Investigating the relationship between psychology and phenomenology in Edith Stein it is necessary to consider her analysis of the human being; she distinguishes causality, which we found in the psychic connections and motivation, that is characteristic of the spiritual life. According to her, this distinction is indispensable in psychology if it wants to be valid research. Psychology has its own field of inquiry but has to refer to the phenomenological anthropology; in this case, it can be a specific and very important science, quite apart from the science of the spirit as the human sciences were called in her time.
In this article, we present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology through the concept of openness upon the world. Through this reading, we show how the concept is important throughout his work, and we demonstrate the concept’s centrality as an organizing metaphor for his conception of subjectivity and perception. With ‘openness upon the world’ as his explicit basis, he attempts an ontology in his late works that more radically transcends the subject-object dichotomy. These developments facilitate a renewed account of perception and, in turn, give a further ontological grounding for a psychological account of perception and subjectivity.
Basaglia rejects the idea that mental illness is a matter of isolated symptoms which can be treated as discrete objects by an authoritative doctor and understood in terms of a priori theoretical concepts and psychological models. On the contrary, Basaglia stresses that mental illness involves the whole existence of the patient, and principally their way of relating to themselves, others and the world. They have lost the possibility of authentically relating to the world, and hence of actualizing their existential possibilities in it. In this estrangement, the patient fragments internally and develops a false consciousness of themselves, for it is through an active and creative relationship with the world and others that we become whole and learn to recognize ourselves. In his view, any approach to the patient from a place of objectifying authority which prefixes and reifies them in terms of a priori categories merely perpetuates their alienation.
The aim of this paper is to explore how Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of empathy, as well as Emmanuel Levinas’ critical reception of the same, could contribute with clarity to the debate over the relevance of empathy to social work ethics. I suggest that more attention should be given to the pre-reflective character of empathy, according to Husserl’s account. This resonates with Levinas’ point that the encounter with the other disrupts intentional experience and thus cannot be sought out as an ethical goal. Some literature on social work ethics as well as on the ethics of social justice education, has taken a critical stance towards the concept of empathy. I review three such cases in detail and try to show how the phenomenological accounts of empathy by Husserl and Levinas may contribute to clarifying the fundamental and non-ethical role of empathy in face-to-face social work practice.
My objective in this essay is to look beyond the seemingly inescapable discursive habits of transaction and exchange that have come to overwhelm social science notions of social behavior, meaning, and communicability. Derrida’s attempt to radicalize the concept of forgiveness finds its foundation in the work of Kant and Kierkegaard, perceiving ultimately “the non-negotiable, anti-economic, apolitical, non-strategic, unconditionality” that forgiveness prescribes. For Derrida, it becomes “impossible” as a symbolic, human transaction within instrumental rationality. Inspired by Arendt, Julia Kristeva likewise maintains that, as an unconditional event, forgiveness cannot be “conditioned” by anything. In coming to terms with the leap of faith enunciated by “forgiving,” I will address the concept of intimacy as an exploration of relational resilience inasmuch as human beings err, lapse, drift, and disappoint one another just as much as they fulfill our hopes and enlarge and animate what Kierkegaard termed the inward sphere of being and consciousness.
This1 “thought experiment” explores the fanciful question of what a psychotherapy based on Nietzsche’s philosophy might look like. Nietzschean psychotherapy is imagined as (1) an in-depth self-actualizing experience that is (2) intended only for select “elite” individuals, which is (3) characterized by an unblinking examination of one’s core values, beliefs, and shortcomings, and seeks to (4) overcome one’s fears through bold forays into the horror of existence. In turn, (5) the therapist is more like a collaborative “life coach” who facilitates the individual’s explorations as a non-directive supporter rather than expert. An additional “augmentative mentor” with expertise in the individual’s field may be advisable. The goal of Nietzschean psychotherapy is to identify and overcome personal limitations to reach one’s fullest potential – self-actualization. Upon completion, the individual will “live dangerously” by counteracting the stifling security of a planned, orderly life by continually challenging oneself, taking risks, creating and pursuing dynamic experiences.
Abstract The experience error is the fallacy of attributing to our experience of a thing what we know to be true of that thing from an objective point of view. This paper argues that the “method of purification” advocated by Edmund Husserl for psychology is nothing other than avoidance of the experience error. The purity of psychology is not philosophical (transcendental) purity. Psychology remains in the natural attitude; it is pure if it is true to the subjective, psychical, genuinely lived content of experience and thus is purely descriptive. But that is easier said than done. Due to the dominance of the modern scientific outlook, the experience error is so insidious that, as the paper argues in a final section, Husserl himself was not immune to it.
Abstract From the phenomenological perspective, intentionality is an important concept for understanding consciousness. The idea was introduced into psychology by Brentano in the 19th century who got it from Scholasticism. Husserl modified its meaning and made it a key concept in his philosophy. This paper shows one way in which intentionality can help clarify psychological phenomena.
Abstract This paper delves into the concept of the uncanny, a theme that has fascinated scholars across multiple disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, literature, and film studies. The study’s primary goal is twofold: to examine the theoretical foundations of the uncanny as explored by Jentsch, Freud, and Heidegger, and to propose a new perspective on the uncanny within the context of modern technological and urban developments. The paper argues that urban, technologically advanced environments foster conditions in which the uncanny can easily emerge, and suggests that the adoption of a techno-scientific worldview plays a central role in the rise of uncanny experiences. Through an analysis of Hoffmann’s The Sandman, this paper revisits classical theories of the uncanny and connects them with contemporary realities. Jentsch’s emphasis on cognitive uncertainty, Freud’s exploration of repressed traumatic memories, and Heidegger’s focus on the broader atmospheric conditions of the uncanny are all examined. The paper concludes by reflecting on how urbanization, technological dependency, and scientific reductionism contribute to a profound sense of alienation, increasing the likelihood of uncanny experiences in the modern world.
Abstract Inspired by Husserl’s (1913/1962, 1925/1977, 1931/1960, 1948/1973, 1954/1970) long term interest in problems of “constitution” at transcendental, psychological, and intersubjective levels, this study originally took up the question of the constitution of social perception in the context of the psychodiagnostic interview. More simply, the research question was: how do psychologists participate in forming a clinical impression? As reported earlier (Churchill 1984a, 19984b, 1998, 2006), data consisted of descriptions obtained from two clinical psychologists reflecting upon their experience during the interview phase of a diagnostic assessment, each of which was videotaped for later reference. These descriptions were obtained in writing, and served as a basis for further elaborating and clarifying their experience through a series of collaborative interviews. The descriptions and interview data were collated into a text of statements for each participant representing different perceptual “moments” distinguishable within the psychologist’s experience. The researcher performed an “intentional analysis” of these experiential moments within the data, posing the following question: What does this statement reveal about the meaning-constituting activity of the psychologist during this moment of the clinical encounter? The “intentional structure” of clinical impression formation was articulated in terms of three interconnected and essential constituents – constitutive projects and interests, modes of attention, and modes of explication – all characteristic of the psychologist’s presence to a patient. The current paper offers a further reflection upon the methodological virtues of the phenomenological method of intentional analysis with an aim to clarify how psychologists can fruitfully apply this philosophical psychological method in qualitative research investigations on perception, cognition, attention, attribution, reflexivity, and psychological understanding.
