Public Key Encryption Resilient to Post-Challenge Leakage and Tampering Attacks.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive(2019)
摘要
In this paper, we introduce a new framework for constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes resilient to joint post-challenge/after-the-fact leakage and tampering attacks in the bounded leakage and tampering (BLT) model, introduced by Damgard et al. (Asiacrypt 2013). All the prior formulations of PKE schemes considered leakage and tampering attacks only before the challenge ciphertext is made available to the adversary. However, this restriction seems necessary, since achieving security against post-challenge leakage and tampering attacks in its full generality is impossible, as shown in previous works. In this paper, we study the post-challenge/after-the-fact security for PKE schemes against bounded leakage and tampering under a restricted yet meaningful and reasonable notion of security, namely, the split-state leakage and tampering model. We show that it is possible to construct secure PKE schemes in this model, tolerating arbitrary (but bounded) leakage and tampering queries; thus overcoming the previous impossibility results.
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关键词
After-the-fact, Post-challenge, Entropic PKE, Split-state, Memory tampering, Related-key attacks, Bounded leakage and tampering
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