One of the leading ethical thinkers of the modern age, Peter Singer has repeatedly been embroiled in controversy. Protesters in Germany closed down his lectures, mistakenly thinking he was advocating Nazi views on eugenics. Conservative publisher Steve Forbes withdrew generous donations to Princeton after Singer was appointed professor of bioethics. His belief that infanticide is sometimes morally justified has appalled people from all walks of life. Peter Singer Under Fire gives a platform to his critics on many contentious issues. Leaders of the disability rights group Not Dead Yet attack Singer's views on disability and euthanasia. Economists criticize the effectiveness of his ideas for solving global poverty. Philosophers expose problems in Singer's theory of utilitarianism and ethicists refute his position on abortion. Singer's engaging Intellectual Autobiography explains how he came by his controversial views, while detailed replies to each critic reveal further surprising aspects of his unique outlook.
According to the dust jacket, Progress in Bioethics: Science, Policy and Politics is the first book to debate the meaning of progressive bioethics. Consisting of almost 20 essays written by well respected scholars in the field, the book tackles questions regarding the nature of bioethics as a discipline, its relationship to progressive ideology, and the ways that relationship plays out in particular issues and controversies.
The rise of "dignity talk" has led to the concept of human dignity being criticized in recent years. Some critics argue that human dignity must either be something we have or something we acquire. Others argue that there is no such thing as human dignity and people really mean something else when they appeal to it. Both "dignity talk" and the criticisms arise from a problematic conception of medical ethics as a legalistic, procedural techne. A retrieval of hermeneutical ethics, by contrast, offers a way to overcome both the legalism of contemporary ethics and the abuses and criticisms of the concept of human dignity. Such an ethics affirms both the inherent dignity of a human being as a multi-dimensional, meaning-seeking, historically-situated, relational individual, who desires to live a good life, and the realized sense of his/her own dignity toward which s/he works. As such, human dignity cannot be reduced to one feature of the human, and instead functions as both a descriptive category that avoids moralism, and as a normative category that allows relativity whilst avoiding relativism.
The moral, legal, and public policy dispute over embryonic stem cell research (and related matters, such as human cloning) is the most prominent issue in American public bioethics of the past decade. The primary moral question raised by the practice of embryonic stem cell research is whether it is defensible to disaggregate (and thus destroy) living human embryos in order to derive pluripotent cells (stem cells) for purposes of basic research that may someday yield regenerative therapies. This essay will explain the legal and political dimensions of the embryonic stem cell debate as it has unfolded at the national level in the United States, contrasting the position and thinking of President Clinton's administration with that of George W Bush. Building upon this, a set of brief reflections is offered on the form and substance of the American federal approach to this public matter and whether it is ultimately sustainable to join the issue in this particular way.
Abstract This article, taken from a presentation to the 2011 European Association of Centres of Medical Ethics (EACME) annual conference, draws on both national legislation in European states and the Conventions of the Council of Europe as well as EU instruments such the Opinions of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights to examine the current state of national and regional diversity in approaches to key bioethics issues and examines its evolution with reference to debates surrounding the development of key pieces of EU legislation and Council of Europe policy with bioethical implications. The relationship between the EU’s genesis as a primarily economic and commercial governance entity – with its accompanying emphasis on the harmonization of technical standards – and its approach to diversity in national bioethical perspectives is also examined. Conclusions are drawn as to the relative success and desirability of the European consensus process in bioethics.
One challenge to the concept of human dignity is that it is a rootless notion invoked simply to mask inequalities that inevitably exist between human beings. This privileging of humans is speciesist and its weak point is the profoundly disabled human being. This article argues that far from being a weak point, the profoundly disabled person is a source of strength and witness to the intrinsic dignity that all human beings have by virtue of being human. The disabled represent the reality of human existence that is both strong and fragile. Although human dignity can be understood philosophically its depth is rooted in Christian theological insights. The profoundly disabled occupy a privileged position and share in a theology of mission since they testify to the interdependence of every human being and human dependence on God to a myopic world that only values strength, autonomy and independence.
Engineering makes profound contributions to our health. Many of these contributions benefit whole populations, such as clean water and sewage treatment, buildings, dependable sources of energy, efficient harvesting and storage of food, and pharmaceutical manufacture. Thus, ethical assessment of these and other engineering activities has often emphasized benefits to communities. This is in contrast to medical ethics, which has tended to emphasize the individual patient affected by a doctor's actions. However technological innovation is leading to an entanglement of the activities, and hence ethical responsibilities, of healthcare professionals and engineering professionals. The article outlines three categories of innovation: assistive technologies, telehealthcare and quasi-autonomous systems. Approaches to engineering ethics are described and applied to these innovations. Such innovations raise a number of ethical opportunities and challenges, especially as the complexity of the technology increases. In particular the design and operation of the technologies require engineers to seek closer involvement with the persons benefiting from their work. Future innovation will require engineers to have a good knowledge of human biology and psychology. More particularly, healthcare engineers will need to prioritize each person's wellbeing, agency, human relationships and ecological self rather than technology, in the same way that doctors prioritize the treatment of persons rather than their diseases.
This article, taken from a presentation to the 2011 European Association of Centres of Medical Ethics (EACME) annual conference, draws on both national legislation in European states and the Conventions of the Council of Europe as well as EU instruments such the Opinions of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights to examine the current state of national and regional diversity in approaches to key bioethics issues and examines its evolution with reference to debates surrounding the development of key pieces of EU legislation and Council of Europe policy with bioethical implications. The relationship between the EU's genesis as a primarily economic and commercial governance entity--with its accompanying emphasis on the harmonization of technical standards--and its approach to diversity in national bioethical perspectives is also examined. Conclusions are drawn as to the relative success and desirability of the European consensus process in bioethics.
The precise meaning of "human dignity" is increasingly being questioned in ethics and law Is human dignity an adequate guide to policymaking in today's biotechnological era? This article is an attempt to answer this thorny issue. The emergence of the concept of human dignity as a key point of reference for the regulation of modern science and technology in the European Union is evaluated. The main contribution of this article is to prove that in EU Directives and Recommendations, human dignity is not an elusive concept but rather a regulatory restraint in European public policies on biotechnology, particularly through the influence of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE). Two examples will be elaborated to prove this claim: first, the issue of intellectual property in biotechnological inventions, and secondly the funding of research proposals involving the use of human embryonic stem cells. These examples prove that the principle of human dignity is not an empty concept as some philosophers and bioethicists claim but rather a normative guideline that is shaping European policies on biotechnology.
(2011). Conscience - A Very Short Introduction, by Paul Strohm. Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics: Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 130-132.
(2011). Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement, by Nicholas Agar. Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics: Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 133-136.
There is an apparent gap between public policy on embryo research in the United Kingdom and its ostensible justification. The rationale is respect for the "special status" of the embryo, but the policy actively promotes research in which embryos are destroyed. Richard Harries argues that this is consistent because, the "special status" of the human embryo is less than the absolute status of persons. However, this intermediate moral status does no evident work in decisions relating to the human embryo. Rather, public policy seems to be based on a different account of "special status": that developed by Mary Warnock. According to this, the embryo has no inherent status and the language of "special status" serves rather to accommodate the feelings of those who object to embryo research. This "emotivist" account is highly problematic, not so much for its attitude to the embryo as for its subversion of public moral reasoning.
This article deals with the discussion on the status of the human embryo in Italy on a philosophical, socio-ethical and juridical level before, during and after the law (n. 40/2004). Different lines of thought are outlined and critically discussed. The focus is the debate over the so-called embryonic stem cells, pointing out the ethical premises and the juridical implications. The regulations in Italy are analysed in detail, referring to legislation and jurisprudence (showing analogies and differences). In particular the author includes evidence for the debate after the law came in, with specific attention on the question of the use of imported embryonic stem cells and public financing for research and the problem of the use of frozen and non-implantable embryos.
Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson's seminal paper "A defence of abortion" published in 1971 has formed part of higher education syllabi for decades. In the paper Thomson criticizes one of the fundamental arguments against abortion, that is, the right of the foetus to life by denying that the foetus is a person. This article argues that her thought experiments do not compare to the reality of abortion and focuses on the influence of the paper on arguments concerning personhood.
In 2006 the Government issued a white paper in which it proposed a ban on human-animal embryo research pending greater clarity on its potential. The Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology initiated an Inquiry and concluded that such research was necessary and should be permitted immediately. The Government agreed and this is reflected in revised legislation. The Government has issued guidelines on the gathering and use of scientific advice and evidence, designed to ensure that these are "credible, reliable and objective." This article tests the Committee's approach in the light of its remit and these, and other, relevant guidelines and concludes that it failed to meet these standards. Rather it effectively ceded to an interest group the regulation of its own activities. The article ends by suggesting alterations to the Committee's remit and composition designed to ensure that the public interest is better protected in future.
After showing that despite being inherently flawed the concept of dignity cannot be replaced without loss by ethical principles such as "respect for persons," it is argued that, if dignity be not understood as dignitas, but as bonitas, which emphasizes connectedness rather than excellence and to which the proper response is not respect, but awe, there is no reason not to ascribe it to the human embryo. The question whether or not human embryos have dignity can then be answered in the affirmative on the same pragmatist grounds that ultimately lead us to respect other human persons as possessors of dignity, that is, a special moral worth.
This article critically examines the argument advanced by Casey Humbyrd in support of international commercial surrogate mothering. It finds her arguments unconvincing especially at the point of implementation. This is because the author was unable to demonstrate how regulation and her notion offair compensation would not lead to undue inducement and exploitation in resource-poor settings where urgent needs often exist. In fact, the argument advanced in this article is that commercial surrogate mothering cannot but be exploitative in so far as urgent and compelling needs exist. To logically drive home this point, the elements of exploitation were discussed in order to show that regulation and fair compensation cannot prevent exploitative transaction in commercial surrogate mothering arrangements. This may happen in the same way as regulation and compensation framework have not been successful in preventing the allegations of exploitation in the research context especially where studies are conducted in resource-poor countries.
