
With generative AI, everyone can materialize whatever fantasy they can conjure up in their imagination, including transgressive ones. The ‘orthodox’ view on the moral status of fantasies, even of materialized ones, is that such content is outside the scope of morality, since fantasies are quarantined from the agent’s real-world beliefs and desires. In this paper, we challenge this view by arguing that even if we grant that that is the case, repeated engagement with fantasies can contribute to the cultivation of various affective dispositions, or tastes, that can themselves be morally criticizable. We then argue that generative AI allows users to enter a ‘co-creative feedback loop’, a near-instantaneous cycle of prompting, viewing, and refining one’s fantasy, which makes sustained engagement with the transgressive representations very easy. Our claim is that such repeated and focused engagement with transgressive content can contribute to the cultivation of a taste or sensibility for what is morally problematic in those fantasies. If such tastes are morally criticizable, then engaging in practices that cultivate them is also open to moral criticism, even when no one is directly harmed.
Current efforts for online hate speech regulation mostly focus on explicit forms of harmful speech. This paper argues that harmful speech does not operate only at an explicit level, but that there are other forms of speech capable of producing serious harms through mechanisms that differ from those characteristic of overt harmful speech and that are overlooked in the current regulatory paradigm: dogwhistles, figleaves and other forms of more implicit sexist, racist or homophobic speech fall outside the usual scope of what is deemed harmful, thus easily slipping under the radar. I argue that no single mechanism approach can adequately address the distinct mechanisms through which harmful speech produces and sustains harm. Since current content moderation practice alone is insufficient to detect the full range of harmful speech, the paper proposes three strategies to online speech governance: 1) swift platform-based responses to explicit harmful content, 2) counterspeech strategies based on perspective-taking, including a novel proposal of Kantian Maxim Mirroring, 3) preemptive institutional and group measures that can help mitigate the conditions under which harmful speech can arise.
An attentional injustice occurs when some person or group is given disproportionate attention. In academic philosophy, it has been observed that members of various marginalised groups are cited less frequently than white men, both in academic papers and in university syllabi. This has downstream effects on gender/racial representation in Philosophy more generally. Because Large Language Models produce text due to prediction on the basis of training data, they are likely to replicate existing biases. As a result, without precautionary measures, LLM use is likely to exacerbate attentional injustice in philosophy and contribute to the continuing of current demographic distortions.
Editorial policies increasingly require authors to disclose substantive uses of generative AI, but such requirements commonly focus on whether, where, and how a model was used. Even function-specific disclosure may locate a model in the research or writing process without showing how its outputs entered scholarly judgment, how they were evaluated, or whether contributors can reconstruct the relevant reasoning and defend resulting claims without treating those outputs as sufficient justification. Drawing on research ethics, AI disclosure policy, human–model interaction, and researcher formation, this article argues that disclosure documents model use, whereas responsible use requires claim-level authorial warrant: a contributor’s capacity to understand, justify, and defend claims within their contribution. The article distinguishes cognitive delegation, in which model outputs shape substantive choices, interpretations, or justifications, from routine delegation, which does not ordinarily bear on the substance of judgment. Its conceptual contribution is to link the epistemic role of outputs that shape judgment to the function-appropriate evaluation required to justify decisions and retain warrant for resulting claims. It then repurposes disclosure categories as a claim-sensitive ex ante heuristic, mapping six recurrent research functions to risks, forms of oversight, and formative questions for recognising cognitive delegation and selecting function-appropriate evaluation. The article contributes to the ethics of information technology by clarifying when AI-supported scholarship remains under responsible human judgment and when cognitive delegation threatens the epistemic basis of authorship.
In philosophical work on the ethics of video games, ludic amoralists argue that acts players perform in games are beyond moral scrutiny. This is chiefly supported by the following arguments: the fictional harm argument, the consequentialist rebuttal, and the moral exploration argument. The fictional harm argument supports ludic amoralism in principle: if all game actions are fictional, none can be immoral. The consequentialist rebuttal supports a defeasible default: if violent games do not reliably produce harmful outcomes, amoralism is the default position. The moral exploration argument provides an aesthetic reason for amoralism: play is beyond moral criticism insofar as the player engages with the game in an aesthetic, exploratory way. Drawing on Waltonian theories of fiction, I argue that players often imagine themselves as performing the fictional acts represented in games, ranging from heroic exploits to morally abhorrent deeds. When players do this, they can come to identify with, to varying degrees, their fictional exploits. Strong identification occurs when players interpret their fictional actions as satisfying real desires, such as the desire to harm others. Using examples from players of violent extremist games, as well as mainstream violent games, I show how such identification can arise in practice. Most importantly, I show that in cases of strong identification, all three justifications for ludic amoralism fail.