WTF-PAD: Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense for Tor
CoRR(2015)
摘要
Website Fingerprinting attacks enable a passive eavesdropper to recover the useru0027s otherwise anonymized web browsing activity by matching the observed traffic with prerecorded web page traffic templates. The defenses that have been proposed to counter these attacks are impractical for deployment in real-world systems due to their high cost in terms of added delay and bandwidth overhead. Further, these defenses have been designed to counter attacks that, despite their high success rates, have been criticized for assuming unrealistic attack conditions in the evaluation setting. In this paper, we propose a novel, lightweight defense based on Adaptive Padding that provides a sufficient level of security against website fingerprinting, particularly in realistic evaluation settings. In a closed-world setting, this defense reduces the accuracy of the state-of-the-art attack from 91% to 20%, while introducing zero latency overhead and less than 60% bandwidth overhead. In an open-world setting, the attack precision is just 1% and drops further as the number of sites grows. For the implementation and evaluation of the defense, we have developed a tool for evaluating the traffic analysis resistance properties of Tor Pluggable Transports that we hope will contribute to future research on traffic analysis.
更多查看译文
关键词
Privacy, Anonymous communications, Website Fingerprinting
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络