Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economic Theory

This special issue brings together eight separate contributions reflecting recent advances in the methodology of supermodular optimization and games. Three of the papers fall in the main area of supermodular games. Balbus et al. (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7 ) study supermodular games with a continuum of players. Jimenez-Martinez (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1107-y ) develops a model of versioning in social networks. Barthel and Hoffman (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1092-6 ) deal with a class of games with mixed-monotonic best responses (in both directions). The second group of papers falls in the related areas of mechanism design, principal agent, and matching. Johnson (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1127-7 ) considers synchronized Becker-style matching with incomplete information. Kushnir and Liu (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x ) generalizes the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation to the case of nonlinear utilities. Zambrano (Econ Theory 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1087-3 ) studies a principal-agent model with choice between a risky and a safe projects. Christensen (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1116-x ) investigates the stability, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, as solutions to systems of equations. Finally, Drugeon et al. (Econ Theory 67, 2019 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1166-0 ) consider a class of dynamic programming problems with endogenous discount factor.