Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions

Weiran Shen
Weiran Shen
Hanpeng Liu
Hanpeng Liu
Michael Zhang
Michael Zhang
Ruohan Qian
Ruohan Qian
Yan Hong
Yan Hong
Zhi Guo
Zhi Guo
Zongyao Ding
Zongyao Ding
Pengjun Lu
Pengjun Lu

national conference on artificial intelligence, 2020.

Cited by: 15|Views36

Abstract:

In this study, we apply reinforcement learning techniques and propose what we call reinforcement mechanism design to tackle the dynamic pricing problem in sponsored search auctions. In contrast to previous game-theoretical approaches that heavily rely on rationality and common knowledge among the bidders, we take a data-driven approach,...More

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