In the literature on capitalism-its development and the diversity of its institutional forms-there is broad agreement on the fact that it rests on deeply conflictual social relations. While such conflicts may at times generate institutionalized forms of violence, they are more commonly mitigated through rules whose origins call for explanation. This article examines two influential hypotheses that seek to account for the emergence of these rules. According to the first, capitalism and democracy are linked by a relationship of special affinity; according to the second, the rules of capitalism are determined by the most powerful actors. Both theses stand up poorly to detailed examination of the facts they attempt to explain. We advance an alternative, dual proposition: the rules result from arbitration between conflicting interests, and this arbitration depends on the unequal access of social groups to the state. Au sein de la litt & eacute;rature portant sur le capitalisme, son d & eacute;veloppement et l'h & eacute;t & eacute;rog & eacute;n & eacute;it & eacute; de ses formes, l'id & eacute;e selon laquelle il repose sur des relations profond & eacute;ment conflictuelles fait consensus. S'ils peuvent engendrer des formes de violence parfois institutionnalis & eacute;es, ces conflits sont aussi att & eacute;nu & eacute;s par des r & egrave;gles dont il faut expliquer la gen & egrave;se. L'article discute deux hypoth & egrave;ses qui s'efforcent d'en rendre compte. Selon la premi & egrave;re, capitalisme et d & eacute;mocratie entretiendraient des relations d'affinit & eacute;s privil & eacute;gi & eacute;es ; selon la seconde, au contraire, les r & egrave;gles du capitalisme seraient fix & eacute;es suivant les int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts des acteurs les plus puissants. Ces deux th & egrave;ses r & eacute;sistent mal & agrave; l'examen circonstanci & eacute; des faits dont elles essaient de rendre compte. Nous proposons une double hypoth & egrave;se alternative : les r & egrave;gles r & eacute;sultent de l'arbitrage entre des int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts contradictoires, et cet arbitrage d & eacute;pend de l'acc & egrave;s diff & eacute;renci & eacute; des groupes & agrave; l'Etat.
Neoliberal defenses of markets are often said to institutionalize authoritarianism, both through technocratic states and “private governments” in firms, and thus to be incompatible with democracy. This paper asks whether a defense of competitive markets can be reconciled with democratic commitments to social justice and non-domination. Focusing on some neoliberal thinkers (Eucken, Lippmann, Hayek), it offers a rational reconstruction of the “competitive order” as a privilege-free institutional framework whose point is to disperse power and secure individuals’ status as non-dominated equals. On this view, markets and democracy appear as complementary anti-power devices that rely on general, impersonal rules to prevent public and private actors from entrenching arbitrary authority. The paper, first, develops a competition-based conception of social justice, according to which a market order is just when its rules eliminate legal and economic privileges, broadly distribute opportunities, and stabilize democratic support. Second, it confronts the critique of “private government” and argues that neoliberalism can integrate concerns about workplace domination through instruments such as competition policy and robust exit options, without abandoning the competitive order itself. JEL Codes : B15, B25, B31, B41.
This article examines the relationship between market freedom, economic expertise, and democratic government in contemporary liberal societies. Over the past decades, certain ideas developed within economic science have gradually been incorporated into institutional arrangements - independent central banks, fiscal rules, and the multilateral architecture of international trade - that structure the governance of market economies. While this institutionalization of economic knowledge is often presented as a way of shielding certain decisions from the contingencies of politics, it also tends to transform contested analytical assumptions into seemingly technical constraints. Drawing on Tocqueville's intuition of the risk of a "soft despotism," the article shows how this dynamic may contribute to a gradual depoliticization of collective choices. For liberal democracies, the challenge is therefore to preserve a living articulation between the freedom of markets and democratic deliberation. Cet article interroge les relations entre libert & eacute; des march & eacute;s, expertise & eacute;conomique et gouvernement d & eacute;mocratique dans les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s lib & eacute;rales contemporaines. Depuis plusieurs d & eacute;cennies, certaines id & eacute;es issues de la science & eacute;conomique ont & eacute;t & eacute; progressivement incorpor & eacute;es dans des dispositifs institutionnels - ind & eacute;pendance des banques centrales, r & egrave;gles budg & eacute;taires, architecture multilat & eacute;rale du commerce - qui structurent la gouvernance des & eacute;conomies de march & eacute;. Si cette institutionnalisation du savoir & eacute;conomique est souvent pr & eacute;sent & eacute;e comme un moyen de soustraire certaines d & eacute;cisions aux al & eacute;as de la politique, elle tend aussi & agrave; transformer des hypoth & egrave;ses analytiques discutables en contraintes apparemment techniques. En mobilisant l'intuition tocquevillienne du risque d'un & laquo; despotisme doux & raquo;, l'article montre comment cette dynamique peut contribuer & agrave; une d & eacute;politisation progressive des choix collectifs. Pour les d & eacute;mocraties lib & eacute;rales, l'enjeu est alors de pr & eacute;server une articulation vivante entre libert & eacute; des march & eacute;s et d & eacute;lib & eacute;ration d & eacute;mocratique.
Drawing on data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (which covered 156,658 individuals surveyed across 92 countries between 2017 and 2022), this article identifies three opinion clusters: Democrats, Authoritarians, and Distrustful people. Each cluster exhibits a consistent perspective on the role of the state, individual freedoms, and economic regulation. However, the distribution of these clusters is based on sociodemographic and geographic criteria, particularly in light of the political and economic contexts. A focus on a sample of ten comparable Western countries reveals that individuals who favor economic competition or private ownership of businesses place greater emphasis on freedom, while those who oppose these economic principles attach greater importance to solidarity and equality. In all cases, freedom takes precedence over equality, but neither is sacrificed. Consequently, market development is thought to be necessarily accompanied by social protection stemming from democratic demands. In other words, a market democracy is required rather than a simple market economy.
This article is a review of the book by Demin Duan, Tocqueville Between East and West. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press (2025). Duan has developed an interesting approach to engaging Tocqueville by imagining an alternative model of governance for China with many unanswered questions.
In this issue of The Tocqueville Review, economists, sociologists and political theorists examine the reasons why liberal democracy and liberalism more broadly are now the subjects of widespread criticism all over the Western world. The alliance of democracy, free-market economics and social justice as outlined in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) seemed a real possibility after the fall of communism in 1989. However, it is now widely seen as a distant dream as democratic states seem powerless and shackled by economic imperatives and globalisation has become a source of misery for the majority of workers. Bringing nuanced analysis and expertise to address the problem, the authors suggest that changes are possible if governments exercise their regulatory powers more effectively and in a more democratic manner.
The relationship between trade openness and democracy is deeply political, yet its meaning is far from unambiguous: polymorphous and historically variable, it has successively taken the form of mercantilist elitism, protectionist imperialism, and post-war Western liberalism. Within this last framework, the conviction took hold that openness would act as a vector of democratic convergence; as it became dominant throughout the 1990s, this conviction shaped decisive institutional choices, foremost among them China’s accession to the WTO. The 2007–2009 global financial crisis laid bare the flaws in this narrative: underestimated social and local impacts, wholly inadequate compensation mechanisms, and a fundamental misreading of the trajectory of the Chinese model. Far from dissipating, these tensions now fuel a growing politicisation of trade issues and a resurgence of power-driven logic. For democracies, the challenge lies less in trade openness as such than in its institutional design and its articulation with domestic politics.
Comme lors de la premi & egrave;re mondialisation (1870-1914), la p & eacute;riode actuelle s'accompagne d'une remise en cause du lib & eacute;ralisme & eacute;conomique et politique. Deux explications dominent : l'une met l'accent sur les rivalit & eacute;s g & eacute;opolitiques qui instrumentalisent l'& eacute;conomie, l'autre sur les effets distributifs de la mondialisation qui fragilisent les classes moyennes et nourrissent une demande de protection. L'article propose une lecture alternative en identifiant une cause commune : une crise morale & agrave; l'intersection de l'& eacute;conomie et de la politique. S'inspirant notamment d'Amartya Sen, il d & eacute;fend une approche positive de la morale comme ensemble de valeurs structurant comportements et institutions. Il montre que la science & eacute;conomique repose implicitement sur des fondements moraux bien qu'elle valorise l'homo oe conomicus. La crise actuelle correspondrait alors & agrave; une fermeture des solidarit & eacute;s et au retour de hi & eacute;rarchies morales in & eacute;galitaires, red & eacute;finissant les rapports & eacute;conomiques et politiques. L'approche par la morale semble plus prometteuse qu'une approche par le retour des id & eacute;ologies car elle se concentre directement sur les valeurs justifiant la hi & eacute;rarchisation des individus.
This article reconstructs the intellectual trajectory of Melvin Richter in order to illuminate the conceptual links between British Idealism, the German tradition of Begriffsgeschichte, and the political thought of Montesquieu and Tocqueville. It argues that these seemingly distinct fields are united by a common concern: the transformation of religious categories into secular principles of political and civic life in modern democratic societies. By tracing Richter’s early engagement with T. H. Green and British Idealism, the study highlights how notions such as self-realization and self-subordination functioned as secularized expressions of religious ethics, giving rise to a form of “civic religion” grounded in moral duty and social responsibility. The article ultimately argues that the tension between self-abnegation and self-interest constitutes a central axis for understanding the moral foundations of modern democracy. By situating Tocqueville within a broader intellectual constellation that includes British Idealism and conceptual history, it offers a reinterpretation of democratic citizenship as the product of an ongoing transformation of religious, moral, and political languages.
Les 27 et 28 juin 2025 s’est tenue la septième édition des Conversations Tocqueville au Château de Tocqueville. Le thème principal concernait l’autonomie de l’Europe. Les deux jours faisaient se succéder le bilan et la projection, le diagnostic et la thérapie. Les deux perspectives se sont avérées inséparables et ont permis de faire émerger des interrogations communes : géopolitique, que faire quand le lien se dénoue entre la république impériale américaine et le continent européen ; stratégique, comment construire une puissance européenne industrielle, technologique et militaire ; éthique, pour quelles valeurs européennes sommes-nous prêts à nous battre ?
L’article interroge les rapports entre expérience et erreur de raisonnement à la lumière d’une des critiques que Raymond Boudon a adressées à la théorie des biais cognitifs d’Amos Tversky et Daniel Kahneman. Le sociologue français, qui est le premier introducteur de ces auteurs dans les sciences sociales francophone, a fait une observation déterminante concernant l’interprétation que l’on pouvait faire de ces résultats expérimentaux. Celle-ci s’accorde assez bien avec les théories les plus récentes des croyances et de la constitution précoce de la cognition humaine. C’est cette intuition du sociologue français que l’article propose d’explorer en même temps que les raisons qui n’ont pas permis à Boudon de tirer tout le profit qu’il aurait pu des apports de la psychologie cognitive de l’erreur à son approche compréhensive.
In the field of moral judgments, relativism denies the existence of any objectivity because it considers it, at best, from its positive angle. In contrast, this article aims to show that we can speak of objectivity in a practical sense. This results from a theory of justice that confers on unanimous agreement, conceived as a regulating ideal, the status of a priori foundation of this justice. Norms or values that do not contradict (logically and performatively) this foundation are therefore objectively just in a practical sense.
Les 27 et 28 juin 2025 s'est tenue la septi & egrave;me & eacute;dition des Conversations Tocqueville au Ch & acirc;teau de Tocqueville. Le th & egrave;me principal concernait l'autonomie de l'Europe. Les deux jours faisaient se succ & eacute;der le bilan et la projection, le diagnostic et la th & eacute;rapie. Les deux perspectives se sont av & eacute;r & eacute;es ins & eacute;parables et ont permis de faire & eacute;merger des interrogations communes : g & eacute;opolitique, que faire quand le lien se d & eacute;noue entre la r & eacute;publique imp & eacute;riale am & eacute;ricaine et le continent europ & eacute;en ; strat & eacute;gique, comment construire une puissance europ & eacute;enne industrielle, technologique et militaire ; & eacute;thique, pour quelles valeurs europ & eacute;ennes sommes-nous pr & ecirc;ts & agrave; nous battre ?
Raymond Boudon’s approach to social analysis rests on theoretical principles he originally adapted from the work of key thinkers of the 19 th and 20 th centuries. In particular, he argued that the principle of “methodological singularism”, a notion borrowed from Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, constitutes a necessary condition for the explanation of social scientific enigmas. This article seeks to highlight the role played by methodological singularism in the social sciences as expressed in Boudon’s rationalist paradigm. The first section retraces the origins of the principle in the work of Austrian school economists such as Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and Ludwig von Mises. The second section focuses on Boudon’s very own understanding of this principle and on the place it takes within his sociology. Overall, this article contributes to our understanding of epistemological and methodological history in the social sciences as well as to our understanding of social theory.
In the field of moral judgments, relativism denies the existence of any objectivity because it considers it, at best, from its positive angle. In contrast, this article aims to show that we can speak of objectivity in a practical sense. This results from a theory of justice that confers on unanimous agreement, conceived as a regulating ideal, the status of a priori foundation of this justice. Norms or values that do not contradict (logically and performatively) this foundation are therefore objectively just in a practical sense.
During the 2024 US presidential campaign, I wrote a series of 22 columns for the Tocqueville 21 website chronicling events and providing commentary. In this essay I reflect back both on the columns, and on the election itself. I note that I, like most commentators, by focusing on the “horse race” aspects of the election, failed to anticipate the radical nature of Trump’s second term in office, and offer an explanation for why and how this radical turn took place. I then discuss the larger question of how Trump rose to power. I take into account explanations grounded in structural economic and social factors, but also note that the 2024 election remained very close, and that very contingent factors―especially Joseph Biden’s refusal to drop out early, and the course of the criminal trials against Trump―could in fact have swung the result.
Raymond Boudon was fond of saying he experienced an intellectual shock in reading Tocqueville as he recognized in Tocqueville's method of thinking a forerunner of scientific sociology.
Only over a century after their first publication did American commentators read Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1835, 1840) and Astolphe de Custine's Russia in 1839 (1843) jointly and recognized in the two works complementary visionary explanations of the Cold War underway.
L'article interroge les rapports entre exp & eacute;rience et erreur de raisonnement & agrave; la lumi & egrave;re d'une des critiques que Raymond Boudon a adress & eacute;es & agrave; la th & eacute;orie des biais cognitifs d'Amos Tversky et Daniel Kahneman. Le sociologue fran & ccedil;ais, qui est le premier introducteur de ces auteurs dans les sciences sociales francophone, a fait une observation d & eacute;terminante concernant l'interpr & eacute;tation que l'on pouvait faire de ces r & eacute;sultats exp & eacute;rimentaux. Celle-ci s'accorde assez bien avec les th & eacute;ories les plus r & eacute;centes des croyances et de la constitution pr & eacute;coce de la cognition humaine. C'est cette intuition du sociologue fran & ccedil;ais que l'article propose d'explorer en m & ecirc;me temps que les raisons qui n'ont pas permis & agrave; Boudon de tirer tout le profit qu'il aurait pu des apports de la psychologie cognitive de l'erreur & agrave; son approche compr & eacute;hensive.
This article introduces the special section of the Fall 2025 issue of The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville, dedicated to a tribute to Raymond Boudon (1934–2013). In addition to presenting the five articles in this section, it briefly summarizes a reminder of his career and work. It highlights, in particular, that Raymond Boudon was a constant and attentive reader of Alexis de Tocqueville’s work, which he frequently commented on and used throughout his various researches.
