This series presents interdisciplinary publications on trust.Trust is one of those rich concepts that have various meanings, some strong, others weak, some straightforward, others subtle.For instance, tryst, a medieval English word, means, in the context of a hare-hunt, the hunter who waits at the fringe of the forest to kill hares with a stick when they are driven out by big noises made by other hunters inside the forest.On the other hand, when one says, I trust that it will be fine tomorrow, its meaning is not strong.More conceptually, trust is known as something that can be most useful in minimizing the costs of misunderstanding and transactions when the goal is to forge bridges and enhance bonds, launch joint undertakings, or establish reciprocal relationships.Without societies based on trust, sustained prosperity is far more difficult to achieve.The concept of trust is also very useful in understanding the propensity to take initiatives, to avoid risks, to enter into or withdraw from collaborations, and to shape and share values, norms and rules.This series examines the meaning and its probable consequences of trust or distrust in various settings from various academic disciplines, not necessarily overtly confined to that of philosophy.Specialists of geography, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, sociology, political science and philosophy can venture to pen a volume from their respective angles.The resulting books will be both enlightening and enjoyable reading.This series welcomes proposals in these broad areas all over the world.
This open access introductory volume of societal safety science provides a clear image of the issues, with suggested strategies against the critical situations that arise in the modern world, both in highly developed and developing countries.
This chapter reviews problems that surround high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and discusses what the governance of societal risk is. Governing all the risks scattered throughout the society takes multidimensional evaluations of trade-offs among multiple benefits and risks, and fair decision-making is essential for reaching agreements among members of the society on risk governance.
Unlike accidents or natural disasters, war, crimes, and terrorism are all incidents caused by people's specific intentions. Nevertheless, these events, just like accidents and natural disasters, are greatly influenced by development of scientific technology and social structures of political disagreement and economic disparities. This chapter overviews structures and what are special about war, crimes, and terrorism.
In a law-abiding nation, the law plays a big role in maintaining social peace and people's safety. This chapter overviews the document system of laws and guidelines and roles of administrative organizations and corporations.
The previous chapter discussed characteristics of contemporary societies in problems related to safety. Histories of birth of societies and cities and their maturing are deeply related to histories of birth and development of scholarship and science. This chapter overviews how scholarship and science were born, how they branched out and specialized, and then how they unified and formed interdisciplinary studies beyond boundaries of specialized fields. It also explains histories of various academic fields related to societal safety sciences.
This chapter opens by discussing what effects disaster victims suffer from in their lifestyles and psychology. Then it will summarize what support systems are available in supporting victims that suffered large damages in terms of legal systems, public support, and psychological caretaking. The chapter closes with discussions on life and psychological effects of those that suddenly 1 day turned into crime victims and various supports for them.
We plan our safety measures under economic, personnel and time constraints. The extent of how far we take these measures depends on our acknowledgement of risk of whether we "stop because it is risky" or we "cannot stop because of its benefits despite its risks". This chapter discusses our risk recognition and concerns about mass media that strongly affect our risk recognition. It also overviews differences in risk evaluation about natural disasters and social disasters.
This chapter discusses actual social disasters and damages they caused. The first section starts with some societal problems we face today. They are accidents due to aging infrastructures and difficulties in preventing them, nature and trends in accidents involving airplanes which are one of the most advanced industrial products today, characteristics of automobile accidents with the most serious social disasters in modern society in terms of the number of deaths and injured, and drug toxicity and safety in medical care. The following Sect. 7.2 analyzes human error, which is the most important factor in conducting analysis and investigation of accidents. Lastly, the third section closes the chapter with an overview of the history of major social disasters and their countermeasures.
Nature and societies that surround us are full of hazards. Depending on their intensities and surroundings, they develop into incidents. What artificial facilities are around, what actions people involved take, and states of societies or nature can further turn them into accidents or disasters. Risk management is ever more important for controlling such development and minimizing damages. This chapter overviews how hazards develop into accidents and damages and discusses several topics in risk management.
The word "crisis" means the turning point of whether one recovers from illness or the situation worsens; thus, we can map crises into four stages of illness, i.e., "prodromal crisis stage," "acute crisis stage," "chronic crisis stage," and "crisis resolution stage." From the societal safety sciences viewpoint, crisis management means a situation where an event that threatens safety and security of the society is close or proper responses at each stage after the event have taken place. For nations, administrations, and corporations, crisis management is the "processes of responding to serious situations of major accidents or mega disasters that have suddenly broken out after some symptoms and calming the seriousness to settle and situations to recover."
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic protocol for privacy-protecting authentication. It is standardized in the TPM standard and implemented in millions of chips. A variant of DAA is also used in Intel's SGX. Recently, Camenisch et al. (PKC 2016) demonstrated that existing security models for DAA do not correctly capture all security requirements, and showed a number of flaws in existing schemes based on the LRSW assumption. In this work, we identify flaws in security proofs of a number of qSDH- based DAA schemes and point out that none of the proposed schemes can be proven secure in the recent model by Camenisch et al. (PKC 2016). We therefore present a new, provably secure DAA scheme that is based on the qSDH assumption. The new scheme is as efficient as the most efficient existing DAA scheme, with support for DAA extensions to signature-based revocation and attributes. We rigorously prove the scheme secure in the model of Camenisch et al., which we modify to support the extensions. As a side-result of independent interest, we prove that the BBS+ signature scheme is secure in the type-3 pairing setting, allowing for our scheme to be used with the most efficient pairing-friendly curves.
We consider the problem of migrating keys from TPM 1.2 to the backwards incompatible TPM 2.0. The major differences between the two versions introduce several challenges for deployed systems when support for TPM 2.0 is introduced. We show how TPM 2.0 support can be introduced while still maintaining the functionality specified by TPM 1.2, allowing a smoother transition to the newer version. Specifically, we propose a solution such that keys can be migrated from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0, while retaining behavior with regard to e.g. authorization, migration secrets, PCR values and CMK functionality. This is achieved by utilizing new functionality, such as policies, in TPM 2.0. The proposed solution is implemented and verified using TPM emulators to ensure correctness.
We present a practical and highly secure method for the authentication of chips based on a new concept for implementing strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) on field programmable gate arrays (FPGA). Its qualitatively novel feature is a remote reconfiguration in which the delay stages of the PUF are arranged to a random pattern within a subset of the FPGA's gates. Before the reconfiguration is performed during authentication the PUF simply does not exist. Hence even if an attacker has the chip under control previously she can gain no useful information about the PUF. This feature, together with a strict renunciation of any error correction and challenge selection criteria that depend on individual properties of the PUF that goes into the field make our strong PUF construction immune to all machine learning attacks presented in the literature. More sophisticated attacks on our strong-PUF construction will be difficult, because they require the attacker to learn or directly measure the properties of the complete FPGA. A fully functional reference implementation for a secure "chip biometrics" is presented. We remotely configure ten 64-stage arbiter PUFs out of 1428 lookup tables within a time of 25 s and then receive one "fingerprint" from each PUF within 1ms.
A CAPTCHA is a challenge-response test often used on the Web to determine whether a Web site's visitor is a human or an automated program (so called bot). Existing and widely used CAPTCHA schemes are based on visual puzzles that are hard to solve on mobile devices with a limited screen. We propose to leverage movement data from hardware sensors to build a CAPTCHA scheme suitable for mobile devices. Our approach is based on human motion information and the scheme requires users to perform gestures from everyday life (e.g., hammering where the smartphone should be imagined as a hammer and the user has to hit a nail five times). We implemented a prototype of the proposed method and report findings from a comparative usability study with 50 participants. The results suggest that our scheme outperforms other competing schemes on usability metrics such as solving time, accuracy, and error rate. Furthermore, the results of the user study indicate that gestures are a suitable input method to solve CAPTCHAs on (mobile) devices with smaller screens and hardware sensors.
Systems designed with measurement and attestation in mind are often layered, with the lower layers measuring the layers above them. Attestations of such systems, which we call layered attestations, must bundle together the results of a diverse set of application-specific measurements of various parts of the system. Some methods of layered attestation are more trustworthy than others especially in the presence of an adversary that can dynamically corrupt system components. It is therefore important for system designers to understand the trust consequences of different designs. This paper presents a formal framework for reasoning about layered attestations. We identify inference principles based on the causal effects of dynamic corruption, and we propose a method for bundling evidence that is robust to such corruptions.
Entering the age of the Internet of things, embedded devices are everywhere. They are built using common hardware such as RISC-based ARM and MIPS platforms, and lightweight open software components. Because of their limited resources, such systems often lack the protection mechanisms that have been introduced to the desktop and server world. In this paper, we present BINtegrity, a novel approach for exploit mitigation that is specifically tailored towards embedded systems that are based on the common RISC architecture. BINtegrity leverages architectural features of RISC CPUs to extract a combination of static and dynamic properties relevant to OS service requests from executables, and enforces them during runtime. Our technique borrows ideas from several areas including system call monitoring, static analysis, and code emulation, and combines them in a low-overhead fashion directly in the operating system kernel. We implemented BINtegrity for the Linux operating system. BINtegrity is practical, and restricts the ability of attackers to exploit generic memory corruption vulnerabilities in COTS binaries. In contrast to other approaches, BINtegrity does not require access to source code, binary modification, or application specific configuration such as policies. Our evaluation demonstrates that BINtegrity incurs a very low overhead – only 2
One of the key features that must be supported by every modern PKI is an efficient way to determine (at verification) whether the signing key had been revoked. In most solutions, the verifier periodically contacts the certificate authority (CA) to obtain a list of blacklisted, or whitelisted, certificates. In the worst case this has to be done for every signature verification. Besides the computational costs of verification, after revocation all signatures under the revoked key become invalid. In the solution by Boneh et al. at USENIX ' 01, the CA holds a share of the private signing key and contributes to the signature generation. After revocation, the CA simply denies its participation in the interactive signing protocol. Thus, the revoked user can no longer generate valid signatures. We extend this solution to also cover privacy, non-trusted setups, and time-stamps. We give a formal definitional framework, and provide elegantly simple, yet provably secure, instantiations from efficient standard building blocks such as digital signatures, commitments, and partially blind signatures. Finally, we propose extensions to our scheme.
