MIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory(2016)
摘要
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auction, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single item and each buyer to buy a single item. In this paper, we extend McAfee’s mechanism to handle multi-parametric agents and allow multiple items per trader. We consider three different settings. (1) There is one item-type. Each seller is endowed with several units of that item and each buyer may want several units of that item. Buyers and sellers have diminishing marginal returns. (2) There are multiple item-types. Each seller is endowed with several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers have unit-demand valuations. (3) There are multiple item-types. Each seller is endowed with several units of a pre-specified type and the buyers have gross-substitute valuations. The mechanism is a combination of random-sampling, posted pricing and twosided random-serial-dictatorship. It is prior-free, universally individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market in all item types is sufficiently large.
更多查看译文
关键词
multi,item-type,double-auction
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络