
When evaluating policies that affect future generations, the most commonly used criterion is the discounted utilitarian rule. However, in terms of intergenerational fairness, it is difficult to justify prioritizing the current generation over future generations. This paper axiomatically examines impartial utilitarian rules over infinite-dimensional utility streams. We provide simple characterizations of the social welfare ordering that evaluates utility streams by their long-run average on the domain where the average exists. Furthermore, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the same axioms to hold in a more general domain, the set of bounded utility streams. Some of these results are closely related to the Banach limits, a well-known generalization of the classical limit concept for streams. Thus, this paper can be seen as proposing an appealing subclass of Banach limits through axiomatic analysis.
ABSTRACT We consider a rent‐seeking contest where two players compete for a single prize. Each player can exert effort in two complementary activities to influence his probability of winning. Each player also has the option to hire a delegate to exert effort in one of these activities on his behalf. We show that if the probability of winning the contest is sensitive enough to the efforts, in equilibrium one of the players teams up with a delegate, whereas the other player does not do so. Hence, delegation by one player arises endogenously in this case.
ABSTRACT We provide a dynamic conjectural equilibrium model where, at each date, heterogeneous and uncertain individuals decide whether to contribute or not to a public good. The model frames the contribution problem within a novel perspective, keeping various classical public good issues together. The results show that a unique conjectural equilibrium exists for given structural parameters; however, it is compatible with an infinity of possible equilibrium conjectures. Various policies can be used to increase the provision of the good, including (i) the enlargement of the exogenous provision of public goods, (ii) a fight against corruption and inefficiencies in the public sector, (iii) positive (negative) incentives to contribute (or not contribute), and (iv) actions supporting social capital. However, significant dynamical effects must be considered: the interaction between uncertainty and the conjectures makes any given policy differ in both impact and feasibility, since the system might eventually stop at a position different from the projected one. This can help explain the varied observable impacts of the same policy across different real‐world contexts. Nevertheless, policies (iii) and (iv) proved to be effective and more feasible.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we study a large class of multi‐contestant multi‐battle resource allocation contests, where contestants can be asymmetric in terms of both resource budgets and battle valuations, battles can be heterogeneous in terms of both contest success functions (CSFs) and battle valuations, and the conflict network can be arbitrary. Under a set of axioms satisifed by a broad range of stochastic contests, we prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of the contest, which is the first equilibrium existence result regarding resource allocation contests with contestant‐and‐battle‐specific valuations under general conflict networks. Furthermore, we show that proportional strategy profile is the unique PSNE under full participation, contestant‐symmetric valuation, and Tullock CSFs with discriminatory power , while the interleaving strategy profile is the one under ring structure, interleaving valuation, symmetric value and lottery CSFs.
We consider a society where social mobility is influenced by parental wealth transfers and education investments, with the latter capturing the time parents devote to the education of their children. These investments affect not only children's individual prospects but also the future distribution of productivity and wealth, an effect that parents do not internalize. We characterize optimal non-linear taxation under two alternative informational assumptions, depending on whether educational investments are observable. When education is observable, marginal subsidies to education and wealth transfers can directly correct for their effects on the future distribution. When education is unobservable, income and wealth-transfer taxation also serve as indirect instruments to influence parental education investments. In particular, a positive marginal income tax on high-productivity individuals can be optimal, in contrast with the standard no-distortion-at-the-top result. We derive these results under a weighted utilitarian criterion and examine how they change under a Rawlsian social objective.