
Abstract Though Frank Knight framed its goal as “refinement, not reconstruction,” scholars have not fully appreciated Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit's debt to debates Frederick B. Hawley sparked on entrepreneurial profit. Hawley argued that profit compensated entrepreneurs for relieving capitalists, laborers, and landlords of risk by contracting to pay them fixed sums from their uncertain revenues. John Bates Clark objected that capitalists—not entrepreneurs—risked their fortunes. This terminological dispute reflected a deeper theoretical tension: Where Hawley saw risk-bearers’ profits as uncertain, Clark's risk premia were predetermined costs like insurance premia. Debates on speculators’ place in the theory of distribution would leave Hawley grappling with this tension. Believing that speculators earned no net profits, he drew on Clark's analysis of insurance to show that competition eliminated the profits rewarding entrepreneurs for bearing any risk that could be hedged, insured, or otherwise managed. Though Hawley did not theorize what made some uncertainties insurable and others uninsurable, his contemporaries wrote a series of inventive textbook syntheses that built on this forgotten contribution to lay further groundwork for Knight's 1921 classic. Beyond mere historical attribution, uncovering Hawley's legacy clarifies Knight's novel contributions and illuminates the primacy of ownership in his vexing treatment of entrepreneurs’ “function of responsible direction.”
Abstract This article examines the quantification of the US tax burden in the postwar period. Much of the effort can be attributed to a desire to measure the fairness of a tax system that had undergone a series of radical changes in response to financing demands of the Second World War and the Korean War. We focus on an influential study of the distribution of the US fiscal burden directed by Richard Musgrave at the turn of the 1950s. Musgrave's results were challenged on technical grounds by conservative economists. Despite a strong social consensus for progressivity during the New Deal order, the empirical evidence was that the tax system was not as progressive as some claimed. This stylized fact crafted by Musgrave and a small group of Washington-affiliated technocrats lent support to a tax philosophy that emphasized a concern for equity. The cognitive infrastructure they forged influenced tax reform debates.
Abstract This article reexamines the transformation of quantitative economics in interwar France, challenging the prevailing dualistic view of the period as a choice between emerging compromise or renewed methodological warfare. We argue that the 1920s and 1930s were characterized by a “positivist consensus” based on a shared commitment to building a positive economic science and establishing statistics as the privileged form of mediated observation. However, we show that this consensus remained largely confined to the statistical domain, failing to resolve deeper methodological disagreements concerning the relationship between theory and data. By analyzing the rival visions of quantification within the Centre polytechnicien d’études économiques (X-Crise), we highlight the tension between Alfred Sauvy's conjuncturist approach, which was grounded in experimental, field-based diagnosis, and the econometricians’ formalist ambitions, embodied by François Divisia and Robert Gibrat. Our account reconciles existing historiographical contradictions by showing how this common positivist foundation gave rise to fundamental disputes over the epistemological boundaries of the nascent field of econometrics. Ultimately, these “small battles” were not just residual echoes of an old war, but formative struggles that shaped the development of economics as an inherently quantitative social science.
Abstract Did capitalism or socialism produce the conditions favorable to National Socialism? This question has been asked and answered since the 1930s, and the historian Benjamin Carter Hett has called the answer a “historical Rorschach test” due to its divisive nature. This article puts two original figures in this debate, the so-called neoliberal F. A. Hayek and the neo-Marxist Franz L. Neumann, into conversation as a means of exploring this question and finding common ground beyond it. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom and Neumann's revised Behemoth were both published in 1944 and have informed subsequent attempts to understand the roots of totalitarianism. Renewed interest in each scholar highlights their relevance to our own time, yet no work has addressed the complementary elements of their thought, nor their overlapping time at the London School of Economics. Despite Hayek's and Neumann's distinct answers to the capitalism/socialism question, they shared common criticisms of the Nazi regime's fragmented sovereignty, its political compromise between competing factions, and its particularistic application of legal principles. These features of what Hayek termed a “middle way” and Neumann termed a “polyocracy” created conditions favorable to totalitarianism. Hayek's and Neumann's insights foreground issues that continue to concern us today, irrespective of capitalist or socialist allegiances.