Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling

EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Virtual Event Hungary July, 2020, pp. 6412020.

Cited by: 0|Bibtex|Views7|DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399468
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Other Links: dl.acm.org|dblp.uni-trier.de

Abstract:

The canonical Bayesian persuasion setting studies a model where an informed agent, the Sender, can partially share his information with an uninformed agent, the Receiver. The Receiver's utility is a function of the state of nature and the Receiver's action while the Sender's is only a function of the Receiver's action. The classical resul...More

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