
This article examines the emergence of coordinated pro-regime digital networks in Burkina Faso through the concept of “cyber-militia.” Drawing on a comparative qualitative analysis of 468 Facebook entries collected across three online targeting campaigns, the study explores how actors associated with the Brigade d’intervention rapide de la communication (BIR-C) use digital platforms to amplify hostile narratives, intimidate critics, and delegitimise individuals and organisations perceived as threats to the military regime. Combining qualitative content analysis and process tracing, the article identifies three operational logics of cyber-militia communication: escalation and intimidation, persistence and reputational delegitimisation, and institutional delegitimisation. The findings suggest that cyber-militias function as hybrid formations situated at the intersection of propaganda, participatory digital culture, and coercive state power. The article contributes to scholarship on digital media and conflict by proposing cyber-militia as a new analytical framework for understanding coordinated forms of participatory digital coercion in contemporary conflict environments.
This article examines the media controversy surrounding Olena Zelenska’s 2022 Vogue photoshoot, including audience reactions, subsequent news coverage, and the feminist social media campaign #sitlikeagirl. It investigates how feminist discourse became mobilised within highly mediatised wartime communication. Drawing on conjunctural cross-platform analysis of social media posts, Instagram comments, and news coverage, the study reveals a significant discrepancy between dominant journalistic framings of the controversy and the discourse visible within the original comment sections. While media coverage repeatedly framed Zelenska as targeted by misogynistic criticism concerning her allegedly “unfeminine” posture, the analysed comments predominantly criticised the political and aesthetic implications of glamourising war through fashion media. The article argues that the viral feminist framing of the campaign emerged less as a direct response to observable sexism and more as a participatory and affective form of wartime digital communication shaped by platform logics, emotional alignment, and recognisable postfeminist activist aesthetics. Situating the campaign within broader debates on participatory war, misinformation, digital activism, and nation branding, the article proposes the concept of digital fem-washing of war to describe how feminist visibility and activist language become incorporated into the communicative infrastructures of contemporary hypermediated warfare.
The article analyzes the visual activism of OMAS GEGEN RECHTS (“Grannies against the right”), a movement founded in Austria in 2017 by older feminist women mobilizing against far-right politics. The movement increasingly extends into digital spaces, where political conflict over democratic values and public legitimacy is negotiated. At the same time, forms of protest by older activists remain largely unexplored. Drawing on concepts of agonistic publics, visual activism, and unruliness, we analyze how OMAS GEGEN RECHTS engage with digital media to articulate political positions and intervene in right-wing politics. The study is based on a qualitative analysis of visual practices in Instagram posts published in 2025, focusing on the nationwide account representing Austria: @omasgegenrechts (137K followers in late December 2025). We examine how visual practices are used to mobilize supporters, construct collective identities, and contest right-wing narratives. Our findings reveal how images and symbolic self-representation are used to counter ageist exclusions from digital spaces while simultaneously mobilizing both members of the movement and broader publics. Rather than being marginalized by digital divides, OMAS GEGEN RECHTS actively negotiate platform constraints and transform age into a source of political legitimacy and moral authority. By emphasizing age and visibility as central dimensions of digital conflict, this article contributes to debates on digital media, activism, and political struggles.
Broadcasting has historically been understood as a spectrum-based medium organised through the territorial transmission of radio signals. Yet under conditions of conflict and media capture, the organisational practices associated with broadcasting may increasingly be reproduced through alternative communication infrastructures. This article examines the emergence of WhatsApp radio in conflict-affected Mali, where political pressure, declining media independence, and widespread mobile connectivity have encouraged journalists and audiences to organise the production and circulation of news through encrypted messaging networks. Drawing on long-term digital ethnographic observation of Fulani WhatsApp groups, computational analysis of shared visual material, documentary research, and field engagement with journalists, community members, and WhatsApp administrators, the article addresses two questions: how are organisational practices traditionally associated with broadcasting reproduced through WhatsApp under conditions of conflict and media capture; and what does the emergence of WhatsApp radio reveal about the changing organisation of broadcasting beyond the electromagnetic spectrum? The findings show that, although WhatsApp radio operates through digital messaging infrastructures rather than conventional broadcast transmission, it reproduces key organisational characteristics historically associated with broadcasting, including scheduled news bulletins, editorial gatekeeping, recurring programming, and audience expectation. Comparing these practices with earlier forms of pirate broadcasting and other adaptive responses to communicative constraint, the article argues that WhatsApp radio represents a form of post-spectrum broadcasting in which broadcasting is defined less by transmission technology than by the organisational practices through which public information is produced, curated, and circulated.
Online technological controversies often involve both ordinary disagreement and counterspeech, yet these forms of opposition are rarely compared within the same discussion environment. Drawing on argumentation theories, this study compares disagreement replies to non-hateful comments with counterspeech replies to hateful comments in Douyin discussions of China’s AI controversies, where hate speech may include stigmatizing generalizations about social groups. Using 9,407 oppositional parent–response dyads, we compared like counts, toxicity, subsequent toxic replies, and the distribution and reception of six response types. Counterspeech and disagreement did not differ significantly in like counts, but counterspeech exhibited higher toxicity and was related to greater odds of toxicity among direct replies posted within seven days. Despite sharing the same six response types, the two response contexts varied in their type distributions and associations with likes. These findings situate counterspeech within a broader spectrum of online opposition, revealing contextual differences in its argumentative expression and subsequent interaction across hateful and non-hateful contexts.