ABSTRACT The religiously unaffiliated represent nearly a third of American adults, yet most large‐scale surveys lack the question batteries necessary to examine this population in depth. This article introduces the Making Meaning Survey, a 2024 opt‐in panel survey of 15,296 US adults, including 12,014 atheists, agnostics, and respondents identifying as “nothing in particular.” The survey was designed to assess belief, spirituality, and meaning‐making among the religiously unaffiliated. Comparing these three identity groups, we document substantial differences in supernatural belief, spiritual self‐identification, spiritual practices, attitudes toward religion, and subjective well‐being. The dataset's principal value lies in its large subgroup samples and extensive question batteries rather than in unqualified population prevalence estimation. The data are publicly available through the Association of Religion Data Archives.
ABSTRACT Studies of religion and nonmarital sexual behavior often focus on the timing of sexual debut and the number of sexual partners during adolescence, limiting understanding of how religion shapes subsequent pathways into and through romantic and sexual relationships during the transition to adulthood. We adopt a multidimensional approach to both sexual behavior (nonmarital relationships, transition to first penile–vaginal sex within nonmarital relationships, and subsequent sexual frequency) and religiosity (public and private) using 2.5 years of weekly data on intimate relationships and penile–vaginal sex among 933 women aged 18–22. Religiously conservative respondents and frequent service attenders delayed sexual transitions and were more likely to be in committed relationships, and frequent attenders were also less likely to be in coresident relationships. Young women who believed in God were engaged more than their peers, and those who prayed alone had less frequent sex. Overall, public forms of religiosity (religious conservatism and service attendance) were more strongly associated with more publicly observable relationship processes, whereas private religiosity (frequent prayer) was more closely related to private sexual behavior. The association between religiosity and sexual behavior was partially explained by adolescent sexual experiences but remained associated with these behaviors net of those experiences.
ABSTRACT Religious service attendance is a consistent negative predictor of interracial romance in the United States, yet less is known about how specific religious affiliations shape this relationship. Using the Collaborative Multiracial Post‐Election Survey (CMPS 2020, N = 7883), this study examines how attendance frequency and religious affiliation predict engagement in interracial romance across a racially diverse national sample. Contrary to expectations in the existing literature, the religiously unaffiliated do not differ significantly from evangelical Protestants once demographic controls are applied. Non‐evangelical Protestants, however, are significantly more likely to be in interracial relationships than evangelicals, net of attendance, congregational racial composition, and other controls. This within‐Protestant variation is concentrated among non‐White respondents and is not explained by congregational diversity, suggesting that theological orientation and denominational culture are the primary religious predictors of racial boundary‐crossing in interracial relationships.
Over the past decade, White evangelicals in the United States have largely aligned themselves with Donald Trump's Make America Great Again, or MAGA, movement and the Christian nationalist ideas it promotes. But an active network of White evangelical leaders are resisting the influence of Christian nationalism in their churches and in American politics. What divides these evangelicals is not whether they are conservative or liberal, respectively, but whether they support Christian autocracy or pluralistic democracy. In this Presidential Address, I argue that the fault lines now running through the evangelical world offer insight into a larger restructuring of American politics that has been developing since the 1990s. I situate this post-1990s restructuring in relation to the post-1950s restructuring of American religion, which involved a shift in many White Americans' primary religious allegiance from their denominations to their liberal or conservative religio-political tribe. Where the post-1950s restructuring was driven by the rise of the Religious Right, I argue the post-1990s restructuring was driven by backlash to this same movement. An ensuing cycle of backlash and counter-backlash radically transformed U.S. religion and politics, as the right-left political divide that once shaped both was gradually replaced by a divide over the promise of pluralistic democracy itself.
This article reports key findings of a split-sample experiment comparing conventional measures of single-choice religion and new measures of multi-religiosity. Although conventional measures implicitly assume congruence among religious affiliation, belief, and practice within a single religion, the new measures are designed to capture multi-religiosity by accounting for belonging to, belief in, or practice of more than one religion. The findings show that although only about 6% of Americans affiliate with or routinely practice two or more religions, about 60% said they somewhat or very much believed in two or more religions. After combining Protestantism and Catholicism into a single Christian religion and restricting it to those who believe very much, 16.3% of respondents still report believing in two or more religions. Asian Americans are more likely to be multireligious than non-Asian Americans but less than people in East Asian societies. These findings call for further analyses and additional surveys to better understand the patterns revealed by the new measures.
How do religious rules and regulations affect behavior? We examine this question using changes in Catholic regulations during the Covid-19 pandemic combined with mobility data from 15 million smartphone users from 2019 to 2022. We first document overall trends: Total religious attendance declined sharply in March 2020 and thereafter recovered slowly and more gradually than other activities like restaurant visits. There were also variations across religious groups, with Catholics returning at a slower pace than Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. We then introduce a novel approach to examine the impact of religious policies on behavior, leveraging variations in the timing of dispensation rescissions (requirements for Sunday attendance) by US Catholic bishops. Using a difference-in-differences event study model, we find a short-term 2-4 percentage point increase in Catholic weekend church attendance following the lifting of dispensations, compared to the 2019 baseline. However, this effect fades over time and is smaller than the attendance surge seen after reopening churches post-lockdowns. These results suggest that religious policies impact behavior, though their effects may be transient.
A radical enhancement to the human body or brain is defined as giving human capabilities that no past or present human has possessed. These are being developed by scientists and bioengineers and backed by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. This article reports on the first study of the US religious public's views of radical enhancements using a nationally representative survey. Church-attending conservative Protestants are more opposed to enhancement-and atheists/agnostics are more supportive-than are the religiously indifferent. These differences are fully explained by three secular ideologies previous studies have found to be important in studies of biotechnology. Additionally, restricting analysis to variation among Christians, theological beliefs about the role of humans in the natural world that cross traditions also explain differences in support and opposition. However, among Christians it is secular ideologies, not theological beliefs or religious identities, that explain support or opposition to radical enhancement.
Although religious service attendance is touted for its reliable measurement and robust associations with well-being, the overwhelming focus on attendance has allowed other aspects of religious participation to be significantly understudied. This study investigates whether short-term religious retreats and mission trips contribute to young adults' subjective well-being beyond the well-documented effects of attendance. Using longitudinal data from Waves 3 and 4 of the National Survey of Youth and Religion (NSYR) (N = 1243), we conduct cross-lagged structural equation models to assess relationships between retreat or mission participation and four outcomes of well-being: life meaning (eudaimonic), physical (global self-rated health), mental health (depression), and hedonic (life satisfaction). Baseline models show modest positive associations, where retreat participation predicts greater life satisfaction and meaning in life, and mission trips predict higher self-rated health and life satisfaction. However, once religious service attendance is included, almost all associations lose statistical significance. Although retreats and missions may provide temporary benefits, their effects on enduring well-being largely reflect broader engagement in congregational life.
In Jewish-Israeli society, circumcision (brit milah) carries far-reaching significance, symbolizing both the covenant between god and the Jewish people and serving as a key marker of communal affiliation and cultural continuity. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Jewish-Israeli parents who have chosen not to circumcise their sons and using theoretical frameworks of generative refusal and care, this article examines the ethical reasoning and social implications of refusing this deeply entrenched practice. It argues that by contesting the normative association between physical inscription and Jewish collective identity, these parents suggest that community can be anchored in the protection of the vulnerable rather than in corporeal regulation. In the face of significant social and familial pressure, parents who refuse circumcision articulate an alternative vision of belonging, one that challenges established norms yet remains engaged with the collective-ultimately exemplifying the social significance of actions intentionally left undone.
Discussion of ethics among scientists has mainly focused on research ethics related to falsification, fabrication, and plagiarism (FFP). Scientific work goes beyond research, and we know little about the ethical issues involved in the broader range of work that scientists do. In this study, we examine how physicists and biologists in the United States, Mexico, and South Africa say religion and spirituality shape their ethical thinking and stances. In our study, scientists identified FFP as important ethical issues. When asked how religion and spirituality inform ethical thinking and practices, our scientist respondents stressed, however, that religious traditions influence ethical thinking around teaching, mentoring, and relationships with students and fellow scientists as well. Our study complements and expands work on science ethics by expanding the ethical issues with which scientists are concerned and, specifically, asks how religion shapes scientists' ethical sensibilities beyond data gathering and dissemination.
The introduction to the spotlight set of research notes that are based on the Global East Survey of Religion and Spirituality briefly explains why we believe it is necessary to develop new measures of religiosity, the process of developing the questionnaire, and the key findings in this set of research notes, including the common phenomenon of multi-religiosity among Asians, Asian Americans, and non-Asian Americans.
Declining American birth rates are a growing national concern, especially among the Christian right. I propose that support for "general pronatalism" (policies that encourage more Americans to have children) and "selective pronatalism" (policies that encourage only certain Americans to have children to preserve demographic dominance) are distinct in their religious antecedents. I use recent nationally representative survey data with an experimental component to test my expectations. Regression models show general pronatalism is predicted by religious commitment and insecure masculinity, whereas selective pronatalism is predicted by Christian nationalism, insecure masculinity, and belief in replacement theory. A wording experiment affirms these distinct religious influences: Religious commitment predicts only general pronatalism; Christian nationalism only selective pronatalism. Moreover, interactions show Christian nationalism's association with selective pronatalism is strongest among those who are less religious. Overall, general pronatalism reflects a stronger attachment to conventional religion, whereas selective pronatalism is more strongly related to secularized ethno-traditionalism.
While the relationship between religiosity and social trust has been widely addressed, empirical results still show divergent conclusions. To enhance our understanding of this relationship, the article examines whether the religious context moderates this dynamic at the individual level within Latin America, characterized by a common religious matrix recently challenged by a substantial increase in religious diversity. Data from 18 countries between 2004 and 2018 are analyzed in multilevel models. The results show that religiosity significantly generates social trust: those who identify with some religion (mainly Catholics) and those who participate in religious organizations trust more. When including interactions between levels, a negative moderation is observed at the individual level: The more diverse the religious context, the less intense the positive effect of individual religiosity on trust. These findings highlight the nuanced role of religiosity in shaping trust within diverse social landscapes, emphasizing its importance as a socially situated factor.
This article systematically investigates the mediators linking Christian religiosity to immigration-related attitudes in Germany. On the basis of current, representative data (ALLBUS 2023), four mediation models reveal multiple pathways through which religiosity shapes such attitudes. These pathways correspond to three distinct functions of religion: economic, value-based, and social. Specifically, religious optimism mitigates perceptions of economic conflict over immigration. Nonfundamentalist religiosity encourages pro-immigration attitudes through concern for diversity, tolerance, and prosociality. In addition, outgroup contact, encouraged by nonfundamentalist religiosity, reduces cultural distancing from immigrant groups. In contrast, religious fundamentalism reinforces social and cultural distancing. By identifying new mediators and refining the modeling of established ones, the study advances our understanding of the complex and ambivalent significance of Christian religiosity in shaping immigration-related attitudes. The mediators examined reflect fundamental functions of religion that extend beyond the German context, suggesting that the proposed model has broader international relevance.
Many institutions seek to increase representation in science by addressing the limited presence of certain racial and gender groups. These efforts often overlook religion as a dimension of stratification and its connections to other identities. Research on religion and science has focused more on scientists' attitudes toward religion than on the presence of religious individuals within scientific communities. Filling these gaps, this study examines how scientists in the United States, Mexico, and South Africa respond to religious people in science. Drawing on 53 in-depth interviews with biologists and physicists at leading universities in these countries, we find that while scientists narratively express openness toward religious individuals, they often include the caveat that religion should not enter scientific work, rendering religious people themselves suspect. Many participate in what we call "safe siloing." These findings highlight subtle forms of boundary work and identity suppression that religious scientists must navigate.
Drawing on 3 years of qualitative fieldwork at a United Methodist church and a Catholic parish in Minneapolis-St. Paul, I analyze how White, liberal congregations translated race-conscious ideals into organizational practice in the wake of the 2020 police murder of George Floyd. These "antiracist projects" included education, reparations initiatives, and efforts to reform congregational culture to address shifting understandings of race. I introduce the concept of "divinized diversity"-a racial frame that draws on religious cultural tools to heighten awareness of systemic racism-to show how race-conscious commitments paradoxically motivate individualist and expressive forms of action that reinforce rather than dismantle racial hierarchies. By sacralizing individualistic approaches to racial justice, divinized diversity naturalizes the status quo even as it mobilizes sincere commitments to change. These findings contribute to research on racialized organizations, progressive religion, and the limits of diversity ideology in majority-White institutional settings.
Sociologists have long been interested in the connection between religion and stratification beliefs. The present study extends this line of inquiry by examining how belief in supernatural agents-belief in divine support and belief in supernatural evil-shapes public opinion about the causes of poverty. In addition, it investigates how the effects of these beliefs are conditional upon political orientation. An analysis of data from a nationwide survey of Korean adults (n = 1632) shows that belief in supernatural agents is not associated with individualistic explanations for poverty. However, belief in divine support is negatively associated with structural explanations for poverty, whereas belief in supernatural evil is positively associated with them. In addition, the positive association between belief in supernatural evil and structural explanations for poverty is amplified among political conservatives. Collectively, the findings sharpen our theoretical knowledge about the ways that religion influences lay explanations about stratification.
