
El presente trabajo argumenta, desde una perspectiva vygotskyana, la construccion social del conocimiento, especificamente en el ambito de la educacion. Vygotsky desarrollo propuestas que, desde lo que denomino mental, posibilitan el abordaje de la edificacio n del saber en distintos ambitos de la vida social. Desde la casa hasta la escuela, pasando por la comunidad. En dicha edificacion, la nocion de signo ayudara en demasia. Los procesos psicologicos superiores, como la percepcion social, el pensamiento, el razonamiento logico, la memoria, entre otros, estan atravesados por la actividad signica. El conocimiento que de estos procesos deriva, en conjunto, esta mediado por una accion en pos del signo. El lenguaje, como sistema de signos, en este caso, posibilita el desarrollo y la complejidad de tales procesos. El aterrizaje de todo esto, signo, lenguaje, procesos psicologicos superiores, bien puede desemb ocar en un ambito: la educacion.
El estudio de la inteligencia ha interesado a psicologos, filosofos, educadores y el publico en general durante varios siglos. La sociedad humana valora altamente la inteligencia y la considera un factor decisivo para los logros educativos, el exito en el trabajo y para el desarrollo socioeconomico de los pueblos. Se analiza el concepto de inteligencia y su medicion, los tipos de inteligencia, las implicaciones sociales y politicas que tiene este concepto psicologico, la relacion entre inteligencia general, factores especificos de inteligencia, inteligencia fluida e inteligencia cristalizada, el desarrollo ontogenetico de la inteligencia, sus origenes evolutivos y otros asuntos relacionados. Se presentan los problemas de investigacion que estan por solucionarse en este campo. La inteligencia como capacidad de adaptacion a un medio cambiante ha tenido importancia decisiva en la evolucion filogenetica de los seres humanos.
The fact that a statement has scientific credibility only to the extent that it is confirmed makes it desirable to examine clinical confirmation of clinical hypotheses of the type that, when presented to patients in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy, commonly are referred to as interpretations. An attempt is made to show that clinical confirmation in significant ways resembles confirmation in natural science. Certain peculiarities of psychoanalytic prediction and postdiction are discussed.
Freud’s theories of hysteria are of interest for both the history and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. A critical study of the development of these theories is apt to throw light on Freud’s way of thinking. Since the theories are predominantly clinical, a study of their development can be expected to be relevant also for psychoanalytic practice.
What we commonly refer to as psychoanalytic theory is in reality a more or less loosely integrated collection of theories. Theories of childhood development, each focusing on a different aspect of this development, the theory of the Oedipus complex, and the theory of narcissism are examples and so is the theory of psychoanalytic therapy. I will consider none of these. My focus will be exclusively on the psychoanalytic theory of unconscious motivation. This theory occupies a central position in relation to other psychoanalytic theories in that in their explanatory endeavors they all in one way or another adduce unconscious motives. It is convenient to subdivide the psychoanalytic theory of unconscious motivation into two theories, namely, a clinical or psychological and an extraclinical theory. The latter is in fact a set of alternative theories of which relevant parts of what Freud ([9]: 181) referred to as metapsychology is one. It can be, and has actually been, maintained-for instance, by Klein ([1 1]) and Schafer ([23])-that the clinical theory can perfectly well stand on its own and that, accordingly, an extraclinical theory has nothing to contribute except confusion. One of the main points I will make in this paper is that, far from leading to confusion, the clinical theory becomes more interesting and also more satisfactory as a theory when properly integrated with an acceptable extraclinical theory. In trying to define the acceptability of such a theory we will be led to examine the nature of unconscious mental events generally, and specifically of unconscious motives. But before we get that far I must