A drunk driver crashes his Lamborghini into a family sedan, killing the mother and brother and putting the sister in the hospital. The family gets a multi-million-dollar judgement, but they cannot collect––the wealthy drunk driver has no money of his own. All of his money and assets are protected from suit in a spendthrift dynasty trust left behind by his great-great-grandfather. He and his family are members of a new aristocratic class created by the downfall of the rule against perpetuities. The drunk driver first turned to alcohol after his inheritance requirements coerced him into leaving his life behind to attend a faraway school. His parents wanted to protect him from the coercive damage of too much wealth but were powerless to insulate him from the distributions of the dynasty trust––his great-great-grandfather determined all their fates through the eternal grasp of the dead hand. A perpetuity is “[a]n interest that does not take effect or vest within the period prescribed by law.” Perpetuities can cause a state of legal uncertainty to persist forever, tying up interests based on prior arrangements for all future time. The rule against perpetuities invalidates these interests. Without the rule against perpetuities, even the wealthy class is subjugated to the will of the dead. Descendants may not always make the best decisions, but it is “better for the sovereign and subject that men should be in hazard of having their houses undone by unthrifty posterity, than to be tied to the stake by such perpetuities.” But Thomas Jefferson’s imperative, that “[t]he earth belongs always to the living[,]” is fading away into history. Striving to prevent this dismal future, the framers of the Arkansas Constitution could not have been more forceful when they stated, “[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be allowed[.]” However, an amendment to the statutory rule against perpetuities in the 2023 legislative session abandons this fundamental principle. Arkansas’s ill-conceived participation in a national race to the bottom fails to benefit Arkansans and worsens inequality in the state. While Arkansas used the uniform ninety-year rule for years, this new rule extends the wait-and-see approach to an unfathomable 365 years. The only justification offered in committee for this arbitrarily long time period is a naked reference to Nevada’s own unconstitutional and undemocratic law. Despite directly conflicting with the Arkansas Constitution, the legislature passed this new Arkansas rule without sufficiently addressing any of its problems. To retain the benefits of the rule against perpetuities and to comply with the Arkansas Constitution, Arkansas should restore the uniform rule. The rule against perpetuities provides unique protections for our republic that should not be overlooked. One of the best features of the United States, and Arkansas, is that equality of opportunity gives innovators the ability to thrive and share the benefits of their ideas. The rule protects equality of opportunity by preventing the development of hereditary economic classes. Further, the rule safeguards sound decision-making by putting control of property into the hands of people who actually live in the world affected by those decisions. Property already tends to accumulate, even with the rule in place. Without the rule, Arkansas loses one of the few protections it has against the natural development of a hereditary class––something the framers of Arkansas’s constitutional prohibition against perpetuities were explicitly trying to prevent. Arkansas should restore the rule to keep these benefits.
Attorneys routinely represent married couples jointly in estate planning matters. Joint representation of married couples—and, increasingly, unmarried romantic partners—is a routine practice for most estate planners. This practice was not always so widely accepted. Beginning in the 1990s, scholars, attorneys, and interest groups successfully advocated for the widespread acceptance of joint representation in estate planning. In a joint representation, the attorney represents both individuals in a collaborative form of representation where confidences and goals are shared between both clients and the attorney. Proponents of joint representation in the estate planning setting argue that it reduces costs, is more consistent with client desires, and can better serve the clients by ensuring coordination of their estate plans. Of course, joint representation still has its critics, and it is not appropriate in all circumstances. For the most part, however, joint representation of married or cohabitating romantic partners is considered a routine and ethically sound practice. Despite its widespread acceptance, joint representation presents a variety of ethical and professional pitfalls for attorneys. While some relationships are egalitarian, copacetic, and enduring, the fact remains that many are not. If a relationship sours, the lawyer can end up in the middle of the crossfire. This Article offers insight to the perils and pitfalls of joint representation of spouses and unmarried romantic partners. Although the Article often refers to married couples in the interest of simplicity, most of the analysis applies equally to unmarried romantic partners. This Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers advice for deciding between sole and joint representations. Part III identifies some key considerations for engagement letters. Part IV considers ethical dilemmas that may arise during a joint representation. Part V considers the circumstances that will cause a joint representation to terminate and the lawyer’s options following the termination of the joint representation.
On June 19, 2024, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry signed legislation mandating the display of the Ten Commandments in all public K-12 schools and colleges in the state. On June 21, 2024, Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick announced his intention to introduce a similar bill in the next legislative session that would require the display of the Ten Commandments in schools. Immediately after the Louisiana law’s enactment, a group of local parents with the help of multiple organizations filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block its implementation. As of today, the district court and appellate court have issued differing rulings. The district court said the law had an “overtly religious purpose, but “[t]he Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision at least temporarily overturns [the] lower court order blocking the law from taking effect Jan. 1, 2025.” Whether the Supreme Court will accept this case and what ruling it will make could become a hot topic and influence the discussion in the next stage. The Supreme Court’s rulings on the display of the Ten Commandments in public spaces have been ambiguous because different standards of review have been applied, further fueling the debate and divisions within society regarding this issue. The Court’s stance has exacerbated the conflict, making it a part of the broader cultural clash in America. These controversies raise a fundamental yet highly contentious question: on which side of the “wall of separation between church and State” should the Ten Commandments be displayed? However, the Supreme Court recently has proposed in a school prayer case—although not a case involving the Ten Commandments in public spaces—that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment “must be interpreted by ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” The line between permissible and impermissible has to “accord with history and faithfully reflect the understanding of the Founding Fathers.” If this becomes a new standard, it could reshape the jurisprudence surrounding cases about the Ten Commandments in public spaces. This Article analyzes the evolution of the Supreme Court’s standards of review in such cases and, by drawing on the historical practices and understanding of the First Amendment, argues that laws like those in Louisiana and Texas requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms will likely—and should—be upheld if the Supreme Court continues to apply this new standard. This Article proceeds in five steps. Part I describes an overview of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Ten Commandments cases involving public spaces. Part II analyzes the evolution of the Court’s standards of review in such cases, examining the emergence of the new standard and its potential implications. Based on this new standard—historical practices and understandings—Part III explores the historical understandings and practices, specifically the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, and reviews historical practices, focusing on the display of the Ten Commandments in public spaces throughout history. Part IV discusses the unique role of the Ten Commandments in American history, culture, and the rule of law, proposing three distinct uses of the Ten Commandments. This section clarifies the different meanings associated with their public display and refutes the misconception that the Ten Commandments are solely linked to the Bible. The last part presents the Article’s conclusion.
In April of 2024, the District Attorney of Alameda County in California revealed evidence of “serious misconduct” by several prosecutors who oversaw a murder trial in 1993, in which the jury found a Black man guilty and sentenced him to death. The evidence of misconduct included the prosecutors’ trial notes. The notes that have been released suggest the prosecutors struck potential jurors from the jury pool because they were Jewish—the notes include: “I liked him better than any other Jew but no way.” The District Attorney is now looking into the county’s other death penalty cases, some of which took place over forty years ago. She indicated that there is further evidence of similar misconduct against Black and Jewish jury veniremen. While dismissing potential jurors in a criminal trial because of race was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, proving bias or discrimination in the jury selection process is usually quite difficult. Potential jurors who are not dismissed for cause can be removed using a peremptory challenge, which allows a party to remove a potential juror without providing any justification. While the Court attempted to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges through its decision in Batson, it is abundantly clear that the current Batson process does little to protect defendants and potential jury members alike from constitutional violations. This Note will explore the history of the peremptory challenge, explain how Batson protections fall short, and analyze the effects those shortcomings have through a focus on the recent uncovering of jury discrimination in Alameda County, California. Specifically, this Note argues that the incredibly low bar set by Batson, requiring race-neutral explanations for a challenged peremptory strike, allows discrimination in the jury selection process to persist, even in the face of Supreme Court protections. This Note also argues that the evidence used in Batson challenges is simultaneously too difficult to gather in its entirety at the trial level and is often not meaningfully reviewable on appeal. Finally, this Note argues that the misconduct discovered in Alameda County last year is not merely an isolated incident, as evidenced by similar cases in various parts of the country. These cases viewed together suggest a systemic issue for which there does not seem to be a solution absent a radical change to the Batson challenge process or the eradication of the peremptory strike altogether.
When a problem erupts between two states, interstate compacts provide a solution without the need for a nationwide decision. Rather than waiting for federal consensus, the states can, with Congressional approval, compact to solve their problems. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. New Mexico (Texas II) has threatened interstate compacts, ignored principles of federalism, and overextended its original jurisdiction. It has allowed the United States to force Texas and New Mexico to keep fighting over a compact, even when the states have resolved their issues on their own. First, this Comment will describe the legal background of compact clause law, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the case of Texas II. Second, this Comment will analyze the Texas II decision and why it harms state cooperation, avoids water law precedents, and overextends the limited original jurisdiction of the Court. Third, this Comment will assert a new legal test for determining whether the Court should allow intervenors to assert claims against two states which have settled a compact dispute in original cases: whether an alternative forum is available. Finally, this Comment will summarize and conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision undermines state autonomy and weakens the efficacy of interstate compacts.
Maternal care has reached a terrifying deficit in the United States. Masses of women throughout this nation are dying preventable deaths resulting from extremely lacking prenatal, birthing, delivery, and postnatal care. This is a silent epidemic. Why is the United States failing so miserably in comparison to its fellow developed countries? Why does the gap appear to be widening more and more each day? Various factors lend themselves to an explanation: general factors like the overall shortage of maternal care providers, as well as specific ones such as the not-so surprising fact that the United States is the only developed nation not to mandate or guarantee paid maternity leave in the postpartum period. Overall, “[i]nadequate access to health services before, during, and after pregnancy, combined with disparities in socioeconomic status, underlying health, and quality of care, have helped drive the maternal mortality rate in the U.S. higher than that of other high-income countries.” The United States has taken steps through federal legislation to battle its unsettling maternal mortality statistics. Legislation such as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (“CAA”) and the Further Consolidating Appropriations Act of 2024 (“FCAA”) have purported to bravely battle this epidemic by contributing mass funds for the expansion of Medicaid coverage, increasing perinatal15 mental health screenings, and providing clinics to maternal care deserts. However, these efforts are falling short. This Comment examines and addresses the root causes of maternal mortality in the United States, with a specific focus on the role states in the southern region play in maintaining this nation’s leading ranking in maternal mortality. Part II closely inspects the contributing factors causing maternal death and the states where these factors are more condensed, as well as the efforts Congress has taken to alleviate this massive healthcare problem. Part III analyzes subsequent southern states’ interactions with those federal efforts. Part IV introduces potential solutions of implementing midwife and doula programs to combat the maternal mortality statistics stemming from southern states. Part V synthesizes the findings, calling on southern states to more closely inspect their role in this matter.
The United States accounts for about 25% of the world’s prisoners but only about 5% of its population. It has the fifth- highest imprisonment rate—higher than China and Russia—with people of color disproportionately impacted. This racialized mass incarceration, and the lack of political will to meaningfully address it, demands bold remedies. Certainly, sentencing reform for low-level, non-violent offenders is needed, but contrary to popular belief, these offenders are not driving mass incarceration. Instead, the problem largely results from increasingly long sentences for violent offenders. This article proposes that the option, which I call “collaborative nullification,” can provide the over-punished needed relief, thereby diminishing our carceral state. Part I explores how previous authors have treated the separate but related concepts of prosecutorial nullification and judicial nullification. Drawing from my former work as an attorney with the Ohio Justice & Policy Center’s Beyond Guilt Project, Part II demonstrates how my real-world efforts at collaborative nullification succeeded and failed. Part III addresses the ethical issues my proposal raises and discusses how my collaborative model fits into our adversarial system. Finally, Part IV completes the story and shows that the pursuit of collaborative nullification can pay dividends even when it fails.
Individual ownership of firearms has been one of the storied rights of our country. During the Founding Era, firearms were plentiful among the colonists, providing them with protection and the means to hunt for food to sustain their communities. With a rebellion brewing against Great Britain, the ill-equipped colonial governments primarily relied upon the personal arms of their people for defense. Arguably, this fundamental right to bear arms played an important role in sparking the American Revolutionary War at the Battles of Lexington and Concord, in which the British attempted to seize an arms cache from the colonists. The subsequent victory in the American Revolution and ratification of the Second Amendment cemented the right of firearm ownership, among other rights, into American culture. Currently, millions of Americans own firearms in their home, and many own multiple firearms. Recently, National Firearms Act (“NFA”) weapons have grown in popularity and have become more accessible to the general population. NFA weapons are “[s]pecial types of firearms” that include short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, suppressors, machine guns, destructive devices, and “any other weapon.” Of these NFA firearms, suppressors are the most popular NFA firearm purchased. Historically, NFA firearms have been under strict regulation and require ownership approval from the ATF. Trends have shown the ATF has significantly shortened the waiting period for approval of individual ownership applications when compared to the waiting period for approval of trust ownership applications. When comparing the benefits of owning NFA firearms within a well-drafted firearm trust with those of individual ownership, NFA firearm trusts provide benefits that the individual form of ownership does not, such as estate planning flexibility, the ability for other people to lawfully possess the firearm, and a roadmap to NFA compliance. While NFA firearm trusts are the safest and most beneficial way to own NFA firearms, there are still apparent hazards to owning NFA firearms, regardless of the ownership method chosen. This Comment argues that firearm trusts are a preferable vehicle for owning NFA firearms as compared to individual ownership and that our legal system can take steps to remove some of the dangerous pitfalls that come with owning NFA firearms. When weighing the merits of each form of ownership, the benefits of trust ownership far outweigh the risks involving trust ownership and the potential benefits of individual ownership. Likewise, NFA firearm ownership can be made safer for people without exposing them, or their loved ones, to unnecessary criminal liability. Part II discusses necessary background information, including the history of firearm ownership, what NFA items are, the history of NFA firearm legislation and regulation, and trust law basics. Part III discusses the forms of how an NFA firearm may be owned and the logistics of purchasing NFA firearms under each form of ownership. This section will also compare individual ownership and firearm trust ownership by using a cost-benefit analysis. Part IV argues that Congress, the Judiciary, the ATF, states, and attorneys should combat the hazards present within NFA firearm ownership. Part V discusses future legislative and judicial implications that could have an impact on the efficacy, necessity, and function of firearm trusts. Part VI concludes that firearm trusts are the most beneficial and safest form of NFA firearm ownership for the foreseeable future.
Lawyering is a human experience in a digital world. Lawyers have long derived pride from labels like personal counselor, trusted advisor, and steady confidant. Sure, sometimes a productized legal service or one-off Turbo-Tax-style filing is all a client needs. But it’s still a people profession, the lifeblood of which is connection with others: clients, colleagues, witnesses, and countless more. Calls for attention to lawyers’ so-called “soft” skills have grown louder in recent years, tagged with descriptors like “people” or “business” or “professional” skills. Modern communication tools facilitate connection and relationship building like never before. But that which connects us threatens to disconnect us, too. A perfect storm of influences is redefining what it means to build a relationship, and to what extent we’re willing to trade in personal rapport and trust for efficiency, productivity, and cost-savings. When many are tethered to smartphones more than to people, are digital-first relationships a worthy substitute for the in-person first bonds of decades past? Reflections on these questions anchor this interview-based study of 60 law students, legal personnel, and senior lawyers. The sweeping topics of human connection and technology cover a lot of ground; so too did the participants. Part II kicks off by defining the you-know-it-when-you-feel-it idea of interpersonal human connection. It conceptualizes it through four core attributes grounded in everyday experience and scientific study. Part III shifts connection into the conversation about legal “soft” skills, drawing on scholarship, client-facing studies, and competency frameworks—all of which tilt away from a black letter law approach toward a broader skillset that fights back against the profession’s longstanding reputation as one of “high-competence, low-warmth[.]” Part IV then frames the study through six modern influences on connection. From there, Part V dives into the study. After sharing design details and methodology, interviewee responses coalesce into nine themes. Part VI launches these themes into action.13 It makes the case that there is more the industry must do to sustain development of connection as a lawyering skill.
Jails throughout the United States hold thousands of legally eligible voters who have not been convicted of a crime While those convicted of felonies are often statutorily disenfranchised, pretrial detainees retain their civil rights—including the right to vote. In theory, this should guarantee them a voice. In practice, pretrial detention operates like a legal disqualification. Without meaningful enforcement mechanisms, the right to vote becomes hollow. This Comment argues that implementing a national standard based on the proactive policies of Massachusetts and Nevada will ensure accessible voting for pretrial detainees. To build that argument, this Comment first explores the low level of protection provided by existing Supreme Court precedent. It will then examine how logistical obstacles at the state level—such as voter registration rules and absentee ballot procedures—contribute to pretrial detainees’ disenfranchisement. Finally, this Comment will highlight reforms implemented in a handful of states and argue for a federal framework that ensures voting access for all eligible voters, regardless of detention status.
This Note addresses the insufficiency of the current system in protecting criminal defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination. Part II will outline the background legal principles of the issue, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the no-impeachment rule. This part will also address the Supreme Court’s sole judicial exception to the no-impeachment rule as laid out in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado. Part III will address the statistical significance of juror bias against criminal defendants who invoke the privilege, highlight the widespread nature of the bias, and argue that the procedural safeguards currently in place are insufficient to protect.
What happens when the conflict of interest relates to the conservatee’s substantial talents and their potential earnings? In this circumstance, a conservator has a perverse incentive to profit off of and coerce their conservatee into labor which serves to benefit the conservator—a kind of involuntary servitude that would seem to implicate the plain text of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the history of conservatorships, why they were created, and the problematic issues that have arisen from the conservatorship system. Part II analyzes how the lack of meaningful judicial oversight creates the harmful potential for dynamics that arguably implicate the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude. Finally, Part III suggests a step forward to addressing the problem: a Guardianship Bill of Rights.
A host of statutory schemes seek to ensure equal employment opportunities in the United States by eradicating workplace discrimination (“EEO laws”). Consider two foundational pillars necessary for these EEO laws to strike the desired balance between individual rights and workplace efficiency. First, employees require robust protection from retaliation if they engage in protected conduct—for example, by reporting perceived discrimination. Second, employers can—and ideally, should—make employment decisions based on how an employee performs the job. The interests in robust protection and performance-based decision-making serve the purposes of our EEO laws and are well-established. Rarely do they conflict (to the contrary, they oftentimes complement one another). Tension arises when the putative protected conduct comes from an employee whose job duties explicitly include tasks like identifying, reporting, and remedying concerns about the company’s legal compliance (“EEO employee”). Courts have struggled with how to handle situations like this. To date, the response has been to either accept or reject the “Manager Rule.” The Manager Rule provides that an employee who voices concern about conduct perceived to be unlawful as part of the employee’s job duties does not engage in protected conduct (and thus cannot maintain a retaliation claim), unless the employee “steps outside” of what the job normally entails in reporting the concern. Existing scholarship has focused largely on statutory purpose and public policy. This Article seeks to fill a void by proposing a new analytical approach: the “Performance Test.” Part II outlines retaliation claims, generally, by examining the ubiquitous burden- shifting framework for EEO claims, the relevant statutory Part III explores judicial treatment of retaliation claims when putative protected conduct and job performance intersect, with an assessment of the faulty analysis employed by both pro- and anti-Manager Rule jurisdictions. Part IV then details the proposed Performance Test as a replacement for the ill-fitted Manager Rule and reasonable-belief doctrine.
In some rural counties of Arkansas, a single attorney is responsible for serving thousands of residents, depriving many Arkansans of even basic legal representation. Imagine facing eviction, fighting for custody of your child, contesting a divorce, or navigating the complexities of probate with no attorney for miles. This stark reality exemplifies the growing “legal deserts” problem facing rural Arkansas, where access to justice has become a luxury rather than a right. To combat the growing shortage of legal professionals in rural areas, states seek new solutions—some proving more successful than others. Several states have implemented rural attorney incentive programs, typically managed by their respective judicial branches or bar associations. Such programs, alongside scholarships, fellowships, and incubator projects, aim to attract and retain lawyers in underserved, rural communities. This Note examines the ongoing rural legal desert crisis in Arkansas and proposes that the state adapt its rural physician recruitment program to increase the presence of Arkansas lawyers in rural communities. It also considers how Arkansas can implement elements from other states’ successful incentive programs for rural attorneys to further enhance efforts to address its legal deserts problem. Section II seeks to provide background on Arkansas’s legal landscape, compare rural attorney incentive programs from other states, and explore the state’s rural practice incentive model for physicians. Section III suggests a solution, proposing that Arkansas adapt its statutory rural physician program to create a parallel model for attorneys, while also addressing potential implementation barriers. Section IV concludes with a call to action, urging Arkansas lawmakers and the legal community to explore the proposed solution and expand access to justice in rural areas.
Charlie Vaughn has been incarcerated since 1991 in Arkansas’s Tucker Unit maximum security prison, serving a life sentence for a first-degree murder he did not commit. His actual innocence is simply irrelevant in the State of Arkansas due to strict adherence to procedural court filing rules. He has only been denied without opinion or procedurally barred. Despite both state and federal constitutional protections safeguarding liberty and freedom through various rights, including to counsel, to remain silent, a speedy trial, a jury of peers, and due process, wrongful convictions persist. Arkansas stands out among other top incarceration rate states as one where notably few exonerations have occurred. A closer look at the stringent limitations and practical implications of the state’s primary post1conviction remedy, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 (“Rule 37”), reveals that very few inmates with innocence claims ever receive a review of their case on the merits because their claims are often procedurally barred just ninety days into incarceration. This Comment begins with Charlie Vaughn’s story, followed by an overview of how a defendant progresses through Arkansas courts after being found guilty of a felony, providing a past to present overview of collateral post-conviction remedies available. Part II focuses on analyzing the practical implications of Rule 37, the primary state remedy available to wrongfully convicted defendants seeking to overturn their original conviction. Part III concludes with specific recommendations for achieving stated goals of the state in post-conviction relief remedies while defending life and liberty as guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.
The government and stakeholders in society must act within their span of control to eradicate excessive and illegal gun violence. It is not surprising that a majority of Americans “say gun violence is a very big problem in the country[,] . . . they expect the level of gun violence to increase[, and] . . . it is too easy to legally obtain a gun” in the United States. This Article tackles this politically charged issue and recommends specific strategies for the government and stakeholders in society to reduce unlawful firearm violence and its harmful effects. At the heart of the controversy surrounding gun control, as explored in Part II, lies the difficult balance of respecting individuals’ right to bear arms under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and fulfilling the government’s duty to protect the public. Part III examines the existing legislation taken to remedy this situation such as extreme risk laws and laws requiring background checks for firearm purchases, as well as, their effectiveness. Recognizing the shortcomings of government efforts to reduce illegal gun violence and the limited ability of any single stakeholder to solve this significant problem alone, Part IV advocates for each stakeholder in society—from the government and media to those who sell, buy, own, possess, or manufacture firearms—to work on the necessary components within their span of control to build layered defenses that will be effective against those who desire to illegally kill themselves or others using firearms. Finally, Part V concludes that the government should enhance public safety by encouraging all stakeholders in society to act within their span of control to do their part to reduce illegal gun violence.
“They eat what they kill.” Dana White, President of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) said this about the state of fighter pay in the organization. White, the voice of the company, holds firm that fighters are adequately compensated for their services. The reality is that UFC fighters are not paid what they deserve, and, one way or another, there are big changes coming to the organization and the sport of Mixed Martial Arts (“MMA”) as a whole. In this Comment, I will discuss how the UFC has used its market power to suppress fighters’ wages and subject fighters to inequitable contract provisions. Further, I will argue that major changes are coming to the MMA industry and explore the UFC’s options in facilitating those changes. Finally, I will propose that a UFC fighter’s union is the best way to resolve the organization’s current mistreatment of their own athletes while still protecting the interests of the fans and the UFC itself. In Part I, I will discuss the origins of the UFC and its rise to market dominance in the MMA industry, and I will explain how the modern UFC’s status in the sport creates legal issues for the company. In Part II, I will discuss the two primary potential solutions to the UFC’s current legal issues and evaluate each of those solutions from the perspective of the UFC, the fighters, and the fans.
On the august occasion of the 100th anniversary of the University of Arkansas School of Law, this Essay celebrates one of its singular achievements: the decision of then-Dean Robert Leflar to admit Silas Herbert Hunt, the first African American allowed to enroll for graduate or professional studies at any all-white university in the former Confederacy since reconstruction. The bravery of both Leflar and Hunt has been correctly celebrated in the past, but this Essay seeks to highlight why it was actually braver than one might think (for both Hunt and Leflar) by comparing the actions of Arkansas Law with the shameful and illegal actions of the University of Tennessee College of Law (an institution that I love enough to hold responsible for its past). My colleague Briana Rosenbaum has aptly described the University of Tennessee’s approach to desegregation as “[d]eflect, [d]elay, [and] [d]eny.”
The term “checkerboarded land” has become associated with alternating public and private square-mile lots in Western states such as Wyoming, Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Arizona. In the mid-19th century, the United States was in the throes of Manifest Destiny. President Abraham Lincoln signed the 1862 Pacific Railway Act which aimed to connect the eastern United States with the newly acquired western territories by developing the Transcontinental Railroad. As an incentive for building the rail line, the federal government granted the even-numbered one-square-mile sections of land to the railroad companies, while retaining the odd-numbered one-square-mile sections for itself. The Federal Land & Management Act of 1976 makes public land, specifically land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), accessible to the public for recreation. Of the 2.4 billion acres of land in the United States, the BLM manages over 240 million surface acres and roughly 60% is privately owned. Before analyzing the legal problems and recent developments on checkerboarded land, it is essential to understand how these sections of land came to be and why they exist in this way. Section II will briefly discuss the history of the property landscape and the conflicting interests of private landownership versus publicly accessible land. It will then delve into the landmark case of Iron Bar Holdings, LLC. v. Cape, a case of first impression that may be the first of many corner-crossing cases. Subsequently, I will address some of the primary conflicting interests in this decision and the key legal principles undermining this area of the law. Following that, I will discuss outcomes from the case, outlining the current state of the law and identifying its pitfalls. In Section III, I will then explore where the law should progress and offer solutions to resolve the problem of checkerboarded lands.
