Executive equity incentive plans: Are they golden handcuffs or do they push away executives?
openalex(2024)
摘要
We examine the impact of executive equity incentive plans (EEIPs) on the retention of targeted (those subject to EEIPs) and non-targeted (those not subject to EEIPs) executives using a sample of Chinese firms. Our findings suggest that EEIPs help retain executives if we do not distinguish targeted and non-targeted executives. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that, on average, targeted (non-targeted) executives in EEIP firms have an approximately 16% lower (43% higher) chance of leaving their current jobs than the average turnover rate of executives in a non-EEIP firm. Additional analysis suggests that 1) the golden-handcuff effect on targeted executives occurs primarily in the first two years of EEIPs, while the push-away effect on non-targeted executives lasts for four years, and 2) non-targeted executives are more likely to leave when they have low compensation.
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