Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Nature communications, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 13800

Cited by: 11|Bibtex|Views88|DOI:https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13800
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Other Links: pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov|academic.microsoft.com

Abstract:

Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner's Dilemma over the course of twenty consecu...More

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