A designer employs a dynamic protocol to elicit private information. Protocols produce a set of contextual privacy violations-information learned that may be superfluous given the context. A protocol is maximally contextually private if there is no protocol that produces a proper subset of the violations it produces, while implementing the choice rule. Contextual privacy violations arise when a choice rule makes some agents collectively, but not individually, pivotal. In auctions, designing for contextual privacy requires choosing an initial question posed to each agent and the order for querying agents. Ascending-join protocols are maximally contextually private for k-item Vickrey auctions. (JEL D44, D82)
We study cultural integration as an equilibrium outcome of marital matching along cultural and education lines and intrahousehold investment decisions regarding fertility and cultural socialization. Our model allows us to identify cultural-ethnic-group-specific investment parameters and spousal preferences for marital matching. Structural estimates reveal a strong demand to preserve cultural identity on the part of immigrants and limited acceptance of the immigrants' cultural diversity on the part of natives. Furthermore, these estimates reveal a substantial heterogeneity of the parental value of children's education across cultures. Nonetheless, our estimates simulate substantial-though heterogeneous-cultural integration rates across immigrant groups.
We provide experimental evidence on the intergenerational impacts of secondary education subsidies in a low-income context, leveraging a randomized controlled trial and 15-year longitudinal follow-up. Secondary school scholarships delay fertility, reduce unwanted pregnancies, and change partner selection. Under-one mortality is reduced by half. We also document cognitive development gains of 0.24 standard deviations of test scores by age five among children of female scholarship recipients. Means-tested secondary school scholarships are a high-return investment, with a conservatively estimated US$4.1 in benefits for each US$1 the policy would cost the government in the long run. (JEL H52, I12, I21, I26, J13, J16, O15)
We document how deepening resource scarcity results in rationing on the basis of race in a high-stakes setting: health care. Using detailed, time stamped data on 107,000 inpatient admissions to a large health system, we find that in-hospital mortality increases for Black but not White patients as hospitals reach capacity. These findings are not explained by differential patient selection. We identify rationing by wait times as a mechanism, documenting that sicker Black patients wait longer for care than healthier White patients at almost all capacity levels. Text analysis of unstructured clinical notes reveals rationing of provider effort as another mechanism. (JEL I11, I12, I14, J15)
Designing public transport networks involves trade-offs between coverage, service frequency, and direct service. We use the expansion of the bus system in Jakarta, Indonesia, to study these trade-offs. We analyze how new direct connections, changes in bus travel time, and wait-time reductions affect bus ridership and aggregate flows and estimate a transit network demand model by matching the route launch events. Commuters in Jakarta are 2-3 times more sensitive to wait time than bus time and inattentive to long routes. We develop a flexible framework to characterize optimal networks. A less concentrated network would increase ridership and commuter welfare. (JEL L92, L98, O18, R41, R42, R48)
