The American public exhibits a deep partisan divide on climate change. Some evidence suggests that engaging with people who hold opposing views decreases polarization; but research into real-world political discussion shows that people avoid conversations involving political disagreement in order to protect their social bonds with those whose opinions differ from their own. I present findings from an intervention in which pairs of people who have a personal relationship and hold opposing views on climate change (personally-close, ideologically-distant) are provided with shared information and a collaborative framework guiding these polarized pairs through discussion of their views on climate change. Using a mixed methods approach, I find quantitative evidence of significant and politically-relevant opinion change from before to after the intervention, persisting three months out; and qualitative evidence that provides insights into the mechanism through which these changes may arise.
This paper investigates the so-called 'far-right mainstreaming' thesis in environmental politics, implying that the far-right discourse has permeated mainstream right-wing politics and that the line between far-right and centre-right ideology has become increasingly blurred due to the influence of far-right talking points. To this end, we identify ideological similarities and differences in environmental arguments across the right-wing spectrum by analysing the voting records and parliamentary speeches of three major right-wing party groups in the European Parliament: the European People's Party (EPP), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and various far-right party groups, across EP terms since 2009. The findings reveal some mainstreaming of the far right in the ECR positioning since the mid-2010s and especially in the post-pandemic era. However, the shared environmental positions of the different right-wing groups, such as pro-people protectionism, subsidiarity, and balancing competitiveness with environmental policies are overshadowed by more significant ideational and contextual differences.
Fossil fuel reliant countries contribute disproportionately to climate change, yet little is known about how nations' fossil fuel reliance relates to public support for climate change mitigation. A large cross-national study (N = 101,956) across 105 countries and six continents showed that citizens of nations with greater fossil fuel reliance were less likely to believe that climate change should be a priority for their government, more supportive of continued fossil fuel use, and less supportive of increased renewable energy use. These associations remained significant after controlling for a wide set of country-level indicators, including fossil fuel consumption, economic development, democratic governance, corruption, and climate vulnerability, as well as demographic characteristics. Overall, these findings show that fossil fuel reliance is linked to reduced support for climate change mitigation. They also point to the need for a transition that acknowledges citizens' concerns about phasing out fossil fuels in fossil fuel reliant societies.
This paper examines the rise of an increasingly appealing, ideologically driven form of climate change denial that cannot be reduced to the fossil-fuel industry's strategy of merchandising doubt: libertarian populism (LP). Neither populism nor libertarianism, taken in isolation, necessarily entails opposition to climate science or climate action. But when combined, they form a coherent hybrid that resists both. LP operates through three intertwined features: epistemic defiance against expert authority, a defense of individual freedom, and a nostalgic attachment to carbon-intensive lifestyles and industrial modernity. Drawing on cultural and political examples - from Demolition Man's Edgar Friendly to Javier Milei and the AfD - the paper shows that LP's appeal lies in its capacity to recast high-carbon practices as symbols of identity and transgression. In doing so, it reverses the moral codes of climate politics: if green once meant good and polluting meant bad, LP turns this on its head. Green is thus the new bad.
