INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 266 I. BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 268 A. Symptoms of a Flash Crash .................................................. 270 B. Subsequent flash crashes and related technological glitches . 271 C. REGULATORY REACTIONS TO THE FLASH CRASH AND CRITICISM OF HOW U.S. REGULATORS REACTED ............... 272 1. Circuit Breakers .............................................................. 272 2. Limit Up, Limit Down ................................................... 273 3. Market Access Rule ........................................................ 274 4. SEC Website .................................................................. 276 5. Criticism of the U.S. Regulators' Reaction .................... 277 II. HFT'S AFFECT ON THE ORDINARY INVESTOR ........................... 279 A. How HFT can be Both Good and Bad for the Market and Ordinary Investors ....................................................... 279 B. HFT May be to Blame for the Ordinary Investors' Loss of Faith in the U.S. Stock Market .......................................... 281 C. How to Overcome the Volatile Effects of HFT ................... 283 III. THE INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR REGULATING HIGH FREQUENCY TRADES: CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND SPEED LIMITS ON TRADE EXECUTION VELOCITY ........................... 283 A. Germany's Plan ..................................................................... 283 B. Canada's Plan ........................................................................ 284
INTRODUCTION 163 I. THE HISTORY OF HSR IN THE UNITED STATES 165 II. WHY CALIFORNIA IS IMPORTANT 167 III. OPPOSITION TO HSR IN CALIFORNIA 169 A. State Legislative Opposition 169 B. Federal Opposition 172 C. Citizen Opposition 173 IV. IS HSR IN CALIFORNIA INEVITABLE? 177 A. The 2012 Election 177 B. Future Years 179 1. State Level Support 180 2. Federal Support 183 3. Public Support 185 V. SUGGESTIONS FOR OPPONENTS 187 A. Affected Property Owners 187 B. State Legislative Opponents 189 C. Federal Opponents 190 CONCLUSION 191
INTRODUCTION 245 I. BACKGROUND OF PIRACY IN CHINA 246 A. Piracy Today and the Increase in Internet Users 246 B. History of Piracy as an Acceptable Practice in Chinese Culture 248 II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S COPYRIGHT LAWS 249 A. The Pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural Revolution Era: 835-1966 249 B. The Post-Cultural Revolution and Modern Era: 1976Current 250 III. THE RISE OF THE INTERNET AND GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP ........ 251 IV. GOOGLE IN CHINA 253 A. Here Comes Google 253 B. China's Response to Google and the Strength of Chinese Nationalism 254 C. Google's Innovative Music Product 257 D. The Real Reasons Behind Google Music's Failure 259 V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM GOOGLE 261 CONCLUSION 263
Demand for wireless service has been growing rapidly. But while quantity of wireless service (measured in terms of bytes or minutes) has increased dramatically, price has increased little, if at all. This paper examines how supply of wireless capacity has increased and how it can continue to increase in the future. Given that there is little prospect for finding currently unused spectrum, the government should institute policies that promote the economically efficient use of spectrum currently in use, which in turn could make spectrum available for alternative uses. The best way for the government to promote spectrum efficiency is to ensure that users have flexibility and that they realize the opportunity cost of their use of spectrum. Two areas where users do not realize the opportunity cost of their use of spectrum are broadcasting and government and rules regarding those uses can be revised. In addition, the government should adopt market mechanisms to determine the opportunity cost of spectrum designated for unlicensed use.
Although 80% of Colorado's population lives in the densely populated Front Range, the remaining 20% of Colorado residents live in sparsely populated regions. The Federal Communications Commission and the federal government's National Broadband Plan have prioritized universal availability of high speed Internet, but Colorado has struggled to close the digital divide, which decreases the benefits of the Internet for public education and other services in rural regions. Using a $100 million federal grant and $35 million in additional funding from CenturyLink, Coloradans created the EAGLE-Net Alliance to address this issue. EAGLE-Net is a local government co-operative designed to create a middle-mile fiber network connecting Colorado's 178 public school districts and other community anchor institutions like hospitals. However, EAGLE-Net has already spent about 90% of its budget, yet it has only completed its broadband infrastructure build-out in six of Colorado's nineteen unserved counties. EAGLE-Net has also faced hostility from small telecom providers because of the organization's construction plan and because the executive team has focused on economic sustainability instead of ensuring optimal improvements to rural infrastructures. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration temporarily suspended EAGLE-Net's grant to determine if it is adequately completing its environmental assessments and to determine if the network will harm small telecom companies in rural Colorado. Many potential solutions exist; such as streamlining agency operations, repealing a state statute that prevents municipal broadband service, and accepting the need to operate at a loss in the most remote regions of Colorado.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 113 I. TWO INTERNET TRAFFIC DISPUTES – THOUGHTS ON SCOPE ..... 116 II. CURRENT (POSSIBLE) LEGAL BACKGROUND RULES ................. 119 III. TENTATIVE STEPS FORWARD ..................................................... 126 a. What An Interconnection Requirement Might Provide ...... 126 b. Who Must Provide Interconnection? .................................. 129 c. What Are The Remedies In Interconnection Disputes ....... 129 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 131
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 193 I. OVERVIEW OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS ........................ 195 A. History of Stock Exchanges and the SRO System ................ 195 B. Periodic Reexamination of the SRO System ......................... 198 II. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR SROS ..................................................... 200 A. Broad Grant of Absolute Immunity for Stock Exchanges .... 201 B. Immunity Analysis – Governmental v. Private Actions ........ 205 III. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY IN A DEMUTUALIZED SRO SYSTEM ............ 208 A. Demutualization .................................................................... 209 B. Policy Implications ................................................................ 211 III. FACEBOOK IPO CASE STUDY .......................................................... 214 A. What happened with the Facebook IPO? .............................. 215 B. Absolute Immunity Analysis ................................................. 216 V. PRESCRIPTION FOR LIMITING IMMUNITY TO MITIGATE RISKY BEHAVIOR .................................................................................. 218 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 220
Since publishing US embassy communications, WikiLeaks has been subjected to treatment designed to force it offline. In many ways, the treatment of WikiLeaks echoes the treatment of terrorist organizations after the September 11, 2001 attacks. This paper documents the similarities between the treatment of WikiLeaks and the treatment of terrorist organizations and concludes that the differences between the two organizations will ultimately lead to the failure of the campaign against WikiLeaks.
Designers of the first electronic telephone switches nicknamed them the large immortal machines because switches last decades. The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires that all digital-switched telephone networks be built wiretap enabled; the law took longevity of switches into account by authorizing funding to update switches in place. But by failing to analyze how threat models would change in a highly connected IP-based world, CALEA did not consider the longevity of switches prospectively. As an architected security breach, CALEA compliance is a ticking time bomb. This paper discusses how this situation arose, and what policy the Federal Communications Commission should be following the alleviate the problem.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 326 I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF LPO ....................................... 327 A. Evolution of Outsourcing .................................................... 327 B. Growth of LPO Industry ..................................................... 329 C. Risks and Benefits of LPOs ................................................. 330 II. VARIOUS STATE AND FEDERAL ATTEMPTS AT RESTRICTING AND REGULATING OUTSOURCING ............................................. 331 A. State Protectionist Actions .................................................. 332 B. Federal Protectionist Actions ............................................. 333 1. Legislative Actions ....................................................... 333 2. Executive Actions ......................................................... 335 C. Private Lawsuit Against Outsourcing ................................. 335 III. THE LEGALITY OF PROTECTIONIST ACTIONS ............................ 336 A. State Protectionist Actions Against LPO Would Likely be Held Unconstitutional ......................................................... 336 1. Preemption .................................................................... 338 2. Dormant Foreign Affairs Power ................................... 340 3. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause ............................. 342 4. Market Participant Exception ....................................... 345 B. Federal Action: If Congress Were to Enact a Bill Regulating LPO .................................................................. 348 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 348
The popular press tends to mark the birthdays and anniversaries of innovations and products by the date at which they became widely available to the general public. While this standard is never precise and there is a flow of inventions before commercialization, it is a useful benchmark for measuring social change. By that standard there is no doubt that the early years of the 21st century are a key period for the digital revolution and its most important manifestation, the Internet. The adolescence of the Internet is ending, which is typically marked by the shouldering of new, adult responsibilities. In humans it has come to be called the quarter-life crisis. The quarter-life crisis is a period of life following the major changes of adolescence, usually ranging from the late teens to the early thirties, in which a person begins to feel doubtful about their own lives [sic], brought on by the stress of becoming an adult. The term was coined by analogy with mid-life crisis.1 The web celebrated its 20th birthday in 20112 and the PC its 30th.3 The age of the Internet is also in the range of 20-30 years.4 The Internet Society,5 which houses the key bodies that set policy for the Internet, turned 20 in 2012. Search engines, which provide a critical function for navigating the vastness of cyberspace, are about 15 years old.6 Broadband Internet service is in the same age range.7 Using the dating technique of initial widespread commercial availability to calculate the age of wireless technologies that are playing an increasingly important role in the digital revolution we reach the same conclusion. In 2012, U.S. cellular service is about 30 years old8 and Wi-Fi is about 20.9 To be a true quarter-life crisis, the life expectancy of the digital revolution would have to be about a
INTRODUCTION 389 I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 391 A. The First Sale Doctrine 392 B. The Public Performance Right 395 II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW 397 A. “Open to the Public” and the Nature of the Place Analysis . 397 B. The Transmit Clause 399 III. THE ZEDIVA CASE 405 CONCLUSION: POLICY REFORM? 409
The traditional value chain is a hierarchical ordering of inputs that results in the ability of one firm - a manufacturer of automobiles, for example - to offer a finished product directly to consumers. The market is characterized by two distinct lines of business relationships: the vertical relationship between input suppliers and product manufacturers, and the horizontal relationship across the market in which the manufacturers compete against one another.
Big data, the enhanced ability to collect, store and analyze previously unimaginable quantities of data in tremendous speed and with negligible costs, delivers immense benefits in marketing efficiency, healthcare, environmental protection, national security and more. While some privacy advocates may dispute the merits of sophisticated behavioral marketing practices or debate the usefulness of certain data sets to efforts to identify potential terrorists, few remain indifferent to the transformative value of big data analysis for government, science and society at large. At the same time, even big data evangelists should recognize the potentially ominous social ramifications of a surveillance society governed by heartless algorithmic machines. In this essay, we present some of the privacy and non-privacy risks of big data as well as directions for potential solutions. In a previous paper, we argued that the central tenets of the current privacy framework, the principles of data minimization and purpose limitation, are severely strained by the big data technological and business reality. Here, we assess some of the other problems raised by pervasive big data analysis. In their book, “A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents,” Samir Chopra and Larry White note that “as we increasingly interact with these artificial agents in unsupervised settings, with no human mediators, their seeming autonomy and increasingly sophisticated functionality and behavior, raises legal and philosophical questions.” In this article we argue that the focus on the machine is a distraction from the debate surrounding data driven ethical dilemmas, such as privacy, fairness and discrimination. The machine may exacerbate, enable, or simply draw attention to the ethical challenges, but it is humans who must be held accountable. Instead of vilifying machine-based data analysis and imposing heavy-handed regulation, which in the process will undoubtedly curtail highly beneficial activities, policymakers should seek to devise agreed-upon guidelines for ethical data analysis and profiling. Such guidelines would address the use of legal and technical mechanisms to obfuscate data; criteria for calling out unethical, if not illegal, behavior; categories of privacy and non-privacy harms; and strategies for empowering individuals through access to data in intelligible form.
