The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, Rusi), registered as Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies and formerly the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, is a British defence and security think tank. It was founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, Sir Arthur Wellesley.The current President of RUSI is the Duke of Kent and its Director-General is Karin von Hippel.
State actors are increasingly using criminal intermediaries to conduct hybrid operations across Europe. Although serious and organised crime is formally included in UK intelligence prioritisation mechanisms, Cathy Haenlein and Matt Ince argue that it has been underweighted as a strategic intelligence priority even as it has become central to this hostile state operating model. The article examines past and present treatment of the issue, how this sits within an evolving threat landscape, and the implications for positioning serious and organised crime as a strategic intelligence concern moving forward.
Examples of AUKUS and GCAP demonstrate how middle powers like Australia, Italy, Japan and the UK can collaborate with a great power to acquire tier-one defence capabilities at an affordable cost, while securing sovereign control over future production capability and operational employment. This type of collaborative model is driven in part by a new geopolitical situation. Simon Chelton and Philip Shetler-Jones analyse the factors that limit its application to partners with a certain profile and discover that the advantages it offers over alternative acquisition pathways will not be open to all.
The negotiations with the Taliban started along various tracks in 2008, but only accelerated in 2018 to reach the February 2020 agreement between the US and Taliban. Even then, they were marred by a lack of cohesion among the US and its allies and partners, with the result of enabling the Taliban to extract concessions and to marginalise the Afghan government. While this led to accusations of the Taliban being untrustworthy ideological jihadists, in reality the Taliban approach to the talks was eminently opportunistic and focused on maximising their gains. Until 2020 at least, the Taliban assumed that they would have to form a coalition with other Taliban factions and groups, and it was only the inability of their counterparts to coordinate that allowed the Taliban to score a complete military victory in August 2021. The Taliban's pragmatism was most evident in their approach to the various foreign jihadist groups that had supported their jihad, which were denied the recognition of what they thought was their right to pursue their own national jihads from Afghanistan after the Taliban's victory. While the Taliban would struggle to bring the foreign jihadists under actual control, their approach had lost them the trust of the foreign jihadists.
This research article is an updated and abridged version of a paper published by RUSI in December 2025. The authors examine the Atlantic Bastion concept outlined in the UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR), assessing its deterrent value against Russian naval strategy in the North Atlantic. Situating the Bastion within deterrence theory, they argue that a sensor-focused barrier in the Norwegian Sea alone is insufficient to constrain Russian maritime operations. The authors contend that the Bastion must extend westward into the Atlantic and eastward into the Barents Sea, while being complemented by an Atlantic Strike capability, uncrewed systems, and naval mining.