
We challenge Seth's claim that simulations of consciousness necessarily lack the causal powers or intrinsic properties of real consciousness. We argue that Seth's position risks begging the question against computational functionalism and faces a dilemma over the reducibility of qualia. This weakens his case, leaving open the possibility that simulations could, in principle, realize consciousness.
Abstract Haueis and Colaço argue that metabolic considerations should constrain and generate cognitive models. Research in cognitive fatigue provides a test case. Passive fatigue induction reveals specific representational degradation that points to local rather than global metabolic mechanisms, pruning potential models. We argue that local aerobic glycolysis offers a coherent, testable generative account of these findings.
Abstract Haueis and Colaço’s framework can be inscribed into a positive theory of metabolic rationality where cognitive strategy selection is governed by allostatic energy management across sequential decisions under uncertainty. Heuristics emerge as solutions to a metabolic opportunity cost problem with distinct empirical predictions.
The target article underscores that metabolic considerations can accommodate the standard functionalist account of cognition. However, the energetic makeup of (biological) information processing systems in fact supports the claim of medium dependence of cognitive capacities. We explore two case studies from active matter physics and basal cognition to highlight the philosophical implications of the physicality of information processing.