Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 11, 2019(2019)
摘要
The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill suited-either because it makes overly strong assumptions or because it advocates overly complex designs. This article reviews several common issues with optimal mechanisms, including exorbitant communication, computation, and informational requirements; it also presents several examples demonstrating that relaxing the goal to designing an approximately optimal mechanism allows us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.
更多查看译文
关键词
algorithmic game theory,auction theory,social welfare,revenue maximization,complexity,simplicity,detail dependence,multiparameter settings,computational complexity
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络