understood.These questions are intimately connected to the round complexity of non-malleable commitments. Indeed, the exact relationship between the round complexities of non-malleable commitments and secure multiparty computation has also not been explored.In this work, we revisit these questions and obtain several new results. First, we establish the following main results. Suppose that there exists a k-round non-malleable commitment scheme, and let k' = max(4, k + 1); then,- (Two-party setting with simultaneous message transmission): there exists a k'-round protocol for securely realizing every two-party functionality;- (Multi-party setting): there exists a k'-round protocol for securely realizing the multi-party coin-flipping functionality.As a corollary of the above results, by instantiating them with existing non-malleable commitment protocols (from the literature), we establish that four rounds are both necessary and sufficient for both the results above. Furthermore, we establish that, for every multi-party functionality five rounds are sufficient.We actually obtain a variety of results offering trade-offs between rounds and the cryptographic assumptions used, depending upon the particular instantiations of underlying protocols.