
ABSTRACT Firms often face multiple emerging technologies that evolve in parallel yet share limited architectural compatibility. In such settings, firms may concentrate innovation on one trajectory or pursue flexibility by maintaining engagement across multiple trajectories. We theorize that flexibility can improve innovation performance, but that these benefits depend on organizational structures that facilitate deep, trajectory‐specific learning and effective coordination. We argue that focused subsidiaries enable deep expertise within individual technologies, external collaborations provide access to complementary expertise beyond firm boundaries, and organizational modularity reduces the coordination burdens associated with pursuing multiple trajectories. Using 40‐year longitudinal data from the flat‐panel display industry, we find that the benefits of a flexibility strategy for innovation performance are substantially greater when firms have more focused subsidiaries, engage in more external collaboration, or exhibit higher organizational modularity. These findings are consistent across three complementary dimensions of innovation performance: patent impact, patent monetary value, and new product introductions. When these organizational arrangements are limited, the relationship between flexibility and innovation performance is substantially weaker. Our study demonstrates how organizational design enables firms to realize the innovation benefits of flexibility across architecturally incompatible technological trajectories.
We advance an audience-based view of incumbent adoption of potentially discontinuous technologies. Drawing on theories of discursive institutional processes and categorical legitimacy, we model how incumbents navigate mixed judgments from external groupings in their environment, that is, audiences, when adopting prospective discontinuous technologies. We argue that incumbents filter this noisy discursive environment by factoring in audiences' credibility and authority. We develop contextualized hypotheses and test them on a longitudinal sample of 149 incumbent financial firms responding to the emergence of financial technology in Europe from 2000 to 2016, distinguishing industry insiders, support experts, the general public, and regulators. Uniform engagement across audiences has a non-linear influence on adoption. Incumbents respond most visibly to judgments from the general public and resist positive engagement from support experts. Industry insiders' and regulators' engagement did not have robust direct linear effects. Our findings reveal a preparadigmatic legitimacy puzzle wherein conventional institutional predictions systematically fail or reverse when legitimacy signals remain contested across audiences. We develop four propositions theorizing the expertise penalty, democratic legitimacy under uncertainty, authority without clarity, and temporal heterogeneity of audience influence, establishing the need to differentiate between audiences to understand incumbent responses in the preparadigmatic phase of technology evolution.
ABSTRACT Business‐to‐business incumbents whose value creation rests on pipeline business models increasingly launch their own marketplace platforms. Yet how these business model transitions toward marketplace platforms unfold, and what they imply for the pipeline model, remains poorly understood. Adopting a cognitive perspective on managerial interpretations and decisions, we conduct a comparative case study of five marketplace platforms launched by incumbents in the European industrial products industry. We find that platform competition and the opportunities managers perceive in business‐to‐consumer platforms trigger platform creation, after which incumbents follow one of two pathways. In pipeline‐enhancing transitions, managers locate future value in the existing pipeline model and adopt platform features that strengthen it, resulting in cognitive alignment and interconnected platform–pipeline business models. In pipeline‐transcending transitions, managers locate future value in the marketplace platform and use business‐to‐consumer marketplaces as a reference point. This generates cognitive tensions with the pipeline model that ultimately resolve into independent pipeline and marketplace platform business models. Which pathway unfolds depends on the customer segments served, which shape managers' reference points for interpreting the evolving platform business model. Our process model explains these divergent outcomes and contributes to innovation management research on business model transitions toward platforms and their cognitive dynamics.
ABSTRACT Academic Summary Research has argued that informal competition (IC)—the competitive pressure from firms that are unregistered but derive income from the production of legal goods and services—increases formal (i.e., legally registered) firms' engagement in new product development (NPD) in emerging economies. However, other studies have suggested that IC may decrease such engagement. Drawing on an institutional perspective, we argue that the relationship between IC and NPD is contingent on the level of IC and the influence of formal and informal institutions. A multilevel analysis of 29,520 formal firms across 21 emerging economies indicates an inverted U‐shaped relationship between IC and NPD probability. Low to moderate levels of IC increase NPD probability, whereas higher levels reduce it. The findings also reveal that this relationship varies across emerging economies, with significant cross‐level interactions between IC and elements of formal (e.g., regulatory control, availability of finance) and informal institutions (e.g., survival vs. self‐expression and traditional vs. secular‐rational values) shaping NPD probability. Managerial Summary Informal competition can stimulate formal firms' new product development at low to moderate levels, but high levels of IC can discourage it. Because informal firms spur innovation among their formal counterparts, policymakers should not automatically seek to eliminate IC. Instead, they should consider IC as a changing condition and adapt enforcement to its intensity. At low to moderate levels of IC, minimal enforcement may be appropriate as the innovation and consumer benefits associated with IC may outweigh its costs. As IC becomes more intense and begins to undermine formal firms' NPD, policymakers can tighten enforcement while offering informal firms incentives to formalize. For managers, the findings suggest that the strategic response to IC should also depend on its intensity. When IC is low, formal firms may continue to innovate despite financial constraints; managers can therefore pursue low‐risk, affordable products using frugal innovation methods, while policymakers can support these efforts through improved access to finance. Managers are also well‐advised to consider the institutional context. Unlike their counterparts in countries leaning toward survival values (e.g., India), formal firms operating in societies that lean toward self‐expression values (e.g., Uruguay) are more likely to engage in NPD when IC is low; the probability decreases as IC becomes higher.
Despite recent efforts to bridge the circular economy and entrepreneurship, and to explore resilience in entrepreneurial ecosystems, the ways in which startups' circularity orientations influence how they build resilience in times of crisis remain unclear. Drawing on the adaptive cycle model from complexity and panarchy theories, this study employs qualitative case research on four circular and four linear startups operating within the built environment sector and belonging to the same entrepreneurial ecosystem to investigate how they responded to the raw material crisis. The study examines startups' positions within the exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization phases of the adaptive cycle in order to uncover distinct resilience trajectories. The findings suggest that circular startups nurtured and leveraged their ecosystems more actively than linear startups did, capitalizing on ecosystem relationships to strengthen innovation, adaptability, and system-wide resilience. In contrast, linear startups tended to withhold contributions and withdraw from ecosystem interactions, limiting collaboration and reducing their capacity to adapt and respond to crises. These findings advance understanding of how business model orientation shapes resilience trajectories within entrepreneurial ecosystems by identifying nurturing and leveraging as distinct mechanisms through which circular startups build firm- and ecosystem-level resilience during crises.