
Allowance rates for disability insurance (DI) applications vary by race and ethnicity, but it is unclear to what extent these differences are artifacts of other differing socio-economic and health characteristics. This paper uses the 2015 American Community Survey linked to Social Security Administration administrative data to investigate DI application allowance rates among applicants aged 25-65. The analysis uses regression, propensity score matching, and inverse probability weighting to estimate differences in allowance rates by race and ethnicity among applicants who are similar on observable characteristics. Relative to raw comparisons, differences in multivariate analyses are substantially smaller in magnitude and are generally not statistically significant.
We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor-market power interacts with product-market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variables are strategic substitutes. The mechanism can raise the regulated firm's profit as well as total employment and consumer surplus. We characterize the conditions for profit enhancement and show how labor-market linkages alter strategic interaction. For instance, in a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with a shared duopsony component, prices can become strategic substitutes, yielding a related profit-enhancing mechanism.
Do firm-specific subsidies create local jobs, and do those jobs go to local residents? Linking Good Jobs First subsidy records to Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Origin-Destination Employment Statistics employment data, we estimate stacked event studies using geocoded census-tract awards in six states and national county-level mega-deals exceeding $100 million. At the tract level, workplace employment rises only for large awards, with gains concentrated in the subsidized tract and not offset nearby. At the county level, mega-deals raise workplace but not resident employment; origin-destination flows show gains accrue primarily to out-of-county commuters. Back-of-the-envelope announced subsidy costs range from $18,233 to $69,749 per job.
This paper examines whether the 1993 Earned Income Tax Credit expansion affected children of single and married mothers differently, given their sharply different labor supply incentives. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that the expansion reduced combined Peabody Individual Achievement Tests math and reading scores of single mothers' children by 0.14 standard deviations relative to married mothers' children. Mechanism analyses provide internally consistent evidence that increased maternal employment was accompanied by reduced cognitive stimulation and fewer time-intensive parental inputs, suggesting that reduced caregiver-child interactions may have contributed to these effects and underscoring the potential need for complementary policies such as access to high-quality child care.
Among National Hockey League (NHL) player contracts signed from 2011 to 24, over 38% are divisible by $100,000. I show that the bunching of NHL contracts at round numbers is partly driven by teams' coarse contract-setting. Teams with more coarse contracts have worse performance. Then, I test predictions from a wage-setting model where optimization costs cause contract rounding. With two measures of management quality, I document a negative relationship between management quality and coarse contract-setting. Next, I find that coarse contract-setting is associated with higher pay inequality. Finally, I do not identify spillover effects of changes in minimum salaries on coarse contract-setting.