A configurational theory of generalized exchange in stakeholder-oriented firms

Recent developments in stakeholder theory have refined our understanding of value creation via bilateral reciprocity. Generalized exchange is another important micro -foundational mechanism in value creation, but because of the potential for free-riding it is surprising that some stakeholders contribute more resources to a firm's value -creating nexus than would be expected based on contractual obligations, and even beyond what bilateral reciprocity would predict. This paper aims to identify the mini-mum conditions that promote generalized exchange in a firm's value-creating nexus. Because generalized exchange is causally complex-it can occur in multiple contexts and through various combinations of explanatory factors-a configurational theorizing approach is applied. We identify four combinations of attributes that consistently promote generalized exchange and limit free-riding behavior, such that generalized exchange can make a net positive difference in a firm's nexus: the entrepreneurial logic (high rewards, strong institutional drivers), the conformity logic (powerful sanctions, strong institutional drivers), the influencer logic (powerful sanctions, individ-ual or firm drivers), and the identification logic (high rewards, individual or firm drivers). This work provides an important additional explanation for why stakeholder -oriented firms tend to have higher performance, and can also help managers devise policies for increasing the amount of generalized exchange exhibited among their firm's stakeholders.