
The Plusvalenza case, affecting Juventus FC, is one of the most significant financial corruption scandals in recent European football. This study investigates how financial markets react to corporate misconduct in sports. Using a short-term event study, it examines cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around five key events such as judicial rulings, sporting sanctions, and regulatory agreements. Results show that investors react asymmetrically: point-deduction announcements generate significant negative returns, while economic penalties have little or no effect. Markets also anticipate both positive and negative news, showing ex-ante optimism and ex-post disappointment when expectations are unmet. Reputational damage emerges as key driver of market responses, often outweighing purely financial penalties. These findings suggest that while circumventing regulations may not immediately affect the stock prices, investors’ perceptions of reputational harm influence firm value. The study highlights the need for transparent financial reporting and sanctioning mechanisms, offering insights for investors, regulators and sport governing bodies.
Awarded to 4,500 municipalities since 2019, the “Terre de Jeux 2024” label has been the main instrument for promoting the Olympic and Paralympic Games among local governments. Its explicit objective was to foster the long-term development of sports club membership, one of the expected legacies of the Paris 2024 Games. In this study, we provide a quantitative assessment of the effect of the “Terre de Jeux” label on sports club memberships in France, using a municipal-level panel dataset covering the period 2016–2022 that combines sporting, socio-demographic, and geographical data. Using spatial difference-in-differences estimations, the analysis reveals a positive impact of the label, corresponding to an increase of between 71,240 and 156,400 additional sports club memberships. The effect varies across regions and local contexts, and appears stronger in less advantaged and less equipped areas, suggesting that the label contributes to reducing territorial disparities in sports participation.
We examine whether in-person crowds cause Major League Baseball (MLB) umpires to become more likely to respond to match-events with decisions that favor the home team. Using MLB’s Statcast data, we examine umpires’ pitch calls made when the home team is pitching, and compare them to similarly located pitches thrown by visiting team pitchers. Furthermore, we examine whether this differential was affected by the absence of crowds at MLB games during the 2020 season. During matches played in front of in-person crowds, umpires are approximately 0.28 percentage points more likely to call a pitch a strike if it is thrown by a home team pitcher. However, we find no such bias during the 2020 season, and this decline in home bias is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
Starting in 2012, Major League Baseball teams have been limited in the amount that they can spend on signing bonuses for players selected in the sport's amateur draft. While each club is constrained by its “bonus pool,” teams have the strategic discretion to allocate their pool across all selections to maximize the aggregate returns on their draft class. Analyzing the MLB Drafts from 2012 to 2022 under these rules, this study evaluates team strategies by estimating the expected surplus value of each draft class after players’ first three professional seasons using MLB data and prospect evaluations by Baseball America and FanGraphs. In evaluating teams’ signing bonus strategies with their first selection—going under, over, or staying near the MLB-recommended slot value—the results offer evidence that no single approach yields better, statistically significant outcomes for a team's entire draft class, implying that the market for draft selections is economically efficient.
Playing time is the product of two coaching decisions, whether to field a player and how long to leave him on, and transfer age should bear on them differently. Using 3,849 permanent transfers into Big Five clubs between 2010 and 2024, with playing time from match records, we reproduce the familiar inverted-U in transfer age, peaking at 28.4 years. It disappears once the player’s market valuation enters. So does its counterpart across 30,260 player-seasons in the five leagues, where the peak is sharper at 28.5 years and the quadratic term turns positive under the same control. The mechanism is visible directly. Clubs buy players who have been playing, and against matched non-movers a signing loses no playing time on arrival. What survives conditioning is concavity in minutes per appearance, and only among forwards. Transfer age tells us which players are bought at what price, not what becomes of them afterwards.