Abstract This article examines how operational-level grievance mechanisms (OGMs) implemented by transnational mining companies in Africa entrench corporate control over victims’ access to remedy. Although OGMs are central to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights , their deployment in weak governance contexts often transforms them from early-warning tools into the sole avenue for redress. Through a comparative analysis of four different mines that reveal converging mining and business and human rights dynamics unique to Africa, this article considers how OGMs reproduce power asymmetries through opaque procedures, limited consultation, information imbalances, and unpredictable remedies. These dynamics undermine the UNGPs’ effectiveness criteria and reveal structural gaps within Pillar Three’s design. The article argues for alternatives, such as independent grievance mechanisms and additional guidance on implementing the UNGPs that guarantee legal representation, prohibit restrictive waivers, and introduce sector-specific recommendations. Without such changes, OGMs risk legitimising corporate abuses rather than remedying harm.
Mapping and measuring corporate harm to human rights and the environment remains difficult due to limited data transparency and inconsistent reporting standards. Yet robust information is essential to understand the magnitude of the problem, track progress, and support an empirical research agenda capable of identifying what effectively curbs business-related misconduct and related questions. This paper introduces a new open-access dataset documenting alleged human rights and environmental abuses-the REBALANCE Business-related Human Rights and Environmental (BRAVE) database-involving 83 of the largest publicly listed European multinational corporations between 2000 and 2020. Built from systematic data collection from the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, the dataset codes allegations by type of abuse, country, victims affected, corporate involvement (direct or indirect), and severity, enabling both comparative and longitudinal analyses. 98 per cent of the monitored firms are associated with at least one alleged abuse. This pattern suggests that such incidents are common rather than isolated. By offering a transparent and replicable empirical foundation, BRAVE aims at supporting evidence-based research, policy development, and stronger corporate accountability in the business and human rights field.
It seems futile to look for order in the tangle of norms that abound in the global extractive sector, even more so to look for the teleological principle that would give it meaning. In this tangle, normative regimes interact with each other-in a largely contingent manner-as elements of an ecosystem. We argue that inasmuch as order emerges in the global extractive normative ecosystem, it is a function of the success of norm entrepreneurs such as Export and Development Canada (EDC), Canada's export credit agency, a financial institution adhering to the Equator Principles. Norms entrepreneurs like EDC perform various normative bricolages claiming to deliver different goods such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). We analyse how EDC tinkers with different normative instruments, including the International Finance Corporation's Standard 7 regarding Indigenous Peoples, to deliver 'FPIC compliance' in jurisdictions that are deemed 'deficient'. We argue that the political ontologies promoted by EDC's notion of FPIC are better understood within the logic of leverage that underlies EDC's Environmental and Social Risk Management Policy. These ontologies directly contradict notions of FPIC as expressions of Indigenous self-determination. In our view, offering such normative solutions as a palliative for 'weak' jurisdictions-a kind of 'do-it-yourself (DIY) FPIC regime' implemented by extractive companies-is thus deeply problematic. We conclude that the appraisal of such normative solutions as put forward by these norm entrepreneurs should look beyond the vocabulary these bricolages mobilise to also consider the political grammar that they induce in territories subject to extraction.
In 2018, human rights organizations filed a criminal complaint in Italy against the directors of the Italian armaments export licensing authority (UAMA) and the CEO of the arms manufacturer RWM Italia, following the discovery of bomb remnants on the site of an airstrike in Yemen that killed six civilians. The criminal complaint was dismissed in March 2023, despite the judge ruling that UAMA's directors had violated the Arms Trade Treaty. In July 2023, the victims filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights against Italy, alleging a violation of the right to life. Drawing on an analysis of the criminal investigation files, this piece assesses the failures of the Italian state and RWM Italia to comply with their international human rights obligations regarding arms transfers. It considers the potential for improving accountability within the arms trade via domestic and European courts.
War is a lucrative business for the military industry, particularly in contexts of mass and structural violence, extensive violations of international law and genocide. For economically advanced states, the profits generated by military businesses are often seen as beneficial under the dynamics of the military-industrial complex. Israel's genocide in Gaza, which has caused untold suffering that has 'scarred the consciousness of humanity', aptly illustrates this dynamic. In such a context, states and corporations arguably have a duty under international law not to contribute to or benefit from the war economy of the state committing such violations. In practice, however, adhering to these obligations conflicts with the lucrative economic and geopolitical opportunities that this war economy provides. This essay reflects on the argumentative techniques used by states and corporations to justify continued military support for Israel, despite its clear contradiction with their international legal obligations.
In the Lafarge decision of 7 September 2021, the French Cour de cassation resolved a long-standing unclarity about the interpretation of French criminal law on complicity in the context of multinational corporations' involvement in international crimes. The court found that complicity in crimes against humanity can be characterized as soon as a business actor is aware that its actions can facilitate the criminal activities of the main perpetrator, without sharing their specific intent to commit the crime. With this ruling, France's highest criminal court asserted that the transfer of money from multinational cement company Lafarge to the Islamic State (ISIS) to maintain its industrial activity in northern Syria could trigger its liability for complicity in crimes against humanity. This article summarizes this case from a French and international criminal law perspective, focusing on the charge of complicity in crimes against humanity, and assessing the potential implications of this jurisprudence to the arms industry.
There is increased public attention directed to the topic of weapons trade and this is a positive development because enhanced scrutiny holds a promise of bringing more accountability to the field that has long been obscure. This article reviews the possibility of criminal prosecutions of corporate officials for supplying weapons to Gaza, Yemen and Ukraine at the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a similar forum. The Nuremberg Trials planted seeds for such an endeavour by holding several industrialists criminally liable. Yet, modern international criminal law has so far largely stayed away from defining the scope of individual criminal responsibility for corporate officials. The case studies in this paper reveal that the moment is not ripe for commencing actual investigations at the ICC. Nonetheless, a future consensus is slowly building through (often failed) attempts to use legal or policy avenues to define the standards of conduct in the weapons trade.
With the Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, the European Union strives to address the negative externalities of companies that arise in the global economy. The new Directive follows the example of national lawmakers by requiring large companies operating in their own jurisdiction to manage adverse impacts on human rights and the environment. These due diligence laws affect companies beyond European borders by cascading due diligence standards down transnational ownership ties and value chains. They are shifting gears in the complex engine of the global economy and have considerable impacts on stakeholders in third countries. These extraterritorial implications raise the question of what limits international law places on relevant unilateral legislation. This article assesses the Directive against the law of jurisdiction and international comity arguing that unilateral due diligence laws are an appropriate way to address transnational sustainability challenges, provided lawmakers take adequate precautions.
This article argues that the global Business and Human Rights movement demonstrates a push towards a human-rights type of sustainable corporation, reconciling economic development and human rights. It explains the necessity for and significance of a definition of a sustainable corporation at the intersection of traditional international human rights and sustainable development instruments. It argues, inter alia, that an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation can settle fundamental questions and create a minimal framework for meaningful discourse on corporate accountability for human rights, climate change and the environment. It identifies difficulties of defining a sustainable corporation such as the integration problem. It suggests 'direct human rights obligation' as a minimally sufficient normative criterion for the definitional correctness of a sustainable corporation. The suggested definition of sustainable corporation requires taking a normative position which makes the term 'essentially contested' resulting in discursive and behavioural norm contestation in the search for definitional determinacy and consensus within the divide between international and domestic law.
2024 marked ten years since the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) took effect. Firmly rooted in international human rights and humanitarian law, the ATT is the first legally binding instrument to regulate international arms transfers. It is a framework for national action to (i) contribute to peace and security, (ii) reduce human suffering caused by irresponsible arms transfers and (iii) promote transparency in the international arms trade. This piece exploresrecent developments in the ATT process that represent a pivot from building treaty infrastructure toward more expansive stakeholder engagement, increased information exchange centred on state practice and a sharper focus on the ATT's human impact. Key new features are discussions on actual arms transfer decisions and the examination of the independent human rights responsibilities of industry that operate alongside government risk assessment obligations. Finally, this piece assesses the potential impact of these efforts on the achievement of the ATT's humanitarian purpose.
Legal waivers embedded in corporate settlement agreements are commonly framed as neutral devices of dispute resolution. They promise finality, prevent double recovery and manage litigation risk. Yet in practice, waivers function as structural tools of accountability avoidance. This article examines the use of legal waivers within operational-level grievance mechanisms, focusing on three dimensions: the UNGPs' procedural formalism, the cost dynamics of corporate settlements, and the opacity created by confidentiality provisions. It argues that the UNGPs' emphasis on process legitimacy neglects the substantive consequences of waivers, that cost volatility incentivises their routine use, and that confidentiality provisions entrench information asymmetry while obstructing judicial oversight. The article concludes by advancing a hybrid regulatory model which prohibits blanket confidentiality of terms governing settlement agreements and advocates for greater transparency through a differentiated disclosure regime and increased judicial scrutiny by domestic courts.
This article examines how concentrated corporate power in the technology sector reshapes repression and human rights harm, arguing that an integrated Business and Human Rights (BHR) and Transitional Justice (TJ) approach is needed. It identifies three persistent gaps in BHR practice-regulatory fragmentation, limited access to remedy and Global North dominance-and demonstrates how TJ principles, particularly victim-centred participation, Global South leadership and transformative reparations, can address these challenges. Drawing on Latin American experiences with truth-seeking, reparations and corporate accountability, the article develops a hybrid BHR-TJ framework designed to confront power asymmetries, strengthen remedies and embed guarantees of non-repetition in global governance. The argument positions this integration as a forward-looking response to the structural harms of the digital economy, offering tools to move beyond proceduralism towards systemic corporate accountability. By combining BHR's regulatory tools with TJ's participatory and transformative approaches, the article contributes a novel accountability model for the digital era.
This article explores digital colonialism in Africa, focusing on how Big Tech and local intermediaries perpetuate data exploitation, infrastructure dependency and algorithmic bias. Applying a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) lens, it draws parallels between historical colonialism and the modern digital economy, highlighting persistent power imbalances in data control and tech sovereignty. Multinational firms from the Global North extract and monetise African data with little benefit to local communities, reinforcing dependency. Local actors (governments, tech elites and influencers) often enable this through policy gaps and cultural alignment with Western platforms. The article examines the impact on data sovereignty, human rights and economic autonomy, including risks of surveillance and silencing local voices. It calls for policy reforms, investment in African tech ecosystems, digital literacy and robust regional regulation. Ultimately, it advocates for digital justice and self-governance to reclaim Africa's digital future.
