Re‐connecting Capitalism: Prospects for the Regulatory Reform of the Employee Interest in UK Takeovers

This article draws upon the disconnected capitalism thesis (DCT) to analyse UK takeovers and their implications for workers. The DCT refers to the disconnect between the source of value creation (the labour process) and the wider political economy. Specifically, we highlight a particular aspect of this disconnect whereby those who create value and have a long-term stake in firms (employees and managers at the firm level) are disconnected from decisions regarding takeovers, as a consequence of wider economic and political trends (processes of financialisation/marketisation and associated state support for a neoliberal takeover regime). We outline these trends and argue the case for are-connect, which will require empowering employees and managers to have more influence in takeover decisions and, in turn,disempowering shareholders and financial intermediaries. The article thus highlights the regulatory space for takeovers and considers feasible policy options, a set of interlinked regulatory changes, which will in particular require a more assertive state.