
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate cultural insights, yet little is known about their cultural expertise and the extent to which their outputs replicate or correct for cultural stereotypes. This study compares country-level estimates of individualism–collectivism (I-C) derived from five different LLMs with a recently validated I-C index based on nationally representative surveys. The LLM-based estimates correlate highly with the survey-based index (up to r = 0.874) but also exhibit systematic deviation from the benchmark: Western societies are consistently overestimated on individualism, while Confucian East Asian societies are underestimated. Statistically, the type of benchmark-relative deviations suggests group-specific baseline distortions rather than random noise, with smaller and older models showing weaker alignment. Moreover, the deviations are systematically aligned with Hofstede’s original I-C rankings, suggesting that LLM-generated cultural representations may reflect information from legacy cultural frameworks alongside contemporary empirical patterns. These findings demonstrate both the potential and the risks of using LLMs as cultural interpreters. In consequential settings, LLM-generated cultural insights should be used responsibly—with calibration, human oversight, and awareness of potential biases. Used uncritically, they risk reinforcing outdated narratives that misdirect academic research and managerial decisions.
The Decade Award–winning article by Darendeli and Hill (2016) presents a novel yet nuanced approach to the question of whether and how foreign firms can strategically navigate a volatile and unpredictable political environment. Their 2026 retrospective builds on their earlier contribution by showing how their insights have contributed to a number of contemporary IB research streams, including those addressing political risk, political action, and political ties. Going beyond their earlier contribution, in the retrospective, they describe the relational and physical pillars of social legitimacy (Darendeli Hill, 2026). They then assess the efficacy of their original perspective in an environment characterized by heightened geopolitical conflict and political polarization. Finally, they develop a model that delineates four strategic approaches to legitimacy building in host countries. In this commentary, I offer perspectives that complement and extend their contributions by discussing (1) the nature of political uncertainty and the use of real options in responding to that uncertainty, (2) the literature on substantive versus symbolic CSR and how that might further extend some of their insights, and (3) research regarding when and how multinational enterprises provide public goods and services typically provided by government. I conclude by outlining how Darendeli and Hill’s (2016, 2026) insights have relevance for contemporary practice and policy.
Although earning political legitimacy helps MNEs manage political risk, association with governments and political elites can become liabilities when regimes, alliances, and public sentiment shift. Reflecting on our study of MNE survival during abrupt regime change, we revisit social legitimacy as a complement to, and sometimes a substitute for, political legitimacy. We distinguish two foundations of social legitimacy: relational legitimacy, built through broad ties across societal constituencies, and material legitimacy, earned by providing products, services, and investments perceived as valuable by non-elite society. Although long recognized as a part of earning and maintaining a license to operate in any country, social legitimacy has become an increasingly important hedge against the ebbs and flows of political power driven by geopolitical fragmentation, populism, and polarization. Indeed, as geopolitics and populism make political affiliations more noticeable and more volatile, we suggest that efforts to earn social legitimacy play an increasingly important role in MNE nonmarket strategy. We identify theoretical and empirical questions concerning the sources, usefulness, and limits of earning social legitimacy; urge researchers and leaders to learn from and connect to non-elite sectors of society; and suggest ways that investment in social legitimacy can help MNEs navigate political turbulence worldwide.
Populist politicians employ rhetoric and policy actions aimed at disrupting a country's institutional environment that undergirds private investors' assets. In this study, I describe how governments led by populists interfere in countries' institutional environments and how this may affect the viability of firms' investments. I suggest that populists' "interference capacity" to disrupt institutions may increase with weaker constraints on executive power and with more time in power, and the capacity to disrupt organizations may increase with government ownership sharing with private investors. Interference weakens the quality of institutions upon which contractual agreements are established and then enforced, increasing the likelihood that infrastructure projects (projects) will face distress or cancellation. Analyses of 2913 projects across 19 developing countries initiated between 1990 and 2018 (allowing until 2022 for distress or cancellation to occur) are largely consistent with this proposition. Projects are more likely to be distressed or canceled if located in a country with a populist-led government. This likelihood is magnified with weaker constraints on executive power and if projects share ownership with governments led by populists. This study outlines the mechanisms through which populist government interference may disrupt project success and provides supporting evidence of such populist "interference capacity". Les responsables politiques populistes recourent & agrave; une rh & eacute;torique et & agrave; des mesures visant & agrave; perturber l'environnement institutionnel d'un pays, qui constitue le fondement des actifs des investisseurs priv & eacute;s. Dans cette recherche, je d & eacute;cris comment les gouvernements dirig & eacute;s par des populistes interviennent dans l'environnement institutionnel des pays et comment cela peut affecter la viabilit & eacute; des investissements des entreprises. Je sugg & egrave;re que la & laquo; capacit & eacute; d'ing & eacute;rence & raquo; des populistes & agrave; perturber les institutions pourrait s'accro & icirc;tre & agrave; mesure que les contraintes pesant sur le pouvoir ex & eacute;cutif s'affaiblissent et que leur mandat se prolonge, et que leur capacit & eacute; & agrave; perturber les organisations pourrait augmenter & agrave; mesure que l'& Eacute;tat partage la propri & eacute;t & eacute; des entreprises avec des investisseurs priv & eacute;s. L'ing & eacute;rence affaiblit la qualit & eacute; des institutions sur lesquelles reposent les accords contractuels et leur application, augmentant ainsi la probabilit & eacute; que les projets d'infrastructure (les projets) rencontrent des difficult & eacute;s ou soient annul & eacute;s. Les analyses portant sur 2913 projets men & eacute;s dans 19 pays en d & eacute;veloppement entre 1990 et 2018 (en tenant compte d'un d & eacute;lai allant jusqu'en 2022 pour les cas de difficult & eacute;s ou d'annulation) corroborent largement cette hypoth & egrave;se. Les projets risquent davantage de conna & icirc;tre des difficult & eacute;s ou d'& ecirc;tre annul & eacute;s s'ils sont implant & eacute;s dans un pays dirig & eacute; par un gouvernement populiste. Ce risque est amplifi & eacute; lorsque les freins au pouvoir ex & eacute;cutif sont moins stricts et lorsque les projets sont d & eacute;tenus conjointement avec des gouvernements dirig & eacute;s par des populistes. Cette recherche met en & eacute;vidence les m & eacute;canismes par lesquels l'ing & eacute;rence des gouvernements populistes est susceptible de compromettre la r & eacute;ussite des projets, et apporte des preuves empiriques de cette & laquo; capacit & eacute; d'ing & eacute;rence & raquo; des gouvernements populistes. Los pol & iacute;ticos populistas emplean ret & oacute;rica y acciones de pol & iacute;tica p & uacute;blica destinadas a desestabilizar el entorno institucional de un pa & iacute;s que sustenta los activos de los inversores privados. En este estudio, describo c & oacute;mo los gobiernos liderados por populistas interfieren en los entornos institucionales de los pa & iacute;ses y c & oacute;mo esto puede afectar la viabilidad de las inversiones de las empresas. Sugiero que la "capacidad de interferencia" de los populistas para desestabilizar las instituciones puede aumentar con restricciones m & aacute;s d & eacute;biles al poder ejecutivo y con m & aacute;s tiempo en el poder, y que la capacidad de desestabilizar las organizaciones puede incrementarse cuando existe la propiedad compartida entre el gobierno y los inversionistas privados. La interferencia debilita la calidad de las instituciones sobre las cuales se establecen y se hacen cumplir los acuerdos contractuales, aumentando la probabilidad de que los proyectos de infraestructura (en adelante, proyectos) enfrenten dificultades o sean cancelados. Los an & aacute;lisis de 2913 proyectos en 19 pa & iacute;ses en desarrollo iniciados entre 1990 y 2018 (considerandos las situaciones de dificultad o cancelaci & oacute;n ocurridas hasta 2022) son en gran medida consistentes con esta proposici & oacute;n. Los proyectos tienen m & aacute;s probabilidades de enfrentar dificultades o ser cancelados si est & aacute;n ubicados en un pa & iacute;s con un gobierno encabezados por l & iacute;deres populistas. Esta probabilidad aumenta m & aacute;s con menores controles sobre el poder ejecutivo y si los proyectos comparten la propiedad con gobiernos encabezados por l & iacute;deres populistas. Este estudio describe los mecanismos a trav & eacute;s de los cuales la interferencia de los gobiernos populistas puede poner en riesgo el & eacute;xito de los proyectos y proporciona evidencia que respalda dicha "capacidad de interferencia" populista. Pol & iacute;ticos populistas empregam ret & oacute;rica e a & ccedil;& otilde;es pol & iacute;ticas destinadas a desestabilizar o ambiente institucional de um pa & iacute;s, que sustenta os ativos dos investidores privados. Neste estudo, descrevo como governos populistas interferem nos ambientes institucionais dos pa & iacute;ses e como isso pode afetar a viabilidade dos investimentos das empresas. Sugiro que a "capacidade de interfer & ecirc;ncia" dos populistas para desestabilizar institui & ccedil;& otilde;es pode aumentar com limita & ccedil;& otilde;es mais fracas ao poder executivo e com mais tempo no poder, e que a capacidade de desestabilizar organiza & ccedil;& otilde;es pode aumentar com a participa & ccedil;& atilde;o compartilhada do governo na propriedade, junto a investidores privados. A interfer & ecirc;ncia enfraquece a qualidade das institui & ccedil;& otilde;es sobre as quais os acordos contratuais s & atilde;o estabelecidos e, posteriormente, aplicados, aumentando a probabilidade de que projetos de infraestrutura (projetos) enfrentem dificuldades ou sejam cancelados. An & aacute;lises de 2913 projetos em 19 pa & iacute;ses em desenvolvimento, iniciados entre 1990 e 2018 (permitindo at & eacute; 2022 para que dificuldades ou cancelamentos ocorressem), s & atilde;o amplamente consistentes com essa proposi & ccedil;& atilde;o. Projetos t & ecirc;m maior probabilidade de enfrentar dificuldades ou ser cancelados se estiverem localizados em um pa & iacute;s governado por populistas. Essa probabilidade & eacute; ampliada por limita & ccedil;& otilde;es mais fracas ao poder executivo e por projetos que compartilhem propriedade com governos liderados por populistas. Este estudo descreve os mecanismos pelos quais a interfer & ecirc;ncia de governos populistas pode desestabilizar o sucesso de projetos e apresenta evid & ecirc;ncias que corroboram essa "capacidade de interfer & ecirc;ncia" populista. 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International business accounts treat national culture as a country-level antecedent that shifts average export propensity uniformly, leaving the individual-level mechanisms producing within-country heterogeneity in internationalization intensity unspecified. We address this micro–macro transmission gap using social cognitive theory, examining how individualism versus collectivism and risk avoidance versus tolerance selectively recalibrate three cognitive orientations in entrepreneurial export decisions: perceived self-efficacy, perceived opportunity availability, and fear of failure. Our multilevel analysis of 40,529 observations across 41 countries spanning 2010–2019 reveals divergent rather than uniform moderation: individualism amplifies self-efficacy and opportunity availability beliefs through the social validation pathway, while risk avoidance constrains opportunity availability beliefs and fear of failure through the anticipatory self-regulation and outcome expectancy pathways. Fear of failure’s directional relationship with internationalization is contingent on the expectations of failure costs that the home-country cultural environment establishes through the outcome expectancy pathway, rather than being uniformly inhibitory as prior frameworks assume. These findings advance international business microfoundations theory by specifying the observable transmission pathways through which national cultural dimensions produce heterogeneous export intensity outcomes within the same national context. For policymakers, the findings imply that interventions to strengthen self-efficacy or opportunity awareness work best when calibrated to a country’s cultural profile.