Abstract This article discusses how great power competition is reshaping the semantics of international legal argument – that is, the array of discursive performances through which states articulate their positions and construct legal meaning at the international level. Our hypothesis is that as geopolitical rivalries intensify, semantics have become the terrain of a struggle between incumbent and emerging powers, each seeking to impose their discursive frames, narrative structures and vocabularies as authoritative reference points in legal discourse. From our perspective, great power competition is not only about substantive definitions of international norms but also about control of the vernacular of the discipline. To develop our hypothesis, we trace this struggle for semantic authority in the context of advisory proceedings at the International Court of Justice, an institution with unparalleled symbolic potential for universalizing argumentative styles in international law. In particular, we examine how 10 great powers have framed their legal positions before the Court between 1993 and 2024 – that is, throughout the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. By relying on a body of 57 written filings, we retrace the evolving dance of ‘semantic moves’ on the stage of the Peace Palace.
This article examines the role of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (YPs) in integrating queer demands into human rights discourse. Approaching international law-making as a social practice that contains particular cultural and discursive patterns of global governance, the article addresses how marginalized groups can appropriate these patterns to advance their own liberatory struggles. Based on empirical data collection, including archival research and oral history interviews, the article recounts in detail the process of elaboration of the YPs to demonstrate how the strategic choices of the activists behind the initiative drove its later success and global influence. Applying the theoretical framework of 'counter-interpellation', the article delineates how the document responded to states' exclusionary discourse on sexual orientation and gender identity, aiming to secure the recognition of queer individuals as subjects of international human rights law.
Extradition treaties grant the parties considerable discretion: why? What are the functions of this treaty design? Discretion can help bridge differences between treaty parties that might otherwise not agree to cooperate in criminal matters. Factors such as the level of trust at the time the treaty was concluded and the political relationship between the parties therefore affect the degree of discretion in extradition treaties. Moreover, discretion enables states to balance competing treaty obligations and competing extradition requests without risking a breach of their obligations towards the party whose request is ultimately considered subordinate. However, discretion is not without costs. These costs stem from the uncertainty inherent in discretionary decision-making processes. Discretion can generate conflict when states are unsure whether their treaty partners will exercise their discretion in accordance with the treaty or when they refuse to accept decisions that do not meet their expectations.
Among the many obstacles to successful litigation against corporations for harms arising within global value chains is the fact that norms on which plaintiffs rely are often located in normative orders other than civil liability law. I argue that the reasonable person standard at the heart of civil liability serves as a conduit connecting a range of normative sites and could serve to overcome at least some of the obstacles faced by plaintiffs seeking to hold corporations accountable for such harms. In this article, I focus on the linkages that the reasonable-person standard could forge among international legislation and guidelines on corporate due diligence and transnational human rights, environmental and labour standards. I sketch a normative network in which the reasonable-person standard is an important node and evaluate the potential of this network to create pathways to corporate liability for violations of rights and standards within value chains. Particular attention is paid to the prospect of relying on privately constituted transnational standards in litigation against corporations. Reliance on such standards presents significant risks and drawbacks. However, drawing on these standards in civil liability litigation could also open these standards to increased scrutiny.
