
This paper draws on Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy to rethink the educational relation across online and face-to-face classrooms, in responding to the uncertainty exposed in online educational practices developed during and after the pandemic. Based on Levinas’s emphasis on the exposure of the self and the transcendence of the Other, a Levinasian ethical relation rests upon the self’s being exposed to an Other who exceeds it, prior to any mastery of knowledge. Illuminated by this, education is traversed by two forms of passivity that pull the subject in two directions in tension: one is an ethical passivity where the subject is summoned beyond itself by the Other; the other is an institutional passivity that draws the subject into an anonymous and predetermined role within a rational community. The ethical dimension of education lies in sustaining the tension between them rather than allowing either side to dominate. On this basis, the paper argues that the difference between online and face-to-face classrooms lies not fundamentally in the medium itself, but in how readily each setting sustains this tension, noting that online environments render it more unbalanced and let the Other recede into a manageable signal and the self into its institutional role. This paper also reconsiders the question from a spatial perspective and finally argues that what defines a relational space lies in its capacity to maintain tension between place and space—allowing the self a foothold while remaining open and exposed to the Other.
In this article, I explore the potentiality of class conversation that embraces intensive, affective, and immanently relational becomings, while resisting the major humanist, technical and rationalist approaches to curriculum and education. Challenging a phenomenological and autobiographical approach to class conversations as a still representational form of communication, I plug the philosophy of immanence by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari into my conversational experiments with students in my teacher education classrooms. Drawing from Deleuze-Guattarian thoughts, I conceptualize the conversations that emerged in my classes as intensive curricular conversations and explore the potentiality of such conversations by attending to those with Jueun, a student from one of my recent classes. Mapping this curricular and pedagogical practicing-theorizing, I ultimately suggest that we imagine teacher education differently, as invitation to draw lines of intensive becomings-learners and create the curriculum in non-identitarian, creative ways by welcoming and attuning to paradoxical, false, meandering, and schizophrenic expressions in intensive curricular conversations.
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has transformed educational debates by raising important questions about learning, assessment, academic integrity, and epistemic injustice. This paper argues that these discussions overlook another equally significant issue: how GenAI participates in students’ affective formation. Drawing on recent philosophical work on affective injustice, I reconceptualize this concept for educational contexts by arguing that affective injustice concerns unjust interference with the processes through which students develop as affective subjects. I theorize GenAI as an affective technology that shapes emotional norms, orientations, and capacities through interactions involving encouragement, reassurance, emotional feedback, and simulated empathy. I then identify two mechanisms through which GenAI may contribute to affective injustice—affective normalization and affective dependency—and examine their implications for educational philosophy and practice. Finally, I propose principles for affectively just educational AI that preserve affective plurality, cultivate affective agency, and support the relational and reflective purposes of education.
This paper advocates for canonical pluralism by defending a particular way of teaching the canonical history of philosophy. More specifically, I argue that there is educational value in retaining the so-called 'standard narratives' in the classroom, namely, that they may increase our self-knowledge. Following the analytic tradition (e.g., Coliva, ), by 'self-knowledge' I mean knowledge of one's beliefs or attitudes. Teaching the canonical history of philosophy can enhance such knowledge if it offers transparency about the exclusionary mechanisms and forces often hidden from view-whether these concern the views of the authors themselves or those who constructed the canon around certain authors. Put differently, teaching the canonical history of philosophy should be retained because of its potential to reduce epistemic ignorance by exposing the discriminatory beliefs and attitudes of canonical thinkers and of the thinkers who canonized them.