Conspicuous monitoring and remote work

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization(2020)

引用 15|浏览57
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摘要
Credible monitoring of remote workers presents unique challenges that may reduce the benefits of formal organization for their management. We consider whether increasing the salience of monitor productivity without changing incentive contracts or monitoring technology leads to changes in remote worker performance. Results from a field experiment run among multi-dimensional task workers in Kenya demonstrate that increasing the visibility of monitor activity improves performance on task dimensions not being directly paid for. Our evidence is consistent with the importance of conspicuous monitoring when managers and workers are not co-located.
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关键词
Moral hazard,Monitoring,Remote work,Field experiment
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