Decoupled-IFTTT: Constraining Privilege in Trigger-Action Platforms for the Internet of Things.

Trigger-Action platforms are an emerging class of web-based systems that enable users to create automation rules (or recipes) of the form, there is a smoke alarm, then turn off my oven. These platforms stitch together various online services including Internet of Things devices, social networks, and productivity tools by obtaining OAuth tokens on behalf of users. Unfortunately, these platforms also introduce a long-term security risk: If they are compromised, the attacker can misuse the OAuth tokens belonging to millions of users to arbitrarily manipulate their devices and data. In this work, we first quantify the risk users face in the context of If-This-Then-That (IFTTT). We perform the first empirical analysis of the OAuth-based authorization model of IFTTT using semi-automated tools that we built to overcome the challenges of IFTTTu0027s closed source nature and of online service API inconsistencies. We find that 75% of IFTTTu0027s channels, an abstraction of online services, use overprivileged OAuth tokens, increasing risks in the event of a compromise. Even if the OAuth tokens were to be privileged correctly, IFTTTu0027s compromise will not prevent their misuse. Motivated by this empirical analysis, we design and evaluate Decoupled-IFTTT (dIFTTT), the first trigger-action platform where users do not have to give it highly-privileged access to their online services. Our design pushes the notion of fine-grained OAuth tokens to its extreme and ensures that even if the cloud service is controlled by the attacker, it cannot misuse the OAuth tokens to invoke unauthorized actions. Our evaluation establishes that dIFTTT poses modest overhead: it adds less than 15ms of latency to recipe execution time, and reduces throughput by 2.5%.