This paper evaluates how ‘regulatory governance’ has evolved as a conceptual framework among the research community and practitioners in the utilities sector literature, what its essential dimensions are, and how it impacts sectoral performance. A thematic and methodological review of 116 relevant articles in the energy and telecommunications domains has been undertaken to create a firm foundation for the advancement of knowledge by (i) uncovering areas where research is required, (ii) identifying areas where a plethora of academic research exists and closing them, and (iii) facilitating the development of new theories. The reviews of the articles helped in the identification of four and five vital themes in the energy and telecommunications domains, respectively, while the methodological review revealed the popular techniques under qualitative, quantitative, and mixed research designs – a piece of useful information for future research. The study highlights essential dimensions of regulatory governance and recommends enhanced use of a qualitative approach for gaining insights into social issues, native viewpoints of policy practitioners, and the generation of relevant substantive theories. The study has mapped the micro themes under attributes, mechanisms/instruments (how and why), and outcomes (what) of regulatory governance and recommends enhanced use of grounded theory, phenomenology, and an action research approach.
Public Wi-Fi is a suitable technology alternative to mobile broadband for affordable Internet access. To improve Wi-Fi access, the Indian government launched the Wi-Fi Access Network Interface (WANI) as an approved Public Wi-Fi infrastructure in December 2020. However, the scheme has so far met with limited success. We discuss the WANI framework, different backhaul options available for resale under WANI scheme and the associated reasons for market failure. We then discuss backhaul tariff capping as one of the regulatory intervention options for sustainability of the public Wi-Fi scheme. Using extensive data-based simulations, we estimate the optimal backhaul tariff for sustainability of the WANI scheme. We also recommend one-time subsidy and a cap on the number of subscribers as additional regulatory interventions.
Microgrids are decentralised electricity systems that offer a local approach to the energy transition. They help to bring electricity generation closer to the consumer, facilitate the integration of renewable energy, and increase energy security. However, the implementation of microgrids currently requires regulatory exemptions as they do not fit into the existing regulatory framework. Therefore, regulatory reforms are needed. Those reforms are influenced by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). Although NRAs are supposed to make technical decisions, their choices have political implications for microgrid development by creating a technically (un)favourable environment. This article explores the narrative of NRAs in facilitating the development of microgrids as part of the transition towards a more sustainable energy mix. An exploratory multi-method study is applied, combining surveys and interviews with representatives from different NRAs in the EU. The article finds that despite the potential benefits of microgrids, NRAs are generally unsupportive of microgrid development. Alternative models, such as closed distribution systems and energy communities, have been proposed instead. Furthermore, the interviews reveal that the perceived costs of developing microgrids outweigh the benefits when considering the functioning of the overall electricity grid.
This paper examines the various challenges facing competitive electricity markets as they transition not only to systems based more on renewable energy, but also to generation sectors that become more competitive. In doing so, it examines how the reform of the South West Integrated System electricity market in Western Australia has affected returns, prices, and concentration in the electricity sector, particularly in the wholesale generation market. In doing so, this paper considers the lessons from the reforms that have taken place in Western Australia, both for the jurisdiction itself and more broadly for the Australian electricity sector as a whole.
The legislative decision-making in the field of competition law has been largely of unquestioned borrowing, expecting foreign transplants to suit local needs. This has compromised the ability of legislation and regulations to be acceptable and effective in the country. Rather than looking to the West for persistent guidance, we need to cogitate on the Preamble to the Indian Constitution to derive legitimate directions for India’s policy decisions. India needs to map out the Competition law by keeping the non-negotiable principles of justice, fairness and equity from the Constitution in their scruples. The paper argues that safeguarding consumers’ right to privacy is an important goal of competition law. The paper aims to decipher objective principles through which privacy can be measured. These principles are basic and cannot be willed or done away with. They form the minimum core of privacy and point towards concrete and controllable factors that should be subjected to minimum interpretative gymnastics. The present paper proposes two things: First, the paper aims to decipher objective parameters of privacy through the K.S Puttaswamy judgement, which declared privacy a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. Next, the authors have formulated various theories of harm under competition law that get triggered when these parameters of privacy are violated. The authors have then suggested how these theories of harm can be contained ex-ante by imposing obligations on dominant companies through Software integration and Contractual obligations. The ex-ante framework, called privacy by design, will help develop a framework for the regulator to impose such obligations on companies designated as systemically significant digital enterprises. Second, it proposes an institutional framework for ensuring compliance with the said ex-ante regime through three courses of action: Notification (obligations of companies), roadmap (information with easy access), and control interface (directions from users). These software functionalities, when adopted by a dominant entity, shall allow them to safeguard a user’s privacy.
This study examines the determinants of willingness to pay (WTP) for Public–Private Partnership (PPP) toll roads in Uganda and South Africa, drawing on qualitative evidence from road users and policy makers. The findings show that WTP is shaped by a combination of socio-economic, institutional, and service-related factors. In South Africa, WTP is influenced by welfare expectations, social norms, and perceptions of fairness, while in Uganda, it is primarily driven by direct economic benefits such as affordability, travel time savings, and road quality. Across both contexts, affordability and time utility emerge as universal drivers, alongside service quality, safety, and reliability. In relation to the New Public Management framework, the findings suggest that market-oriented, user-pay models are effective only when supported by strong accountability, transparency, and service performance, reinforcing the need to balance efficiency with social legitimacy in public service delivery. The study further establishes that governance credibility, transparency, and trust mediate user acceptance. The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that WTP in African PPPs reflects the interaction of economic utility, welfare traditions, and institutional legitimacy — underscoring the need for context-sensitive PPP design rather than uniform user-pay models. In practice, the findings highlight the importance of affordable, transparent pricing, regulatory oversight, and sustained investment in road quality, safety, and maintenance. Socially, the study emphasizes the need for equity, inclusivity, and the provision of alternative routes to enhance public acceptance.
The growing authority and influence of digital platforms has sparked debate over how much sovereignty governments should exercise in regulating them. While asserting digital sovereignty is important for countering external influences, including those from digital platforms, it also risks giving states excessive control over citizens. This article examines a regulation issued by Indonesia’s Ministry of Communication and Information that requires private digital platforms to register with the government. Using thematic analysis of YouTube discussions and interviews with government officials, the article explores the reasoning behind the policy and how it plays out. The study finds that the regulation reflects a narrow understanding of digital governance, focused on territorial control and state authority. Although the policy aims to map digital businesses, ensure fair competition, and protect users, the registration requirement may fall short of these goals. It treats digital platforms like traditional companies requiring licenses and gives authorities access to user data, enabling them to remove content and cut off access in cases of non-compliance. The article concludes that to better achieve its objectives, Indonesia should revise the regulation and develop more tailored, sector-specific rules that reflect the unique nature of digital platformsand their role in society.
Since the 1990s, different reforms have been implemented in the electricity sector of many Latin American countries. Those embraced vertical disintegration, privatization, and the introduction of incentive regulation, while vertically integrated public monopolies prevailed in other Latin American countries. We explore the technology of the electricity distribution sector in Latin America to analyze productive efficiency. We use a parametric stochastic distance function which includes controls, companies’ features, private versus public property, vertically integrated versus unbundled sectors, and the regulatory model which defines the pitch, among others. The focus is on the distribution segment within the electricity industry. We examined a sample of 73 electricity distribution companies from 9 countries over 14 years and found a 70% average efficiency. This study differs from the preceding literature (discussed extensively) because: (1) it encompasses several Latin American countries (while most existent studies focus on national cases); (2) it uses a specially developed database, which standardizes variables and covers longer periods than preceding studies to employ econometric estimation techniques; (3) it addresses various aspects of the efficiency discussion. The results reveal differences in efficiency scores (being the unit an indication of full efficiency) by regulatory regime, with the best average results for Reference Firms (0.74) concerning Price Cap (0.66) and Cost-Plus (0.71). Private companies show higher average efficiency levels (0.72) than public ones (0.66). Vertically integrated monopolies, on average, behave poorly in efficiency comparative terms (0.46 versus 0.71 of unbundled firms). Nevertheless, the quantitative differences are not overwhelming, except in the last case.
This paper explores and compares two significant antitrust battles faced by Google across the EU, India, and the United States: the Google Search Bias case and the Google Android case. It delves into the allegations of “self-preferencing,” where Google is accused of steering search results to favour its own services, and examines how courts in different jurisdictions have approached this issue, balancing the protection of competition against potential benefits for consumers. The paper also examines the complexities of the Google Android case, investigating claims that Google used its dominant Android operating system to stifle competition and lock users into its ecosystem. The analysis reveals notable differences: while the EU focuses on preventing the foreclosure of competitors, often without requiring evidence of actual harm to consumers, the United States places consumer welfare and pro-competitive benefits at the centre of its scrutiny. India’s stance aligns with the EU’s in the Android case but remains inconsistent regarding self-preferencing. Through this comparative study, the paper highlights the challenge of maintaining a delicate balance between preserving competition, fostering innovation, and protecting consumer interests in the fast-evolving digital landscape. It also touches on the growing relevance of data privacy in antitrust discussions, highlighting the broader implications for regulating Big Tech.
The market for delivery of e-commerce parcels to consumers in Sweden is considered to exhibit high competition. Aggregate data from the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority shows the market shares, with the Universal Service Provider as the dominant actor with 50 %. We identify the market structure according to the dominant-fringe-firm model. In this study, we employ a disaggregated methodology to analyse the competitive situation concerning e-commerce delivery for consumer goods. We observe the delivery options provided by the 200 largest e-commerce companies, measured by turnover in 2022, to the urban parts of a medium-sized town in Sweden. By making ‘fake’ purchases online, we register the delivery companies offered by the different e-commerce companies, prices for delivery, and the purchase limit for free delivery. Consumers mostly have a maximum of three delivery companies as options, and in almost one third of the cases only one available option. Our study shows that the number of delivery companies significantly covariates with lower delivery prices for consumers. E-commerce companies without free delivery have a higher delivery price than those who have, and the limit for free delivery correlates positively with the delivery price. It seems that some e-commerce companies offer a low delivery price and a low purchasing limit for free delivery and others do not. Our study indicates that the market may be progressing to a more ordinary oligopoly with a few companies that might end up like intensive Bertrand price competition or like a Cournot one, with higher prices and profits. Regulatory authorities and competition authorities must carefully monitor the competitive conditions before allowing mergers; review and possibly advise against governmental subsidies; consider price or profit limitations, but at the same time protect the Universal Service Obligation.
The Indian power sector has been experiencing considerable stress at the distribution level of the power supply networks. The distribution companies’ position has been financially weakened due to poor recovery of tariffs and losses and also partly due to the regulatory constraints placed on the power networks. The open-access network allows the distributors to share and trade electricity and allows retail consumers to switch to a low-cost power distributor with the payment of a surcharge duty. However, little is known about the optimal bidding strategies of the distributors to purchase power at minimum cost from the generators to fulfil the open-access power requirement of the downstream retail consumers. This research problem formulates the distributors’ upstream and downstream bidding strategies to supply low-cost and non-discriminatory open-access electricity to retail consumers at competitive open-access rates. In line with this, a linear programming model is formulated to evaluate the upstream and downstream bidding strategies of the distributors. The validation is carried out using two separate case studies. The results show that the success of the open-access network is contingent upon the upstream bidding strategies of the distributors, allowing the supply of low-cost power and switchovers above the minimum bid volume and price bids.
5G technologies are introducing new capabilities and services in the telecommunications (telecom)industry, changing business models and market structures, and compelling alterations in regulatory frameworks. Telecom administrations across the world are making choices for regulation of key resources such as spectrum to meet 5G requirements. 5G is taking root in the Indian telecom market. This paper analyses expert stakeholder and practitioner opinion through a policy Delphi to examine what kind of regulatory and policy changes need to be made in India’s spectrum management policies in a 5G market and how these could be best adapted to the unique public policy and political economy environment of this country. It arrives at practical recommendations for planning, assigning, and pricing spectrum which could be of value to policy makers and regulators.
This research studies the disassociation phenomenon between network and data services that has disrupted the telecom sector in India. We employed grounded theory approach to explore this phenomenon and its impact on the Telecommunication Service Providers (TSPs). We have derived the insights and developed a coding paradigm via a judgmental sample of 19 senior experts at decision-making positions in the Indian telecom sector. Through literature review, we identified the fundamental changes in the Indian telecom sector from 2013 to 2019, when this phenomenon was widely observed. The findings indicate the technology evolution’s role in driving the data-network disassociation in the presence of regulatory forbearance, 4G spectrum availability, hyper-competition, and evolving device ecosystem. These conditions have proved advantageous to Over-The-Top (OTT) players, caused financial stress to the TSPs, and forced them to resort to consolidation measures and shift from voice-based to data-based business models. The study’s insights will help the Industry understand the phenomena, regulatory issues in technology adoption, survival challenges, and decision-making strategies for pre-empting technical disruptions. It also emphasizes being watchful of the competing non-conventional industries from a regulatory perspective.
Australia has a long history of privately owned utility price regulation, one that is little known. This price control was designed to restrain the market power of several utilities (gas, rail, tramways, electricity, and water). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to establish what types of price control that were used in Australia in the utilities sector before the First World War and to determine the degree to which this price control influenced efficiency. As price levels in this era were set in legislation, the lack of flexibility led to less-than-optimal outcomes, and eventually and led to new approaches were developed after 1912 to the utilities that remained in private ownership, and in some cases influenced the movement in Australia towards government control.
This study introduces a theoretical framework for the Turkish natural gas market based on the principles of game theory and industrial organization. It investigates the effects of the legal and ownership unbundling on consumer surplus, social welfare, and competition. The model considers a mixed oligopoly with a transmission system operator (TSO), a state-owned incumbent, and a private firm. The state-owned incumbent is assumed to maximize consumer surplus and its own profit, while the private firm is assumed to be profit-maximizing. Additionally, the state-owned incumbent is assumed to be less efficient than the private firm. The game consists of three stages. In the first two stages, the state-owned incumbent and the private firm sequentially choose contract sizes in the upstream market. In the last stage, a contract size-restricted Cournot game is played. The findings of the study suggest that legal unbundling appears to offer greater advantages for consumer surplus and social welfare compared to ownership unbundling, particularly when considering key factors such as third-party access, non-tariff discrimination, and import liberalization. The results indicate that adopting the role of a Stackelberg follower by the state-owned incumbent in the upstream market is advantageous in terms of consumer surplus, social welfare, and competition under both unbundling approaches.
Our main contribution is to identify the risks implied by the existence of prolonged regulatory lags. We hypothesize that a likely first response is to reduce OPEX, increasing efficiency. If the lag persists for enough time, a vicious circle of inefficiency, disinvestment, and reduced performance can follow. We use a regulatory episode affecting natural gas distributors in Argentina as a natural experiment, controlling with other Latin American countries’ utilities not exposed to the same regulatory stimuli. We evaluate the relative efficiency of fourteen firms for five countries, in seven years, using Stochastic Frontiers Analysis (SFA). Thus, we perform a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) to assess the consequences on the performance of two idiosyncratic regulatory policy instruments applied in the distribution gas industry in Argentina in the 1998–2021 period (the 2002 Public Emergency Law and the 2016 Integral Tariff Review).
This article discusses how shared ownership of energy storage facilities between grid managers (Distribution System Operators and Transmission System Operators) and third-party market participants may help to resolve congestion issues. The article uses the Netherlands as a case study on how congestion issues may lead to a stalemate: increasing energy storage capacity may help to resolve grid congestion but may cause additional congestion if used to trade in profitable markets. As a result, it is not installed, or installation is delayed until the grid is fortified. The article discusses how shared ownership may lead to the co-optimization of investment decisions by different stakeholders and of the operation of the storage facility. It also discusses how the exemption to unbundling obligations under art. 36 (2) of Directive 2019/944 can be used to allow for these ownership constructions. The article argues that national regulatory authorities can use regulatory experimentation to find the desirable conditions and uses of the exemption and to stimulate regulatory learning. The use of experimentation can help to resolve congestion issues in certain localities in the short term and help to develop principles for regulation of the future energy system in the long-term.
In electricity markets, ancillary services (AS) are vital to ensuring system reliability through the instantaneous balancing of supply and demand. An important current policy question is whether AS markets clear simultaneously or sequentially with wholesale markets. We develop a model to study the strategic implications of market timing. We demonstrate that a strategic incentive to reduce AS and, consequently, lower marginal cost in the wholesale market arises when markets clear sequentially. Using data from Alberta, we find that the strategic effect has a small impact on wholesale outcomes but a large impact on the AS market.
Logistics, beyond being a strategically important function for global supply chains, is a sector of considerable size in terms of the global economy. Thus, economy-wide logistics capabilities have a strategic impact at the national level, supporting countries to achieve a global competitive advantage. For this reason, the logistics performances of the countries not only show the success of using their existing logistics capabilities but also provide significant indications about their competitiveness at the global level. Due to this strategic impact, this study aims to deal with the logistics performances of OECD countries from the perspective of competitiveness and to determine the competitiveness-based logistics performance index (CB-LPI). For this purpose, data envelopment analysis has been applied with two different techniques. The input variables are the Global Competitiveness Index, and the output variables are the Logistic Performance Index. In this empirical study, 7 inputs (infrastructure, skills, product market, financial system, information and communication technology adoption, business dynamism, innovation capability) and 6 output variables (Customs, Infrastructure, International shipments, Logistics quality and competence, Tracking and tracing, Timeliness) have been used. This study is handled in a total of 5 periods. These periods are 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018. As a result, it was determined that the competitive logistics performances of 8 countries (Australia, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey) were at the level of full efficiency in each period in the application of both techniques. In addition, the CB-LPI covering all OECD countries has been established. Based on the scores obtained, country-based suggestions for countries have been developed.
This article discusses the challenges posed to the traditional, physically delivered public services as a result of their digitalization, something that mainly concerns infrastructure public services in the transport, the energy, and the communications sectors. In addition, it assesses whether the digital interfaces that increasingly intermediate between the traditional, physical public services and the citizens also have public service features and, as a consequence, should be regulated accordingly. The article first clarifies the concept of public service in the context of the liberalization of the infrastructure sectors, sectors in which public services had come to play an important role over time. It then explains how to conceptualize digitalization and its effects on physical services providers by paying particular attention to the business model of the digital platforms. It furthermore examines how digitalization affects the traditional physical public services and whether the digital platforms in the concerned infrastructures could have public service features. In the concluding section it discusses remedies.
