Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games

EC '13: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce Philadelphia Pennsylvania USA ..., pp.563-564, (2014)

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We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share `welfare' (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this setting, e.g., the Shapley value and its weighted variants; however, a characterization of the space of ...更多

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