Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols
2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)(2017)
摘要
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.
更多查看译文
关键词
Security Protocols,Unlinkability,Computational Model,RFID Protocols
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络