Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

STOC, pp. 878-889, 2017.

Cited by: 45|Bibtex|Views5|DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055407
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Other Links: dblp.uni-trier.de|dl.acm.org|academic.microsoft.com|arxiv.org

Abstract:

For a constant є, we prove a (N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of є-Nash equilibrium in two-player N× N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (є,є)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such th...More

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