The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, Rusi), registered as Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies and formerly the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, is a British defence and security think tank. It was founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, Sir Arthur Wellesley.The current President of RUSI is the Duke of Kent and its Director-General is Karin von Hippel.
State actors are increasingly using criminal intermediaries to conduct hybrid operations across Europe. Although serious and organised crime is formally included in UK intelligence prioritisation mechanisms, Cathy Haenlein and Matt Ince argue that it has been underweighted as a strategic intelligence priority even as it has become central to this hostile state operating model. The article examines past and present treatment of the issue, how this sits within an evolving threat landscape, and the implications for positioning serious and organised crime as a strategic intelligence concern moving forward.
Examples of AUKUS and GCAP demonstrate how middle powers like Australia, Italy, Japan and the UK can collaborate with a great power to acquire tier-one defence capabilities at an affordable cost, while securing sovereign control over future production capability and operational employment. This type of collaborative model is driven in part by a new geopolitical situation. Simon Chelton and Philip Shetler-Jones analyse the factors that limit its application to partners with a certain profile and discover that the advantages it offers over alternative acquisition pathways will not be open to all.
This research article is an updated and abridged version of a paper published by RUSI in December 2025. The authors examine the Atlantic Bastion concept outlined in the UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR), assessing its deterrent value against Russian naval strategy in the North Atlantic. Situating the Bastion within deterrence theory, they argue that a sensor-focused barrier in the Norwegian Sea alone is insufficient to constrain Russian maritime operations. The authors contend that the Bastion must extend westward into the Atlantic and eastward into the Barents Sea, while being complemented by an Atlantic Strike capability, uncrewed systems, and naval mining.
