In the age of `Faster, Better, Cheaper', NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center has been looking for a way to implement university based world class science missions for significantly less money. The University Explorer (UNEX) program is the result. UNEX missions are designed for rapid turnaround with fixed budgets in the $10 million US dollar range. The CHIPS project was selected in 1998. The CHIPS mission has passed the Concept Study and Confirmation Reviews. Many lessons have already been learned from the CHIPS UNEX project. This paper will discuss the early issues surrounding the use of commercial satellite constellations as the bus and the politics of small satellites using foreign launchers. The difficulties of finding a spacecraft in the UNEX price range will be highlighted. The advantages of utilizing Internet technologies from the earliest phases of the project through to communications with the spacecraft on orbit will be discussed. The current state of the program, as of July 2001, will be summarized and the project's plans for the future will be charted.
The Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design (SMARD) study evaluated the potential costs and benefits of on-orbit satellite servicing for an existing flight architecture. This paper provides a detailed description of the costing evaluations and results, places the evaluations in context to other alternatives, and suggests future work in this subject area. The study categorized different levels of on-orbit servicing and identified the appropriate solutions for each level. Scheduled servicing as well as on-demand servicing options were evaluated. The costing evaluations were part of a larger study that examined all impacts associated with satellite servicing, including required enabling technology developments, modifications to current satellites, and impacts to existing launch systems infrastructure. Information on these other subject areas is included in the paper.
Traditional practices of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) in the acquisition of space systems have focused on advanced versions of proven technology, meaning large satellites. This paradigm contributes to dependence on a handful of satellites, program schedules measured in decades, and the expensive oversight and program management functions which must be applied to systems which, since there are so few assets, cannot countenance failures. The escape from this paradigm is offered by Microsatellites (Microsats). Microsats are not only useful technology, but technology which enables a different approach to acquisition. What the authors call the Microsat Acquisition Paradigm (MAP) is partly modeled on NASA's ‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’ approach and takes lessons from NASA's successes and failures. Now that some space functions can be undertaken by low-cost Microsats, the advantages of mass production, reduced government oversight, and acceptance of a reasonable failure rate can be applied to space system acquisition. This paper explores the three pillars of the MAP approach: requirements, technology, and acquisition, which together support the Holy Grail of space system affordability. Understanding the military's space requirements is the first pillar of this approach. The second pillar is the ability to correlate the requirements to the current and projected state of Microsat technology and explain what space functions can be accomplished with Microsats. Finally, historical examples, as well as recent studies. demonstrate that streamlined, cost-effective acquisition is a reality for Microsats, enabling savings in time and money compared to the acquisition system used for traditional space systems.
The Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) is the latest Space Robot developed by the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and McDonald Detwiller Space and Advanced Robotics (MD Robotics, previously Spar Aerospace) for the International Space Station (ISS). The SPDM has presented its designers with a number of new challenges in performing the Systems Engineering effort required for a complex robotic system:
Using economic incentives to control costs is a new concept for space missions. The basic tenets of market-based approaches run counter to typical centralized management techniques often utilized for complex space missions. NASA's Cassini mission to Saturn used a market trading system to assist the Science Instrument Manager in guiding the development of the spacecraft's science payload. This system allowed science instrument teams to trade resources among themselves to best manage their resources (mass, power, data rate, and budget). Thus, Cassini Project management was no longer responsible for adjudicating and reallocating resources that result from instrument development problems. Instrument teams were responsible for directly managing their resources and if they ran into a development problem it was their responsibility to resolve their problem by descoping or through the use of a 'resource exchange.' Under the trading system, instrument cost growth was less than 1% and the total payload mass was under its allocation by 7%. This result is in stark contrast to the 50%–100% increases in these resources on past missions.
In an environment of declining financial budgets for space projects, new approaches - such as Design-To-Cost - are being implemented to improve today's satellite design processes. Using an example of a current mission (the power subsystem of the Solar Probe spacecraft) under study at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the main part of the paper discusses an Integrated System Model (structured into a performance model, a cost model, and an effectiveness model) that is part of a model-based design process used to perform cost-effectiveness trades. A simulation tool is used during the first step to size the components of the power subsystem, and then simulate its performance during operation. The determined dimensions are transferred into an EXCEL TM -spreadsheet and linked to the components' costs. With a cost accounting tool that combines cost estimating relationships with the Work Breakdown Structure of the power subsystem, the life-cycle cost of each alternative design concept is computed. To determine the cost-risk of the different design alternatives for each component, cost probability distributions are introduced. By performing Monte-Carlo simulations, cost sensitivities are revealed. In the next step of the trade study process, the effectiveness of the alternatives is analyzed. Having determined cost and effectiveness, estimates can be made for where the different alternatives lie in the design space. The last part of the paper identifies the main drivers for the spacecraft's performance and cost. Finally it is shown how the mission design benefited from the Integrated System Model and from the application of Design-To-Cost.
Cost budget restrictions of space organisations and the appeals of science communities for faster development lead-times resulted in a new approach of developing satellites in the eighties. More companies and universities got involved in developing small and low cost satellites. This paper summarises a final thesis concerning cost engineering in small satellite development. The main issue is the description of a model consisting of activities required to meet objectives of cost engineering, such as generation of cost estimates, identification of high cost contributors and optimisation of the design. The development of a cost matrix is an important part of the model, in which a cost overview is generated based on a Product Tree and a Work Breakdown Structure. For the development of the model, a literature study was carried out. In addition, a world-wide survey was conducted amongst companies and universities participating in small satellite development to identify the importance of cost engineering objectives and to identify the used cost estimation methods and tools. The model was applied to a small satellite program at Delft University, called Delfi-1. With the available tools, some rough cost estimates were obtained together with the high cost contributors and its parameters (cost drivers).
Earth remote sensing (alongside communications) is one of the key application of Earth-orbiting satellites. Civilian satellites in the LANDSAT and SPOT series provide Earth images which have been used for a vast spectrum of applications in agriculture, meteorology, hydrology, urban planning and geology, to name but a few. In the defence sector, satellite remote sensing systems are a critical tool in strategic and tactical planning – for the countries which can afford them. To date, remote sensing satellites have fallen into one of these two categories: military missions driven by the requirement for very high resolution and orbital agility; and multipurpose civil satellites using general purpose sensors to serve a diverse community of end users. For military-style missions, the drive to high resolution sets the requirements for optics, attitude control and downlink data bandwidth. For civil missions, the requirement to satisfy multiple, diverse user applications forces compromises on spectral band and orbit selection. Although there are exceptions, many small satellite remote sensing missions carry on in this tradition, concentrating on ultra high resolution products for multiple user communities. This results in satellites costing on the order of US $100 M, not optimised for any particular application. This paper explores an alternative path to satellite remote sensing, aiming simultaneously to reduce cost and to optimise imaging products for specific applications. By decreasing the cost of the remote sensing satellite system to a critical point, it becomes appropriate to optimise the sensor's spectral and temporal characteristics to fit the requirements of a small, specialised user base. The critical engineering trade-off faced in a cost driven mission is how to reduce mission cost while still delivering a useful product to the selected user. At the Surrey Space Centre, we have pursued an engineering path using two dimensional CCD array sensors, commercial off-the-shelf lenses and gravity-gradient stabilised microsatellites. In spite of the inherent limitations of such systems, recent successes with the Thai Microsatellite Company's Thai-Phutt satellite show that a system costing in the region of US $3 million, can approach the spectral and spatial characteristics of LANDSAT. Surrey's UoSAT-12 minisatellite (to be launched April, 1999) will further develop this cost-driven approach to provide 10 m panchromatic resolution and 30 m multi-spectral resolution. This paper describes the Thai-Phutt and UoSAT-12 imaging systems, explaining the engineering methods and trade-offs. Although Surrey is presently the only centre presently pursuing such implementations, our paper shows that they deserve wider consideration.
Financial pressures are forcing organizations to minimize operations costs. Although the easiest way to achieve this goal is simply to reduce operational requirements, often this is not possible. Therefore, automation must be employed. This paper discusses the system trade-offs that must be performed to maximize the impact of automation efforts. The discussion begins with the development of generic automation guidelines. Since many automation issues are program-specific, the paper addresses the application of these principles to operation of the ORBCOMM satellite constellation. This example demonstrates how automation can be used to produce a highly efficient satellite operations system.
With a maximum time of 12 days out of ground contact and a round-trip light time as high as 56 minutes, The Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) spacecraft requires a moderate degree of onboard autonomy to react to faults and safe the spacecraft. Beyond the basic safing requirements, additional functions are carried out onboard. For example, on-board calculation of the Sun, Earth, asteroid, and spacecraft positions allow the spacecraft to autonomously orient itself for science and downlink operations. On-board autonomous momentum management during cruise relieves Mission Operations from planning, scheduling, and carrying out many manual momentum dumps. During development, additional operations, such as center-of-mass management during propulsive maneuvers and optical navigation were also considered for onboard autonomy on the NEAR spacecraft, but were not selected. The allocation of functions to onboard software or to ground operations involved tradeoffs such as development time for onboard software versus ground software, resource management, life cycle costs, and spacecraft safety. After two years of cruise operations, considerable experience with the NEAR autonomy system has accrued. The utility of some autonomous capabilities is greater than expected, others less so. Software uploads increased spacecraft autonomy in some cases, and the impact on Mission Operations can be assessed. Allocation of functions between spacecraft autonomy and ground operation during development of future missions can be improved by applying the lessons learned from the NEAR experience.
From computers to aeronautics, many industries have achieved great cost savings through the use of modular engineering approaches. In standardizing interfaces between elements and by reusing functional units, projects can achieve direct reductions in required development labor and secondary savings from enhanced reliability via improved process control from manufacturing identical units. Issues involved in the extension of modular design to the space industry are discussed. A cost model is developed to resolve some of the conflicting advantages and disadvantages between modular and customized designs. Key regimes are identified that represent the best opportunities for applying modular concepts.
The paper describes the basic definition and application of 'Cost Engineering' which means to design a vehicle system for minimum development cost and/or for minimum operations cost. This is important now and for the future since space transportation has become primarily a commercial business in contrast to the past where it has been mainly a subject of military power and national prestige. Several examples are presented for minimum-cost space launch vehicle configurations, such as increasing vehicle size and/or the use of less efficient rocket engines in order to reduce development and operations cost. Further a cost comparison is presented on single-stage (SSTO)-vehicles vs. two-stage launchers which shows that SSTOs have lower development and operations cost although they are larger, respectively have a higher lift-off mass than two-stage vehicles with the same performance. The design of a space tourism-dedicated launch vehicle is an extreme challenge for a cost-engineered vehicle design in order to achieve cost per seat not higher than $50,000. Finally an outlook is presented on the different options for manned Earth-to-Moon transportation modes and vehicles – another most important application of 'cost engineering', taking into account the large cost of such a future venture.
The paper summarizes research into cost-effective propulsion system options for small satellites. Research into the primary cost drivers for propulsion systems is discussed and a process for resolving them is advanced. From this analysis, a new paradigm for understanding the total cost of propulsion systems is defined that encompasses nine dimensions – mass, volume, time, power, system price, integration, logistics, safety and technical risk. This paradigm is used to characterize all near-term propulsion technology options. From this effort, hybrid rockets emerges as a promising but underdeveloped technology with great potential for cost-effective application. A dedicated research program was completed to characterize this potential. This research demonstrated that hybrid rockets offer a safe, reliable upper stage option that is a versatile, cost-effective alternative to solid rocket motors. Finally, an innovative technique was derived to parametrically combine the diverse cost dimensions into a useful, quantifiable figure of merit for mission and research planning. Overall, it is shown that the most cost-effective solution is found by weighing all options along the nine dimensions of the cost paradigm within the context of a specific mission.
Market-based systems are those systems in which currency is used to express demand for a limited resource. In these systems, users `own' currency and exchange it for a desired commodity. Though used for thousands of years, market-based applications to space missions are still in their infancy. The first successful application was in 1992 with the Cassini Mission to Saturn. In this case, the sum total of mass and dollars for the science instruments had to fit within the allocated resource envelope. Results from the use of a market-based system show that the entire science payload grew from original estimates by only +1% for cost, and by −7% for mass. The next application was for Space Shuttle Secondary Payloads. In this application, available shuttle lift mass, number of lockers for secondary payloads, and available astronaut time had to be allocated between 5 NASA Users. Experiments showed that a market-based system can reduce the size of the required workforce needed to produce a manifest of the same quality as one produced `by committee.' Finally, a market-based system was experimentally applied to LightSAR science planning, a proposed joint NASA/Commercial RADAR mission. In this application, users were able to produce a conflict-free timeline of events remotely, of high science value, in about half the time required by more traditional methods.
In comparing the costs of different launch vehicles, the possibility of the risk of failure is assumed to be accounted for by the cost of insurance. The satellite may be insured against loss during launch, and the launch services provider may offer a “free relaunch.” However, actual costs of reliability and failure extend beyond this. Each failure necessitates an investigation and a “get well” programme by the operating agency, while putting the operations team “on hold” until services can resume. A commercial operator may also lose customer revenue and actual customers through loss of confidence or unavailability. Such costs tend to be hidden, and not evaluated in assessing the effectiveness of a system, but count towards total costs. Failure investigations help to improve system reliability, but this could equally have been achieved by expenditure in development and qualification. Reusable launch vehicles will have different costs associated with reliability and failure. The relationship between reliability and cost, properly assessed, ought to influence the design of both expendable and reusable launch systems.
The high cost of launching payloads into Earth orbit is a main limiting factor on the development of space. In order to reduce the high cost of launch, reuse of (parts of) the launch vehicle is needed. This study analyses the possibilities of recovering and reusing the core stage of Ariane 5. Recovery of the core stage sets demands on re-entry trajectory, attitude, stability, thermal protection, structural strength, terminal deceleration, salt water protection, recovery and refurbishment. All these subject areas require solutions to their individual problems. Added subsystems to the stage are defined and their mass is determined. These masses are used to determine the financial feasibility of the recovery concept, by weighing the payload demise and operational cost against the gains of reduced production cost. It is concluded that the recovery is technologically feasible, using a detachable ablative heat shield on the nose of the stage and a stabilisation device (an inflatable drag cone), a parachute system and an engine enclosure device. Total mass of these systems is 1320 kg, with financial savings amounting to $8.5 million per flight.
Beacon monitoring is an architecture for augmenting on-board health assessment software with the following elements: a transmitter that periodically broadcasts this health assessment to the ground, a network of globally distributed low-cost monitoring stations that relays the health assessment to mission control, and an automated mission control system for notifying on-call operators and initiating appropriate response actions. While beacon monitoring is often cited as a means of lowering nominal monitoring costs for particular missions, these claims have typically been qualitative and undiscriminating in nature. This study introduces modeling and experimentation as means of providing a more fundamental validation of the cost-effectiveness of beacon monitoring. Results include simple quantitative estimates of first-order performance metrics, experimental data that verifies predicted performance and validates the use of beacon monitoring for a test mission, and a method for assessing the value of beacon monitoring for general satellites missions.
