Information disclosure and partner management in affiliate marketing

The recent massive proliferation of affiliate marketing suggests a new e-commerce paradigm which involves sellers, affiliates and the platforms that connect them. In particular, the fact that prospective buyers may become acquainted with the promotion through more than one affiliate to whom they are connected calls for new mechanisms for compensating affiliates for their promotional efforts. In this paper, we study the problem of a platform that needs to decide on the commission to be awarded to affiliates for promoting a given product or service. Our equilibrium-based analysis, which applies to the case where affiliates are a priori homogeneous and self-interested, enables showing that a minor change in the way the platform discloses information to the affiliates results in a tremendous (positive) effect on the platform's expected profit. In particular, we show that with the revised mechanism the platform can overcome the multi-equilibria problem that arises in the traditional mechanism and can obtain a profit which is at least as high as the maximum profit in any of the equilibria that hold in the latter.