
As illustrated by the proposed EU Industrial Accelerator Act, concerns over clean technology dependencies are prompting importers to adopt trade-restrictive localization measures. States justify these measures by invoking the threat of weaponization of supplies, a phenomenon theorized in the energy statecraft literature. This article examines whether weaponization concerns, associated with strategic dependencies, can be accommodated under the GATT general exceptions. In order to understand the constraints that the GATT imposes on states’ responses to alleged weaponization risks, it analyses WTO decisions on ‘short supply’ and the recent US–Inflation Reduction Act Panel Report regarding ‘public morals’ based on the energy statecraft theory. It finds that general dependency offers little relief unless importers can demonstrate the unreliability of transnational supply chains, while diversification towards trusted partners may better align with public morals than localization. These constraints do not represent a failure of WTO law – given the threat that protectionism poses to accelerated decarbonization, WTO safeguards are necessary to ensure that clean industrial policies do not slow down the energy transition.
Abstract Over recent decades, international trade has expanded significantly, increasing economic integration but also amplifying systemic vulnerabilities. Recent global shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict, have exposed the fragility of international trade systems, underscoring the need for analytical tools to enable timely, evidence-based trade policy. This paper introduces TERRA, an analytical framework created by the Italian National Institute of Statistics to support the monitoring and analysis of European trade patterns using official statistics. Using high-frequency Eurostat COMEXT data, TERRA integrates network-based representations and time series indicators to identify structural vulnerabilities, emerging concentrations, and changes in countries’ roles within trade networks. Beyond interactive monitoring, the framework supports advanced analytical extensions, including programmatic longitudinal analyses and model-based counterfactual analyses, designed to explore trade reallocation mechanisms under stylized supply shocks. The analytical potential of TERRA is shown through two case studies: electricity trade during the COVID-19 pandemic and weapons and ammunition trade during the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The findings demonstrate how network-based monitoring tools, grounded in official statistics, can effectively interpret complex trade dynamics and support evidence-based trade governance.
Provisions prohibiting the mandatory disclosure of source code and algorithms as a condition for market access in digital trade rulemaking aim to prevent forced technology transfer and safeguard confidential business information. However, their proliferation raises significant concerns regarding the state's capacity to regulate digital technologies, including artificial intelligence. This Article argues that their rapid diffusion signals a regime shift in the international protection of software and algorithms, from intellectual property (IP) law to digital trade law. Under the TRIPS framework, trade secrets primarily protect undisclosed confidential information, such as source code and algorithms, and offer limited protection at the point of market entry. Source code provisions in digital trade function as an ex-ante layer of protection that operates independently of, yet cumulatively with, existing IP rights. Because digital trade law lacks the internal balancing mechanisms characteristic of the IP regime, regulatory space is mediated principally through the design of exceptions and carve-outs. By situating these provisions against this background, this Article reframes current debates from regulatory chill to the governance consequences of this regime shift and contends that the design of source code exceptions and carve-outs is now the primary mechanism for balancing proprietary protection against legitimate public policy disclosure.
Abstract Governments increasingly view data as a strategic asset, providing curated datasets and computing resources to domestic firms as part of national industrial development. This shift raises a fundamental question: can the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), which was negotiated for tangible goods in a pre-digital era, accommodate state provision of data and computational capacity as subsidies in the twenty-first-century economy? This paper examines that question, not to argue for a definitive answer but to map the doctrinal pathway and identify key analytical steps, evidentiary requirements, and practical constraints. Rather than focusing narrowly on artificial intelligence, this analysis situates data provision within broader debates about WTO law’s technological neutrality, the evolving purpose of subsidy rules, and the resurgence of digital industrial policy. By tracing the function of data as a critical production input and analyzing specific state initiatives, this paper identifies key considerations for policymakers and adjudicators assessing the alignment of data infrastructure measures with SCM disciplines. The analysis reveals both the analytic promise of existing legal frameworks and their significant practical limitations.
What factors shape public opinion toward international law? Current research suggests that citizens respond strongly to negative cues, but have found limited effects for information about the potential benefits. We theorize that cues about the reciprocity of international law - that the parties face mutually enforceable obligations - can increase support. We evaluate our theory with a survey experiment in the United States (US) examining views towards Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a frequently used but controversial dispute settlement mechanism in international investment law. Two findings stand out. First, consistent with previous research, the public is more supportive of international law if their country is the initiator rather than the target of a dispute. Second, when their country is the target, information about the use of ISDS by US firms, which we refer to as specific reciprocity, appears to increase support. More diffuse cues of reciprocity, however, do not affect support. Overall, our findings provide evidence that specific reciprocity cues can increase support for international law even when one's country faces potential costs.