SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY, SAGT 2016, pp. 260-272, 2016.

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Keywords:
Mechanism designDouble auctionBudget balanceSocial welfareGain from tradeMore(1+)

Abstract:

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented the first dominant strategy truthful mechanism for double auction. His mechanism attains nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large. However, his mechanism may leave money on the table, since the price paid by the buyers may be higher than the price paid to the sellers....More

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